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Abstract		
This thesis aims to explore how some of the findings from behavioural economics and the 
social capital literature can apply in the case of electricity access in developing countries with 
a focus on solar off-grid electrification. And specifically on solar home systems and solar 
hybrid mini-grid electrification in rural Guinea-Bissau.   
Specifically, I am drawing from studies looking at the role of discounting anomalies on 
technology adoption and recurring payments, the role of trust on technology adoption and the 
role of computational limitations and the use of simplification strategies on the accuracy of 
frequency and expenditure reporting in surveys.   
This exercise aims to inform electrification policy in developing countries, demonstrate 
instances where insights from behavioural economics and social capital can enrich our 
understanding of the underlying barriers and drivers of electrification access, but also 
demonstrate how some selected case studies can help to strengthen empirical findings from 
other contexts.  
Chapter 1 provides an introduction on the issues surrounding electrification access in 
developing countries and introduces the research motivation and the research objectives of this 
thesis. This chapter also discusses the relevant gaps in the literature, how this thesis attempts 
to address them and the contribution to knowledge. Finally, the research location is introduced.  
Chapter 2 presents the results of a stated preference study that uses a choice experiment 
to estimate willingness to pay for a solar home system, and the trade-off between different 
repayment schemes and maintenance responsibilities, in the region of Bafatá in Guinea-Bissau. 
Results suggest that preferences are driven both by income constraints as well as self-control 
problems, excessive discounting and self-reported trust for a number of actors.  
Chapter 3 explores the main determinants in the decision to connect to a solar hybrid 
mini-grid, in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau, with a focus on 
social capital as expressed in trust. Connections are driven largely by the socio-economic 
background of the households and prior energy use patterns. However, there is evidence that 
social capital as expressed in self-reported trust for one’s neighbours, also has a positive effect 
on connections through facilitating the informal expansion of the grid, whereby households use 
their neighbours’ infrastructure to connect to the service.  
Chapter 4 explores how the technology of prepaid meters can help researchers acquire 
more insight regarding the accuracy of survey responses and the response strategies used. More 
specifically, this chapter tests the accuracy of reported energy expenditure in surveys, when 
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using differently defined recall periods, namely a ‘usual’ week versus a ‘specific’ (i.e. last) 
week. We compare real expenditure data for prepaid meters for electricity, from a solar hybrid 
mini-grid operating in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau, with 
answers from a survey where respondents are asked to state their expenditures, randomly, in 
different recall periods. Overall, our results show that respondents tend to over-report the level 
and frequency of their energy expenditures, but reporting is more accurate when the ‘specific’ 
period rather than when the ‘usual’ period is used. 
Chapter 5 investigates the role of self-control problems on prepayment patterns for 
electricity provided by a solar hybrid mini-grid installed in the semi-urban community of 
Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau. Prepayment patterns are found to be mostly driven by income 
constraints and equipment in use however there is evidence that individuals with self-control 
problems as well as individuals being charged with an additional time-varying tariff (a higher 
tariff between 7pm to 12am) resort to smaller refill levels possibly as a strategy to consume 
less electricity at home.  
 Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks.  
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Chapter	1	
Introduction 
1. Introduction	
 
Achieving universal access to modern energy, which entails efficient lighting, heating, 
cooking, mechanical power, transport and telecommunication services is a pressing challenge 
both for development and environmental policy. Universal electrification is central to 
achieving energy access however, currently over 1.2 billion people are without access to 
electricity (World Energy Outlook energy access database)1 and they resort to inefficient 
alternatives (e.g. kerosene lamps, candles, batteries, generators) that are of lower quality and 
often costlier (Grimm, Munyehirwe, Peters, & Sievert, 2016). This problem is more 
pronounced within the rural areas of developing countries and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa 
where 632 million people live without electricity and the rural electrification rate reaches a 
meagre 19% (World Energy Outlook energy access database). This situation impedes 
development and poses various health and safety threats. 
Access to electricity is a necessary condition for development as it has a positive impact 
on several of its determinants namely economic growth, environmental quality, health, 
education and security.  
A reliable source of power can affect economic growth directly as the operation of 
electrical appliances increases productivity, and better lighting allows for extended working 
hours, and indirectly through human capital development (e.g. health and education). 
Educational opportunities are enhanced with more efficient lighting at schools and extended 
time available to study at home.  Health is positively affected as electricity improves the quality 
of the health services available, through lighting and refrigeration at hospitals, and reduces the 
dependence on substitutes that are responsible for indoor air pollution (e.g. kerosene lamps). 
Access to electricity also lessens the reliance on disposable batteries, kerosene lamps and 
generators which are often responsible for local pollution. Finally, the availability of street 
                                                
1 There is no universal definition of what constitutes access to electricity. The international energy agency defines 
the minimum level to be primarily 250 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per year for households in rural areas and 500 kWh 
per year for households in urban areas (5 people per household are assumed). This corresponds to the use of a fan, 
a mobile phone, and two compact fluorescent light bulbs for five hours per day in rural areas and an additional 
mobile phone, a fridge, and a small television for urban areas. However, for the electricity access database, a 
binary distinction of electricity access is used due to data limitations (World Energy Outlook defining and 
modelling energy access).  
	 11	
lighting at night can increase security. (See Bonan, Pareglio, & Tavoni, 2017 for a discussion 
on findings and challenges of impact evaluations)  
The importance of access to electricity for development has also been recognized both 
by national governments and the international community. A number of international 
organizations and initiatives have emerged (e.g. Sustainable Energy for All initiative, Lighting 
Africa initiative) with recent breakthroughs including the addition of energy access in the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 and the acknowledgement of the importance of energy 
access in the Paris Agreement.  
Despite these efforts, the situation is expected to improve only modestly by 2030 
(WEO, 2016). The main challenges often cited is lack of investments. As stated by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) the additional investment required to achieve universal 
access to electricity is estimated to be around $640 billion between 2010 and 2030 (WEO, 
2011). 
However, the challenge is not only to increase the levels of investment, but also to 
design electrification initiatives and programs in ways that address potential barriers both from 
the supply and the demand side, and better meet the needs and preferences of the households 
currently lacking access.  
Policy makers, predominantly focus on extending the grid and on increasing 
connections to the main grid and the majority of the funding goes to large scale infrastructural 
projects (WEO, 2011). Nevertheless, grid expansion is not always feasible, especially when it 
comes to reaching isolated rural areas in developing countries. In these instances, small-scale 
off-grid technologies have been proven to be more cost effective and easier to implement. 
These technologies can be installed at the community level (mini-grids) or at the household 
level (isolated off-grid solutions). In contrast to centralized grids, these small-scale off-grid 
solutions rely heavily on renewable energy (solar home systems, solar lanterns, wind turbines, 
biogas installations, pico/micro hydro power, biofuel powered generators, solar mini-grids) and 
these, therefore, have the possibility to address both social and environmental considerations. 
In addition, such applications can help boost the clean technology industry creating positive 
spill-overs for both developing and developed countries.  
According to the International Energy Agency, as the major part of people lacking 
electricity access are located within rural areas to gain access to universal energy, most of the 
additional investment must be channelled into mini-grid and isolated off-grid projects, which 
will predominantly be based on renewable energy (WEO, 2011).  
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There are also a number of barriers to electrification from the demand side. Despite 
high demand for electrification in developing countries, and despite the fact that electricity 
substitutes often constitute a higher burden on the budgets of non-electrified households 
(Bernard, 2010), even households that are close to the grid often fail to make connections that 
require high upfront payments (Lee, Miguel, & Wolfram, 2016). In addition, connected 
households often fail to meet recurring payments for electrification (Jack & Smith, 2015) and 
to purchase the appliances they need or to undertake proper efficiency investments (Bernard, 
2010; Jordan, Corry, & Jaques, 2017).  
A number of policy solutions have been suggested to address these demand barriers. 
For example, credit and rental schemes have been put in place in order to reduce the barriers 
of high one-off costs associated with electricity connections and the purchase of appliances. 
These are common in the market of solar home systems. In addition, prepaid meters are 
increasingly being used as a billing alternative for electricity that will help reduce instances of 
non-payment and allow consumers to have more control over their expenditures. However, the 
literature looking at the effect of these policies is still scant.  
Addressing demand barriers properly requires, first and foremost, an understanding of 
their underlying determinants and how these interact with different policy solutions and the 
different technologies available.   
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2.1 Research	motivation	
 
Technology adoption studies have cited potential barriers to adoption decisions for a number 
of products (e.g. fertilizers, water filters) in developing countries as well as for energy 
efficiency investments in developed countries drawing from both standard and non-standard 
models of individual choice. 
Rational choice theory within neoclassical economics is based on assumptions of pure 
self-interest and unbounded rationality. However, a number of systematic deviations from the 
predictions of this standard economic approach have been observed empirically. These 
deviations demonstrate the systematic presence of irrationalities and the influence of the social 
context in decision making.  This has led to the need for alternative paradigms in order to 
capture more accurately the process of human decision making.  
 Behavioural economics is a strand of economics that incorporates insights from 
psychology to systematize and synthesize departures from the standard economic model of 
decision making.  
The underlying explanations behind these departures are known as behavioural biases, 
anomalies or principles. These departures can be classified in three clusters: bounded 
rationality, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest2 (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000).  
Bounded rationality refers to the inability of the human brain due to reference 
dependent preferences, loss aversion, limited attention, limited computational capacity or 
biased reasoning to process information correctly in order to make optimal choices between 
alternatives. Bounded willpower refers to the inability of humans to actually make the right 
choice even if they know what it is. This is due to the presence of time inconsistent preferences. 
Finally, bounded self-interest refers to individual preferences being affected by considerations 
of the well-being of others or other social context (altruism, fairness, social norms, and 
interpersonal preferences).  
A number of detailed reviews on behavioural economics and their application are 
available (DellaVigna, 2009; Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000; Rabin, 1998). In the following 
sections I discuss the behavioural biases that are relevant to this thesis in more detail.  
The social capital literature has also looked at the importance of the social context in 
decision making. Durlauf & Fafchamps, 2005 discuss the importance of social capital in 
                                                
2 Other classifications have also emerged e.g. imperfect optimization, bounded self-control and non-standard 
preferences (Congdon, Kling, & Mullainathan, 2011). Non-standard beliefs, non-standard decision making, non-
standard preferences (DellaVigna, 2009). 	
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dealing with inefficiencies caused from externalities, free riding, imperfect information and 
imperfect enforcement. This is achieved as social capital can address problems of coordination, 
change the motives of individuals and create opportunities for the flow of information.   
There are multiple definitions of social capital and ways that it has been measured in 
the literature (size and type of networks, membership in associations, norms, trust) (Knack & 
Keefer, 1997).  
Trust is one of the indicators that have been used from scholars to measure social 
capital. Some scholars see trust as a component of social capital. For example, in Putnam’s 
seminal work social capital is defined as “features of social organization, such as networks, 
norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” ((Putnam 
1995: 67 in (Krishna & Shrader, 2000)). Others regard trust more as an outcome of social 
capital (e.g. Woolcock, 1998). However, Woolcock, 1998 maintains that as such trust can still 
be used as an indicator to measure social capital. Regardless of the position one takes trust only 
captures an aspect of social capital. 
Finally, not all scholars agree that trust is a good proxy for social capital. For example, 
Dasgupta, 2005 is a proponent of a more neutral definition of social capital and therefore 
proposes for social capital to be measured only by networks. The argument behind this is that 
social capital is not always able to “enhance human well-being” and it can also have detrimental 
effects (Dasgupta, 2005).  
Despite the lack of consensus in the literature, trust has been used in a number of studies 
looking at the effects of social capital on a broad range of economic phenomena. 
Self-reported general trust has been found to have a positive effect on economic growth 
(Knack & Keefer, 1997), on reduction in firearm violent crime (Kennedy, Kawachi, Prothrow-
Stith, Lochner, & Gupta, 1998; Lederman, Loayza, & Menendez, 2002), on confidence in 
institutions (Brehm & Rahn, 1997), on the performance of large organizations and on the 
performance of the society more generally (health, education, infrastructure, GDP growth, 
inflation) (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silane, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). In a developing country 
setting self-reported trust has been found to predict participation in rotating labour associations 
(Wang, 2009), repayment and saving levels of participants in a microcredit programme 
(Karlan, 2005) and energy adoption (Adrianzén, 2014; McEachern & Hanson, 2008).  
Findings from behavioural economics and the social capital literature have been used 
to inform various strands of public policy to explain preferences, beliefs and choices and to 
offer policy fixes which increase welfare. This includes energy and development policy. 
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In a number of studies looking at technology adoption in developing countries, and 
energy efficiency investment decisions in developed countries, both market and behavioural 
failures as well as peer effects have been used to explain a number of phenomena. Namely the 
inability of individuals to make the adoption decision, to meet the required repayments and the 
non-optimal use of the technology after it has been acquired. Market failures refer to issues 
like liquidity constraints, credit constraints and information gaps. And behavioural failures to 
issues like time inconsistent preferences, computational difficulties and reference points.  A 
range of policy recommendations have been suggested to address these underlying barriers e.g. 
price structures, subsidies, credit, social marketing, information campaigns, progressive tariffs, 
innovative financing solutions like mobile payments, microcredit and prepaid meters. (See 
(Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010; Gillingham & Palmer, 2013) for relevant reviews). 
Although similar considerations have been suggested to apply in the case of 
electrification in developing countries (Bernard, 2010; Bonan et al., 2017) the issue, remains 
largely unexplored (Bonan et al., 2017). This thesis aims to address this gap by looking at how 
some of the demand-side barriers of electricity access can be informed by some findings of the 
behavioural economics and social capital literature. The focus of this thesis is on the adoption 
decision and on the payment patterns for electricity, in the case of solar hybrid mini-grids and 
isolated off-grid solar home systems. 
Electrification access choices have some similarities with other technology adoption 
decisions, namely the high upfront costs often required, and the relevance of the social context 
including amongst others the role of peer effects on the decision to adopt a technology (positive 
and negative externalities as well as information and imitation effects).  (Bonan et al., 2017) 
Electrification access has however, its own unique characteristics in terms of the 
benefits of electrification, the costs structures, the type of externalities generated especially 
when the grid extension is involved (Bonan et al., 2017), as well as cognitive difficulties 
associated with the idiosyncrasies of energy consumption namely the difficulty to understand 
the billing methods and to calculate the consumption of energy consuming appliances 
(Bernard, 2010).  
In addition, mini-grid and isolated off-grid solutions also differ compared to 
conventional centralized energy systems. As these off-grid systems rely on renewable sources 
of power they often provide more limited services to users and entail different requirements on 
the consumer side (e.g. maintenance responsibilities, demand-side management to enhance 
performance of the systems). In addition, as they are installed at the household or community 
level they are embedded in different social contexts compared to centralized grids 
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(Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Nieuwenhout et al., 2000; Roland & Glania, 2011; Urmee, Harries, 
& Schlapfer, 2009).  
Finally, the context of electricity consumption in developed countries has analogies 
with that in developing countries as individuals have to make similar choices regarding the 
purchase of electrical appliances and face similar difficulties to understand the billing methods 
and to manage their consumption. However, the two settings also differ in terms of the 
electrification rates, the availability of infrastructure, the quality of the service available and 
the socio-economic background of the users.  
This exercise is therefore important to inform electrification access policy, but also to 
strengthen empirical findings from these other contexts. 
 
 
2.2	Research	objectives	
 
This thesis aims to explore how some of the findings from the literature of behavioural 
economics and social capital can apply in the case of electricity access in developing countries 
with a focus on solar off-grid electrification. And specifically on solar home systems and solar 
hybrid mini-grid electrification projects in rural Guinea-Bissau.   
Namely, I am drawing from studies looking at the role of discounting on technology 
adoption and recurring payments, the role of trust on technology adoption and the role of 
computational limitations and the use of simplification strategies on the accuracy of frequency 
and expenditure reporting in surveys.   
Specifically, this thesis has the following research objectives: 
1) Chapter 2 looks at the role of income limitations as well as of discount rates, 
hyperbolic discounting, that captures self-control problems, and self-reported levels 
of trust for different actors, on the demand for a solar home system and how these 
factors shape preferences for different different delivery models.  
2) Chapter 3 examines the factors affecting the decision to connect to a community 
solar hybrid mini-grid with a focus on the role of trust for neighbours on the 
informal expansion of the grid infrastructure.  
3) Chapter 4 tests if the use of different elicitation frames in surveys affects the 
accuracy of reported energy expenditures on surveys for clients of a solar hybrid 
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mini-grid using prepaid meters. The effect of the use of simplification strategies on 
response accuracy is also explored.  
4) Chapter 5 looks at the how self-control problems and intra-household dynamics 
affect prepayment patterns for electricity for clients of a community solar hybrid 
mini-grid.  
This exercise aims to inform electrification policy in developing countries, demonstrate 
instances where insights from behavioural economics and social capital can enrich our 
understanding of electrification policy in developing countries, but also demonstrate how these 
chosen case studies can help to strengthen empirical findings from other contexts.  
This thesis is not an exhaustive account of how behavioural economics and the findings 
from the literature on social capital can inform access to electricity. It however delivers a novel 
contribution to knowledge by introducing a number of new applications that encompass the 
two main stages of electricity access: adoption decisions and usage decisions. Despite some 
piecemeal research into this field, to my knowledge, there does not appear to be an effort to 
create a more systematized study encompassing these different stages of the electrification 
process.  
The following section discusses the relevant applications and the gaps in the literature. 
The thesis structure section that follows after, discusses how this thesis attempts to address 
these gaps and what is the contribution to knowledge.  
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3. Relevant	gaps	in	the	literature	
 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the adoption rates for welfare enhancing products that 
require high one-off investments that pay off over time are lower than expectations based on 
the rational model. This has been observed in developed countries in the case of energy 
efficiency investments (e.g. better insulation, fuel efficient vehicles, efficient appliances and 
lighting) also known as the “efficiency gap” or the “energy adoption” paradox (Jaffe & Stavins, 
1994), but also in developing countries in the adoption of a number of products (fertilizers, 
health products) (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010). 
One explanation is that individuals have higher discount rates than assumed. Simply 
put individuals discount the future higher than theory expects, and therefore place a higher 
weight than expected on current compared to future costs and benefits. In many instances the 
observed purchases in the case of energy consuming durables have been used to calculate 
implicit discount rates which were found to be higher than market rates of return (Hausman, 
1979; Train, 1985; Allcott & Taubinsky, 2013). This is done by looking at trade-offs between 
upfront purchase costs and the level of energy savings.  
It is widely believed however, that a number of other factors, linked to market failures 
behavioural biases, or the social context could be driving this observed paradox.   
A number of explanations from the standard economic model are the lack of 
information about benefits of available technology, hidden costs involved in the use of a new 
technology, energy price uncertainty (Jaffe & Stavins, 1994), principle agent problems (split 
incentives), which arise when  the individual that makes the purchase decision is not the same 
as the individual that will pay the bills (Davis, 2011), low levels of consumption that render 
efficiency investments irrelevant (Morss, 1989), and the fact that other product features might 
be more important (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2004). Finally, income, liquidity and credit 
constraints can hinder the ability of individuals to meet the high upfront payments required 
(Golove & Eto, 1996). Liquidity and credit constraints have also been identified as main 
barriers of adoption of technology in developing countries.  For example, Tarozzi et al., 2014 
find that liquidity constraints inhibit the adoption of bed nets in India.  
The explanations drawing from non-standard models of decision making range from 
the presence of time inconsistent preferences (hyperbolic discounting) that lead to self-control 
problems to the fact that such intertemporal choices are sensitive to other behavioural biases 
linked to bounded rationality as well as to the social context (Frederick, Loewenstein, & 
O'donoghue, 2002).  
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Hyperbolic discounting, bounded rationality and the social context are also relevant to 
explain other factors pertinent to technology adoption. 
For example, hyperbolic discounting and the social context offer insights about the 
relative strengths of different billing methods. Findings from bounded rationality can inform 
the ways by which consumers calculate and report their energy expenditures more accurately. 
Finally, the role of the social context can be relevant to explain patterns of technology adoption 
also in instances where intertemporal trade-offs are not present.  
All these applications are pertinent to electrification access in developing countries. 
The following section discusses relevant applications of hyperbolic discounting, bounded 
rationality and the role of the social context in more detail as well as the relevant gaps in the 
literature.  
 
 
 
3.1	Hyperbolic	discounting	
 
Hyperbolic discounting is linked to bounded willpower. Hyperbolic discounting is the 
phenomenon whereby discount rates drop with higher time intervals, or are higher for trade-
offs in the present than in the future. This has been confirmed in a number of experimental 
studies and captured in economic models (Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2006; Camerer & 
Loewenstein, 2004; Laibson, 1997; Thaler, 1981).  
More specifically hyperbolic discounting can be identified by comparing the fit of 
functional forms expressing declining discounting to those expressing constant discounting 
(Kirby, 1997; Myerson & Green, 1995). In addition, hyperbolic discounting can be identified 
experimentally where individuals are asked to make trade-offs between current and future gains 
or losses (usually monetary). In this case hyperbolic discounting is identified when individuals 
exhibit lower discount rates over longer time horizons than over short time horizons (e.g. 
Thaler, 1981) or when individuals have higher discount rates for more proximate trade-offs 
compared to trade-offs further in the future (e.g. Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2006).  
Hyperbolic discounting causes self-control problems or else procrastination. This is a 
situation whereby individuals keep putting-off actions which incur current costs even though 
these actions would make them better off from a welfare perspective in the future (Camerer & 
Loewenstein, 2004; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981).  
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The extent of this procrastination has been found to be affected by the awareness of 
problems of self-control (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). More sophisticated individuals tend to 
have higher demand for commitment mechanisms that will help them address their self-control 
problems (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Ashraf et al., 2006).  
For example, hyperbolic discounting has been shown to negatively affect an 
individual’s ability to save (Ashraf et al., 2006; Bauer, Chytilová, & Morduch, 2012). 
Individuals with self-control problems have been found to have a higher demand for 
commitment devices such as saving (Ashraf et al., 2006) and credit schemes (Bauer et al., 2012; 
Dupas & Robinson, 2013). And access to such commitment devices has been found to increase 
the saving levels of these individuals (Dupas & Robinson, 2013). 
Applications in developing countries have looked into the mechanisms of how self-
control problems are hindering technology adoption, but also how different commitment 
mechanisms can help address these problems. 
 Through a randomized control trial Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011 find that self-
control problems explain the low investments in fertilizers in Kenya, and that randomly 
allocated small discounts at the time of harvest allow farmers with hyperbolic preferences to 
commit to fertilizer use. Dupas & Robinson, 2013 find that hyperbolic discounting inhibits the 
ability of individuals to invest in health products in Kenya through affecting negatively their 
ability to save. They also find that access to a commitment device (credit with social 
commitment to make repayments) increases such investments (Dupas & Robinson, 2013).  
Tarozzi, Mahajan, Yoong, & Blackburn, 2009 find that self-control problems limit the 
ability of households to treat their bed nets in India, but find no demand for commitment 
devices (a contract that includes two retreatments of the purchased bed net) for individuals with 
self-control problems (Tarozzi, Mahajan, Yoong, & Blackburn, 2009). 
Applications on energy purchase decisions are very limited. Hyperbolic discounting 
might induce individuals to put-off welfare enhancing purchases related to energy efficiency 
(Gillingham & Palmer, 2013; Heutel, 2015). These effects can also be indirect through 
affecting one’s inability to save to meet the upfront payments required. Bradford, 
Courtemanche, Heutel, McAlvanah, & Ruhm, 2014 undertake the only study, to my 
knowledge, that tests this assumption on self-reported energy efficiency actions in a developed 
country context and find a positive correlation between hyperbolic discounting and the low use 
of a number of energy-efficient products (high fuel economy vehicles, home insulation), but 
not for other (efficient lighting).   However, it is not clear if these effects are direct or indirect.  
	 21	
So far studies have not looked at how these issues may apply in the case of 
electrification decisions in developing countries in general and demand for solar home systems 
in particular, despite the fact that often these decisions include large upfront costs that only pay 
off, over time. In addition, despite substantial work done on the role of different commitment 
mechanism to limit the negative effect of hyperbolic preferences, the interaction of self-control 
problems with a preference for credit and rental schemes, in the context of solar home system 
demand, hasn’t been tested. Such an exercise would help explain more in detail the relevant 
strengths of these different delivery models for solar home systems. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis undertakes a stated preference study using a hypothetical choice 
experiment to estimate demand for different delivery models of a solar home system including 
upfront, credit and rental schemes in Guinea-Bissau. This chapter addresses this gap as it 
investigates, amongst other things, the role of hyperbolic preferences on delivery model 
preference.  
Apart from affecting an individual’s ability to meet the high upfront costs often required 
for technology adoption self-control problems can also have direct negative implications on 
the consumers’ ability to meet recurring expenditures required by billing systems. Through 
their negative effect on saving self-control problems might hinder the ability of consumers to 
meet their monthly electricity payments. In addition, individuals with self-control problems 
could have a harder time saving electricity at home (Brutscher, 2011).  More flexible payment 
methods (e.g. the use of prepaid meters, where consumers pay for the electricity they consume 
in advance and they are allowed to choose the size and timing of the payment and to consume 
accordingly) allow to address income and liquidity constraints but also self-control problems, 
as individuals can use smaller refill levels as commitment mechanism to use less electricity at 
home (Brutscher, 2011). However, since self-control problems affect individuals’ ability to 
save and smooth their income this might lead to a reduction of electricity use during the months 
of lower revenues (this is especially relevant in developing countries when income is highly 
seasonal) and increase the occurrence of self-disconnection (Brutscher, 2012a, 2012b). Very 
little empirical research exists in this domain. 
 The only exception is Brutscher, 2012b that studies the drivers of self-disconnection 
for costumers using prepayment for electricity in the case of Great Britain. However, this study 
only looks at the effect of self-control problems (elicited through time preference measures) on 
the seasonality of self-disconnection, which is found to be positive. In another study looking 
at prepayment patterns for costumers using prepayment for electricity in Northern Ireland 
Brutscher, 2011 does not attempt to elicit hyperbolic preferences in order to test how they 
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might be affecting prepayment patterns. In addition, no work has been done to test the effects 
of hyperbolic preferences on prepayment patterns in a developing country setting.  
Chapter 5 of this thesis addresses this gap as, amongst other issues, it looks at the role 
of self-control problems in driving prepayment patterns for electricity in a developing country 
setting. This chapter combines actual information on the prepayment of clients of a solar hybrid 
mini-grid operating in Guinea-Bissau, and time preference measures elicited through a survey.  
 
 
 
3.2 Bounded	rationality	
 
Congdon et al., 2011 classify all biases that lead to bounded rationality (outside the ones 
emanating from prospect theory discussed below) in three broad categories: limited attention, 
limited computational capacity, and biased reasoning. These “have broadly similar 
consequences ... leading individuals to make decisions based on heuristics and biases ... 
shortcuts or crude rules of thumb that can be incorrect”.  
The human brain does not have the capacity to factor in all aspects of a choice, this 
phenomenon is known as limited attention, and it leads to salience effects whereby decisions 
are influenced by those features of the choice made noticeable (Kahneman, 1973; Pashler, 
Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001). Computational limitations on the other hand refer to incorrect 
processing of the relevant alternatives even if all aspects of a choice are taken into 
consideration. This includes common practices of individuals like inability to make choices 
when there are too many alternatives (choice overload) (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Tversky & 
Shafir, 1992), inability to process complex prices schedules properly (average vs marginal 
prices) (Liebman, 2004), the projection of one’s current situation and preferences into the 
future (projection bias) (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999) and grouping expenditures in different 
budget categories and assigning them to accounts with a different propensity to consume 
(mental accounting) (Thaler, 1999).  
Finally, there are a few systematic biases emanating from “the way that the human brain 
processes probabilities”. In their seminal work Tversky & Kahneman, 1975 find that in order 
to evaluate probabilities individuals rely on heuristic principles used to simplify complex tasks, 
which can be useful but can also lead to systematic errors. More specifically individuals assess 
probabilities of occurrence of events according to how representative they are 
(representativeness heuristic), they use instances that come in mind to assess frequencies 
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(availability heuristic) and anchor their assessments based on information available or 
incomplete computation (adjustment and anchoring) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). The model 
since then has been extended to apply on other decision environments and not just decision 
making under uncertainty (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).  
Bounded rationality explains partly the efficiency gap as consumers tend to make 
computational errors that place more weight on upfront purchase costs in comparison to 
recurring expenditures.  
Evidence suggests that consumers behave consistently with bounded rationality when 
it comes to making decision about energy in developed countries. In an experiment Allcott & 
Taubinsky, 2013 demonstrate that individuals pay less attention on recurring costs when they 
purchase lamps online as information provision on costs increases demand for efficient light 
bulbs (but not at the store) (Allcott & Taubinsky, 2013) and survey evidence shows that 
consumers pay less attention on fuel costs when they purchase cars (Allcott, 2011). Similarly, 
through survey evidence it is demonstrated that consumers also fail to understand the 
curvilinear relationship between miles per gallon (MPG) and fuel efficiency, and therefore 
undervalue the benefits from removing highly inefficient cars (Allcott, 2013; Larrick & Soll, 
2008).  
When consumers assess their car fuel expenditures they make these calculations based 
on current prices as revealed by semi-structured interviews (Turrentine & Kurani, 2007) and 
quantitative survey research (Allcott, 2011; Anderson, Kellogg, & Sallee, 2013). The same 
holds in the case of residential energy, as shown by a study based on semi-structured interviews 
(Kempton & Montgomery, 1982). Similarly, Ito, 2014 uses observational data to show that 
consumers respond to average rather than marginal electricity prices. 
Reference dependent preferences  and loss aversion are main features of the prospect 
theory created to address limitations of expected utility theory for decision making under risk, 
but it is also extended for riskless decision (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991). In the presence of reference dependent preferences utility is not purely 
based on final wealth states, but it is dependent on a reference which could be the status quo, 
expectations and social comparisons. Loss aversion refers to the situation whereby individuals 
value losses more than equivalent gains. Some implications of loss aversion are the endowment 
effect, which is the observation that individuals value more things that they already possess 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990; Thaler, 1980), and status quo bias that maintains that 
individuals prefer to stick to the status quo (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Two main 
implications of these findings for policy are the role of defaults and framing. Individuals tend 
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to choose the default options and react more strongly to options framed in terms of losses than 
to options framed in terms of gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Madrian & Shea, 2001).   
Reference dependence and loss aversion are expected to have direct implications on 
decisions to invest on energy efficiency as they affect the way consumers perceive upfront in 
relation to recurring costs. In addition, these findings present room for policy interventions 
through the role of framing and the use of defaults. However, empirical research so far is scant 
(Gerarden, Newell, & Stavins, 2015; Greene, Evans, & Hiestand, 2013). One exception is the 
study undertaken by Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011, which presents experimental 
evidence that replacing incandescent light bulbs with CFLs as the default significantly 
increased the proportion of subjects who chose CFLs.  
The above findings have established the role of bounded rationality in the efficiency 
gap. One of the main challenges is isolating the effect of bounded rationality from competing 
explanations, which remains empirically difficult especially in observational studies (see 
Geraden, Newell & Stavins, 2015; Gillingham, Palmer, 2013). In addition, to my knowledge, 
no work has been done to see how bounded rationality issues affect the way by which 
individuals process information regarding energy expenditures in developing countries and the 
subsequent negative effects this might have on electrification and energy access in general.  
Applications from bounded rationality do not only have the potential to inform the 
energy efficiency gap (and technology adoption paradox in general), but also survey 
methodology. Heuristic decision making has been found to be present when individuals report 
frequency of behaviour and expenditure in surveys. For example, by combining survey 
reporting with direct response strategy elicitation (where respondents are asked to explain the 
way they form their responses), research has shown that respondents often use simplification 
strategies to report the frequency of certain behaviour. These simplification strategies can be 
based on information available in memory, but also on contextual information (i.e. the survey 
instrument) (Menon, 1993; Menon, Raghubir, & Schwarz, 1995). There is still however, no 
consensus on whether the use of these simplification strategies lead to more or less accurate 
reporting (Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). 
No such application has been undertaken for energy expenditure reporting in 
developing countries.  Such an exercise is warranted to shed light on the level of accuracy and 
the potential biases of energy expenditure surveys and how they can be made more accurate. 
This is important in order to be able to collect more accurate data in energy expenditure surveys 
that are often used to inform policies especially in developing countries.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses this gap as it compares real energy expenditure data 
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on prepayment, from a solar hybrid mini-grid operating in the semi-urban community of 
Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau, with survey elicited energy expenditure data to test the 
accuracy of survey responses on energy expenditure and how this accuracy can be improved 
with the use of different recall periods, namely a ‘usual’ week versus a ‘specific’ (i.e. last) 
week. This chapter also assesses the the accuracy of the different response strategies used.  
 
 
 
3.3 	The	role	of	social	capital	and	trust	on	technology	adoption	
 
Despite the limitations mentioned, this thesis uses trust as a partial measure of social capital. 
There are a number of mechanism through which trust as a measure of social capital could be 
influencing technology adoption decisions.  
As Narayan & Pritchett, 1999 discuss, on the one hand social capital can enable the 
diffusion process. At the same time social capital may increase cooperation, reduce transaction 
costs and enhance enforcement which can increase collective action. Finally, social capital 
could lead to increased “risk sharing among individuals and act as an informal safety net” 
(Narayan & Pritchett, 1999).  
In the case of the diffusion process Manski, 2000 identifies three channels through 
which social interactions affect economic decisions that have been proven to be relevant for 
technology adoption. The first channel is through constraint interactions, where an individual’s 
economic decision entails externalities (positive or negative) and therefore affects the 
economic decisions of others. In the case of technology adoption these constraint interactions 
can take the form of cost reductions for late adopters or the indirect use of the benefits of the 
technology from non-adopters. The second channel is through expectation interactions, where 
an individual’s economic decision affects the knowledge of others. In the case of technology 
adoption this takes the form of social learning about new technologies. And finally, the third 
channel is through preference interactions where one’s economic decision affects the 
preferences of other individuals. In the case of technology adoption this is expressed as 
imitation effects (Bernard & Torero, 2015; Manski, 2000). 
“Depending on their size, social interaction effects may contribute to high or low 
adoption equilibrium of particular commodities, technologies, or behaviour” (Bernard & 
Torero, 2015). These social interaction effects can inform the efficiency gap, but also 
technology adoption decisions in general.  
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Although a number of applications in developing countries have looked at the role of 
peer effects on technology adoption the focus has mostly been placed on expectation 
interactions and preference interactions. These applications are mainly on agriculture 
(Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Conley & Udry, 2010; Isham, 2002), but there are also studies on 
health (Kremer & Miguel, 2007), water (Devoto, Duflo, Dupas, Parienté, & Pons, 2012), 
electrification (Barron & Torero, 2015; Bernard & Torero, 2015) and cookstove adoption 
(Adrianzén, 2014).  These studies use different methods to isolate the role of peer effects some 
measure the types and sizes of relevant networks of individuals (e.g. Bandiera & Rasul, 2006), 
others use self-reported trust measures (Adrianzén, 2014)  and others vary the level of adopters 
exogenously (e.g. (Barron & Torero, 2015; Bernard & Torero, 2015 through the random 
provision of subsidies)).  
Most studies attribute the presence of peer effects to learning or imitation effects, by 
rejecting other potential channels through observations, the use of secondary data and result 
interpretation (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Bernard & Torero, 2015). Constraint interactions have 
been studied less, but are however very relevant for electrification especially for technologies 
involving grid infrastructure.  
The ability of social capital to enhance collective action has been an argument in favour 
of community driven development. Empirical evidence has however, highlighted that when 
such projects are implemented potential divisions within the community could lead to elite 
capture and have negative effects for marginalized groups (Mansuri & Rao, 2004). There hasn’t 
been a study looking at how potential divisions within a community can negatively affect 
electrification projects undertaken at the community level.  
Mini-grids present a good case study to address these gaps as they operate at the 
community level and involve a range of dynamics relevant to the community driven literature 
and the study of peer effects.   
Chapter 3 looks at how trust amongst neighbours can increase connections, to a solar 
hybrid mini-grid installed in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau, 
through enabling the informal expansion of the grid, which is a type of constraint interactions.  
This study also looks at the potential of divisions within the community to negatively affect 
connections. 
Finally, the ability of social capital to increase “risk sharing among individuals and act 
as an informal safety net” (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999) has been linked with both positive and 
negative outcomes that can be associated with technology adoption. For example, Karlan, 2005 
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finds that self-reported trust can predict loan repayments. However, at times some intra-
household dynamics could have negative effects. 
For example, Dupas & Robinson, 2013 suggest that social pressures to share money 
can be a strong factor limiting one’s inability to save to make health investments. Earmarked 
saving devices are shown to deal with social pressures to share money (Dupas & Robinson, 
2013). Brutcher, 2012a finds a similar negative effect of social pressures to share money on 
individuals’ ability to save to purchase heating oil, and finds that heat stamps help increase 
saving through limiting social pressures and not because they address self-control problems.  
No study has yet looked at how trust for different actors, and social pressures to share 
money can affect the preference for different delivery models for solar home systems. In 
addition, no study has looked yet at how social pressures to share money through their negative 
effect on saving can affect consumption patterns in the case prepayment for electrification in a 
developing country setting.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis also examines the role of trust for different actors on delivery 
model preference for solar home systems and Chapter 5 investigates the role of intra-household 
dynamics, including pressures to share money, on prepayment for electricity.  
 
 
4. Thesis	structure	
 
This thesis addresses a number of the gaps in the literature mentioned above in the following 
chapters: 
Chapter 2 presents the results of a stated preference study that uses a hypothetical 
choice experiment to estimate willingness to pay for a solar home system for different delivery 
models within the region of Bafatá in Guinea-Bissau. These different delivery models (upfront, 
rental and credit scheme) include trade-offs between upfront and recurring costs with different 
time frames and different maintenance responsibilities. Importantly the study looks at the 
potential role of income constraints, discount rates, hyperbolic preferences, and trust for 
different actors (measured through survey questions) on these choices. Results suggest that 
rental schemes capture the largest market share in comparison to upfront payment and credit 
schemes. Preferences are driven by income factors. In addition, there is some evidence that 
individuals with self-control problems have a preference for credit schemes, and high discount 
rates are linked with lower demand for upfront and credit schemes. Finally, low levels of trust 
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for actors in the community are associated with a lower preference for credit and rental 
schemes.  
This indicates that the different repayment schemes address not only income limitations 
but also self-control problems, excessive discounting and limitations relevant to the social 
context. This study contributes to the literature examining the drivers and barriers of 
technology adoption where intertemporal trade-offs are present, as it is the first to attempt to 
control for the effect of hyperbolic discounting, high discount rates and trust in the decision to 
adopt a SHS and the associated delivery model choice. The controlled nature of the choice 
experiment also allows to rule out some of the alternative explanations (e.g. computational 
limitations as respondents are informed about the total costs of the different options).  
This study also contributes to the literature of solar home system adoption as it is the 
first study to use a hypothetical choice experiment to study the preferences for different 
delivery models of solar home systems and their underlying determinants. 
Chapter 3 studies the factors that drive the decision to connect to a solar hybrid mini-
grid installed in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau with a focus on 
the role of social capital, as expressed in self-reported trust for one’s neighbours, in facilitating 
electricity connections through the informal expansion of the grid. The informal expansion of 
the grid, is a process whereby neighbours come into agreements on how to share each other’s 
connecting infrastructure and the associated costs. This can have significant cost reductions 
and is seen as a form of constraint interactions. Trust for one’s neighbour is expected to play a 
positive role in the process of the informal expansion of the grid as it can enhance the ability 
of neighbours to reach such agreements. I attempt to isolate the effect of trust on the informal 
expansion of the grid as, unlike other peer effects, it only becomes relevant for households that 
are farther away from the main grid. This study combines actual observations of the connection 
decision with responses to a baseline survey containing information on the socio-economic 
status of the households and self-reported trust about different actors in the community. 
Findings show some evidence that social capital as expressed with trust for one’s neighbours’, 
has a positive effect on electricity connections through the informal expansion of the grid.  
Results also suggest that connections are driven by a number of standard socio-
economic factors suggested by the electrification and technology adoption literature (e.g. 
income, upfront connection costs and prior possession of appliances). Social capital as 
expressed with trust for a number of actors in the community and variables reflecting a 
households’ integration in the community are not found to be affecting the connection decision. 
This is the first study to look at the role of trust on constraint interactions (achieved 
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through the informal expansion of the grid) as well as the first study to look at the potentially 
negative effects of community divisions in the context of rural electrification. This study also 
contributes to the literature of community mini-grids by looking at the the determinants of 
electrification. 
Chapter 4 explores how the technology of prepaid meters can help researchers acquire 
more insight on the accuracy of survey expenditure reporting and the response strategies used. 
More specifically, this chapter tests the accuracy of reported energy expenditure in surveys, 
when using differently defined recall periods, namely a ‘usual’ week versus a ‘specific’ (i.e. 
last) week. Real expenditure data for prepaid meters for energy, from a solar hybrid mini-grid 
operating in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau, are compared with 
answers from a survey where respondents are asked to answer randomly in different recall 
periods. Overall, our results show that respondents tend to over-report the level and frequency 
of their energy expenditures, but reporting is more accurate when the ‘specific’ period rather 
than when the ‘usual’ period is used. Expenditure specific characteristics have a stronger effect 
on the level of misreporting than individual and household specific characteristics. The level 
of average weekly expenditure, as well as the irregularity of weekly repayment frequency, 
retain a robust effect on all the different measures of error used. In addition, the effect of the 
irregularity of weekly repayment frequency is more pronounced when the ‘specific’ period is 
used, which is attributed to the use of different response strategies and their varying effects on 
accuracy. However, this last finding is only robust for frequency reporting and not for 
expenditure level reporting.    
This is the first study to corroborate the accuracy of different recall periods with real 
data, in the context of energy expenditure in developing countries.  
Apart from its contribution to survey methodology this chapter contributes to the strand 
of literature looking at how individuals assess their energy expenditures and the role of 
computational limitations. No other study has looked before at the role of response strategies 
used on accuracy of energy expenditure reporting. Finally, this exercise suggests that energy 
expenditures can be a useful case study for the study of expenditure reporting related biases as 
information on actual energy expenditures is becoming increasingly available.  
Chapter 5 investigates the factors affecting prepayment patterns for electricity with a 
focus on the role of self-control problems and intra-household dynamics. This is for clients of 
a solar hybrid mini-grid installed in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-
Bissau. This study uses the actual prepayment information of the clients coupled with survey 
measures which also include measures of time preference. Results indicate that overall there is 
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a preference for small and frequent repayments. The level of monthly expenditure is driven 
positively, amongst other factors, by income levels and using the service for income generating 
activities. Self-control problems affect negatively the level of refill amounts indicating that 
customers with self-control problems use smaller refill amounts as a method to commit to using 
less electricity at home. Similarly, individuals charged an additional higher tariff for their 
consumption between 7pm to 12am choose smaller refill amounts, from those that are not, 
possibly as a method to control their electricity consumption patterns. The effect of seasonality 
of income on expenditure levels, self-disconnection, and using electricity at times when it is 
most expensive to consume is not found to be driven by self-control problems or intra-
household dynamics. This is the first study to investigate these issues in the context of a 
developing country setting.   
Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks.  
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5. 	Methods	and	limitations	
 
Lab experiments, and field experiments often used by behavioural economists allow to isolate 
the measurements of interest from confounding effects by creating counterfactuals through 
randomization.  
In natural or framed field experiments the experiment is undertaken in an actual field 
context in respect to the commodity, the behaviour and the incentives in question as well as 
external factors like the information available. This improves generalizability in comparison to 
lab experiments and artefactual field experiments (lab experiment choosing a subject pool from 
the population of interest relevant to the field context) where participants are asked to 
participate in tasks with a given set of rules and abstract framing. (Harrison & List, 2004) 
Natural experiments differ from framed field experiments as in the latter subjects are 
aware of their participation to experiments. Therefore, natural field experiments allow to 
eliminate experimenter effects and selection bias (Harrison & List, 2004). Conducting a natural 
or framed field experiment to measure the demand for a solar home system and the respective 
characteristics of the delivery models in Chapter 2 instead of a hypothetical choice experiment 
would have allowed to minimise hypothetical bias as well as other biases linked with stated 
preference methods (Mitchell & Carson, 1989) (discussed more in detail in Chapter 2) 
However, it was not possible to undertake such an endeavour given the limited means and time 
frame of this study. In addition, the logistics required were not available. The product did not 
exist yet and there was no structure in place to offer it with varying attributes to the consumer 
base. The hypothetical choice experiment method was chosen as it allows to conduct valuations 
in the absence of an actual market and to have control over the attributes of the product under 
valuation (Mitchel and Carson, 1989). 
Similarly, incentivized lab experiments are often used to measure time preferences. 
Time preference measures were not incentivised in this thesis mainly due to logistical issues. 
The inclusion of a time preference reversal component, to identify self-control problems, would 
have required to return to the communities a year latter to make the payment according to 
choice, which was not possible. The potential implications of this choice are discussed more in 
detail in Chapters 2 and 5.     
Finally, for all the surveys undertaken respondents were not compensated for their time 
as in discussion with local stakeholders it was suggested that compensation for participation in 
surveys and focus groups was not common practice and it could potentially cause disruptive 
dynamics in the community. Namely between households that were chosen to participate and 
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those that weren’t. In addition, compensation could cause a precedent and impact negatively 
future work within the community as project implementation often requires frequent focus 
group studies, interviews and baseline studies. Whittington, 2004 discusses an additional 
negative effect of compensating survey participants in developing countries. As participation 
in such surveys should be voluntary Whittington, 2004 argues that in environments of extreme 
poverty it is hard to argue that even minimal compensation does not have a coercive character.  
 
 
6. Case	study	-	Research	location	
 
This thesis is an outcome of collaboration with TESE- Development Association, a Portuguese 
non-governmental organization (NGO) working on infrastructural projects in Guinea-Bissau. 
This thesis is based on two case studies which are both projects of TESE- Development 
Association. The first project is a solar hybrid mini-grid, currently operating in Bambadinca (a 
semi-urban community situated in the Bafatá region) (see Chapter 3 for more details). The 
second project has not yet been implemented but aims to service the region of Bafatá in Guinea-
Bissau with a range of solar home system products and delivery models that the consumer can 
choose from (see Chapter 2 for more details). 
This thesis is based on case studies from the Bafatá region of Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-
Bissau is a country located in the western coast of Africa bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, 
between Guinea and Senegal. The country has a land-mass of approximately 36,125 sq km, 
52% of which is covered by forest, and a 350 km of coastline giving way to the Archipelago 
of Bijagos (see Figure 3) (CIA World Factbook). 
Guinea-Bissau is a former Portuguese colony, which achieved its independence in 
1974. A mosaic of ethnic groups, languages and religions, according to the latest census 
(RGPH, 2009) Guinea-Bissau has a population of 1.45 million with the majority leading a rural 
life (subsistence farmers, fishermen (ILAP II, 2010)). Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest 
countries in the world with its economy heavily reliant on subsistence agriculture and cashew 
nut exports. In its recent history the country has experienced violent conflict and unstable 
governments (IMF, 2011).  
 The country’s human development index (HDI) ranking 178 out of 188 countries, 
reflects the social and economic problems it is confronting, along with its weak institutions. 
Most households do not have access to safe water; sanitation facilities and medical care (IMF, 
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2011) and 69.3% of Bissau-Guineans remain below the national poverty line (Human 
Development Report, 2015). Life expectancy at birth is 55.2 and the literacy rate is 56.7% 
(Human Development Report, 2015).  
Generally basic infrastructure is lacking with electrification rates being very low. 
According to the World Energy Outlook energy access database, in 2013 the national 
electrification rate in Guinea-Bissau was 21% and the rural electrification rate 6% in addition, 
98% of the population relied on the traditional use of biomass.  
Electricity, water production and distribution in Guinea-Bissau has collapsed since 
2000, after a catastrophic civil war left the country bankrupt and unable to finance a power 
supply entirely dependent on petroleum. Power production capacity declined from 20 MW in 
2000 to a current 5.5 MW (IMF, 2011).  
Guinea-Bissau has an average solar irradiation of 5.8 kWh/m2/day. This very 
promising potential for the development of solar energy however remains largely unexploited. 
Nevertheless, the number of projects and finance in the sector of solar energy are increasing 
and there is a preference for solar energy for lighting and water pumping, compared to other 
renewable options (SNV, 2011).  
The region of Bafatá, is one of the nine administrative divisions of Guinea-Bissau3 (see 
Figure 1) and is located in North-Central Guinea-Bissau. The capital of the region, Bafatá city, 
is the third largest city of the country. Bafatá is divided into 6 sectors4. 15,5% of the Bissau-
Guinean population lives in the region of Bafatá, 75,5 % of which lives below the level of 
poverty (ILAP II, 2010). A power plant, operating from the city of Bafatá and extending 
throughout the region until early 2000, currently operates sporadically and only within the city 
limits. The population is largely dependent on traditional energy sources (e.g. candles, 
flashlights), or highly polluting inefficient power generating alternatives that the majority 
cannot afford (e.g. private generators).  
 The socio-economic and energy access status as well as its potential for solar energy 
development render Guinea-Bissau very relevant for the study of access to electrification and 
solar energy applications. 
Despite the inevitable case specific idiosyncrasies, findings are expected to be 
generalizable on a large extent to rural settings of other developing countries facing similar 
circumstances i.e. low HDI levels, similar social and economic problems, low electrification 
                                                
3 Bafatá,  Biombo,  Bissau ,  Bolama/Bi jagos ,  Cacheu,  Gabu,  Oio ,  Quinara ,  Tombal i  
4 Bafatá, Bambadinca, Contuboel, Galomaro, Gamamundo, Xitole	
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rates and absent grid infrastructure, but a promising potential for the development of solar 
energy. Such countries include especially other countries in Western Africa like Guinea, 
Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone.  
In addition, although the focus of this thesis is on off-grid solar applications some of 
the findings can be generalizable to other technologies. For example, the use of prepaid meters 
and the role of trust in the expansion of the grid infrastructure can also apply to centralized grid 
applications.  
Finally, the study of electrification access in Guinea-Bissau presents an additional 
opportunity to gain insights from a Sub-Saharan African country, that has overall been very 
little exposed to research and does not attract much global attention. Indicative is the fact that 
a simple search in the EconLit database with the key word ‘Guinea-Bissau’ renders only 73 
results. This pales in comparison to results given for other countries in the continent like Ghana 
(3,168), Ethiopia (1,964) Nigeria (4,287) and Kenya (3,515), but even for neighbouring 
Western African countries that also attract less research attention Mali (656), Senegal (821), 
Guinea (962), Liberia (229) and Gambia (212)5. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Search conducted in 15/06/2017 
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FIGURE	1	MAP	OF	GUINEA-BISSAU6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support Cartographic Section, 2012 
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Chapter	2	
Willingness	 to	 pay	 for	 solar	 home	 systems	 in	 Guinea-Bissau:	
consumers’	preferences	for	different	delivery	models	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract	
 
Solar home systems are a viable alternative to achieve energy access in developing countries 
especially in areas lacking grid infrastructure. But despite their important potential there is a 
dearth of research in measuring the demand for these products and understanding its 
determinants. This stated preference study uses a choice experiment to estimate willingness to 
pay for a solar home system, and how it changes for different delivery models offering different 
repayment schemes and maintenance responsibilities within the region of Bafatá in Guinea-
Bissau. Results suggest that rental schemes capture the largest market share in comparison to 
upfront payment and credit schemes. Preferences are driven by income limitations as well as 
discount rates. In addition, there is some evidence that individuals exhibiting hyperbolic 
discounting have a preference for credit schemes and lack of trust for actors within the 
community leads to a lower preference for delivery models that entail monthly repayments (i.e. 
rental, credit). Implicit discount rates inferred from preferences for repayment over time, 
confirm certain priors regarding discounting anomalies that have been outlined in the 
discounting literature, namely excessive discounting, preference heterogeneity and hyperbolic 
discounting.  
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1. Introduction	
 
‘Energy poverty’ is a widespread problem in developing countries with serious economic and 
social implications (See Chapter 1). One of the potential technological solutions to address lack 
of electrification are solar home systems (SHS), which are isolated off-grid solutions that use 
photovoltaic modules to power households. The advantage of SHS rests in their ability to 
bypass grid infrastructure, which is often too costly to expand in areas currently lacking access.  
A number of factors impeding wider SHS adoption have been identified. These are 
namely high upfront costs, limitations regarding the type and size of appliances that can be 
used and burdensome maintenance responsibilities (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Nieuwenhout et 
al., 2000; Urmee, Harries, & Schlapfer, 2009). Different delivery models have been designed 
to address the barriers of upfront costs and maintenance responsibilities. Specifically, credit 
schemes offer the option to consumers to repay for their SHS in instalments over time instead 
of having to pay high upfront costs; and rental schemes offer the additional option to consumers 
to free themselves from maintenance responsibilities.  
For successful product design and dissemination, it is important to understand the 
impact that these delivery models and their respective characteristics have on demand as well 
as the underlying factors that drive the preferences of consumers.  
This chapter uses a hypothetical choice experiment to estimate willingness to pay 
(WTP) for a SHS in rural Guinea-Bissau and how this WTP changes for different delivery 
models, which involve trade-offs between upfront costs and monthly payments, and different 
maintenance responsibilities.  We also test if consumers’ preferences are driven apart from 
income limitations, by discounting irregularities, namely high discount rates and hyperbolic 
discounting and factors relevant to the social context, namely trust for different actors.  
As discussed in Chapter 1 quite a few explanations have been suggested for the 
disproportionate negative impact of upfront costs on technology adoption. Amongst these are 
high discount rates, hyperbolic discounting and the influence of the social context in decision 
making.  
Hyperbolic discounting, and high discount rates have been shown to negatively affect 
the adoption for a number of products with high upfront costs in a number of studies. These 
consist of energy consuming appliances in developed countries and health product and 
fertilizers in developing countries (Newell & Siikamäki, 2014; Bradford, Courtemanche, 
Heutel, McAlvanah, & Ruhm, 2014; Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011; Dupas & Robinson, 
2013). In addition, it has been shown that individuals with hyperbolic preferences or social 
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pressures to share money are unable to save in order to meet investments in health technologies 
(Dupas & Robinson, 2013). On the other had the social context is maintained to be able to 
affect technology adoption positively through facilitating risk sharing and contributing to the 
diffusion process (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999).  
Credit and saving schemes have been suggested as a way to deal with these barriers as 
they have worked as commitment devices for individuals exhibiting hyperbolic discounting or 
social pressures to share money and increase their investments in health products (Dupas & 
Robinson, 2013). Similarly, credit schemes can also help individuals to deal with non 
behavioural barriers to adoption (e.g. income and liquidity constraints) (Tarozzi et al., 2014). 
However, the role of rental and credit schemes in the context of SHS to adress income as well 
as barriers to adoption linked with high discount rates, hyperbolic discounting and the social 
context has not been explored.  
Apart from drawing information from literature on discounting, this study also 
contributes to a strand of the discounting literature that infers implicit discounting rates by 
observing consumer choices for different energy consuming products that entail trade-offs 
between upfront and recurring costs (e.g. Revelt & Train, 1998; Hauseman, 1979; Allcott & 
Wozny 2014). By observing consumer trade-offs between different intertemporal payments 
this study tests the validity of these methods and the replicability of the findings (high discount 
rates and the systematic variation of discount rates between different time intervals, amongst 
different individuals and amongst different goods) in the context of demand for different 
delivery models of SHS. We are also able to test some correlates of these implicit discount 
rates (discount rates, hyperbolic discounting, trust for different actors) that is more difficult to 
do in the case of observational studies (Newell & Siikamäki, 2014). 
We use a hypothetical choice experiment (CE), conducted in 149 households in rural 
Guinea-Bissau so we can measure the demand for a SHS product, the trade-offs between 
upfront payments and payments that recur monthly, and the value of maintenance 
responsibilities. Hypothetical stated preference methods were needed as there is not enough 
product variation in the market to use revealed preference methods (Benton, Meier, & 
Sprenger, 2007). A separate elicitation of time preference was included to test for the role of 
discount rates and hyperbolic preferences on delivery model choice. Finally, questions on trust 
regarding formal and informal institutions were included. 
    Results suggest that although preferences are heterogeneous, rental schemes capture 
the largest market share, in comparison to upfront and credit schemes. In addition, expressing 
a firm disinterest in purchasing the product, is driven by the limitations in the SHS features 
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(lack of television). Overall, preferences are driven both by income limitations as well as 
behavioural factors namely self-control problems, excessive discounting and trust for different 
actors. Specifically, demand for credit and upfront schemes is higher for higher income 
households and lower for individuals with high discount rates. In addition, individuals that 
exhibit hyperbolic preferences have a higher demand for credit schemes which is an indication 
that credit schemes are seen as a form of commitment mechanism to deal with self-control 
problems. Finally, those with lower self-reported trust for actors within the community have a 
lower demand for delivery models entailing monthly repayments. One explanation is that they 
have less people to rely on in case they are unable to meet their monthly repayments. At the 
same time, pressures within the household to share money was not found to affect preference 
for delivery models.   Finally, implicit discount rates calculated confirmed certain priors 
regarding discounting anomalies that have been outlined in the literature on discounting, 
namely excessive discounting, preference heterogeneity and time preference reversals.  
These findings have important policy implications as they demonstrate that there is high 
demand for SHS, in the context of rural Guinea-Bissau, which can be unlocked with the right 
delivery model design that could help meet both income as well as behavioural and social 
limitations. In addition, the existence of heterogeneity amongst consumer preferences suggests 
offering a range of different delivery options to consumers from which they can choose from.  
This study is structured in the following way: In Section 2 we present the case study. 
Section 3 provides a literature review, while Section 4 presents the conceptual framework and 
the experimental design. Section 5, contains the results and Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Case	study		
	
2.1	SHS	and	their	delivery	models	
 
SHS are isolated off-grid solutions that use photovoltaic (PV) modules to electrify households. 
A PV panel is installed on a roof, converts solar energy to electricity and charges a storage 
battery, which is controlled by a charge regulator, and can be used to power equipment when 
there is no sunlight (See Figure 1). 
A big variety in SHS in terms of sizes and services is offered in developing countries. 
These can range from small portable solar lanterns with limited lighting services to larger 
systems that permit the use of a number of appliances (e.g. TV, radio, mobile charger, fan, 
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fridge etc.). Services offered, depend on the wattage of the system, the battery capacity, 
efficiency of appliances used and sunlight availability. But in general, the needs met through 
SHS are usually limited, and therefore these systems are not direct substitutes of grid 
electricity. They are often seen in areas where grid extension is impossible or as a temporary 
solution in areas where the grid will be extended (Nieuwenhout et al., 2000). In addition, SHS 
have limited scope for income generating activities in comparison to other electricity solutions, 
but could provide opportunities for businesses through additional operating hours and 
refrigeration (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
			FIGURE	1	EXAMPLE	OF	A	SOLAR	HOME	SYSTEM	
 
A	 PV	 PANEL	 IS	 INSTALLED	ON	 A	 ROOF,	 CONVERTS	 SOLAR	 ENERGY	 TO	 ELECTRICITY	 AND	 CHARGES	 THE	 STORAGE	
BATTERY	WHICH	IS	CONTROLLED	BY	A	CHARGE	REGULATOR.		
 
 
  
Due to their reliance on a renewable resource, SHS require no operating costs, however they 
entail high upfront capital costs as well as expensive maintenance requirements. Specifically, 
batteries, which constitute a big part of the initial capital cost, deteriorate and need to be 
replaced every four or five years. These high upfront costs and expensive maintenance, 
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constitute the main adoption barriers in developing countries (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; 
Nieuwenhout et al., 2000; Urmee et al., 2009). Consumer credit and rental schemes are delivery 
models that have been designed to address these barriers and render SHS more widely 
affordable (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Nieuwenhout et al., 2000).  
Consumer credit and rental schemes are delivery models designed to overcome the 
problems of high upfront costs required by upfront schemes, in which consumers are required 
to pay the full price of the system in one instalment. When credit is provided, the customer 
needs to pay only a small upfront cost and repay the rest of the loan in monthly instalments 
with a certain interest. In the rental scheme the customer is only required to pay monthly fees 
for the time he/she uses the system. However, there is usually a price premium for not paying 
the full cost of the system upfront, which is usually higher in rental schemes than in credit.   
From the customer’s perspective, an additional benefit of a rental scheme is that the 
maintenance responsibilities rest with the programme implementers. However, customers lack 
ownership of the system. Ownership is usually desirable unless there are expectations for 
imminent connection to the grid (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). From the seller’s point of view 
when the systems are rented out, there is a danger that the customer will not maintain the system 
properly, as lack of ownership gives no incentive to the consumer to maintain the system’s 
performance. In addition, both rental and credit schemes entail higher transaction costs and 
increased incidence of repayment delays and defaults. Table 1 provides information on the 
characteristics of the different delivery models based on full cost recovery (adopted from 
Nieuwenhout et al., 2000).  
 
 
 
TABLE	1	CHARACTERISTICS	OF	DIFFERENT	DELIVERY	MODELS		
Delivery model Ownership Financing Maintenance 
Upfront (Cash sales) Customer  Customer 
Credit Customer Commercial bank, 
cooperative, dealer, 
International donor 
Customer/ Service 
company 
Rental (Fee for 
service) 
Energy Service 
Company (ESCO) 
ESCO ESCO 
Adopted from Nieuwenhout et al., 2000 
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2.2	‘Lojas	Sta	Claro’	project	
 
‘Lojas Sta Claro’ is a project proposed by TESE- Development Association (TESE), a 
Portuguese non-governmental organization (NGO) working on infrastructural projects in 
Guinea-Bissau. This project, which has not reached the implementation stage yet, aims to 
service the region of Bafatá in Guinea-Bissau with a range of SHS products and delivery 
models that the consumer can choose from. The project is called ‘Lojas Sta Claro’, which in 
the local Portuguese Creole language means ‘the store it is illuminated’.7 
Three different products have been proposed to address the needs of low income, 
medium and upper income groups8, as well as businesses (see Appendix for more details). This 
study focuses on the product proposed for the medium to upper income group. This is a 20 
peak watts (Wp) system that can power 4 fluorescent lights and has an outlet to plug in a mobile 
charger, a radio and a fan. The lights can be used for 7 hours a day and the radio, fan and 
charger for a few hours a day, depending on the use of the rest of the equipment. Figure 2 
provides a schematic representation of the product.  
The lifetime of the system is estimated to be 10 years. As far as replacements are 
concerned the battery will need replacement on average every four years and the lights and 
fuses once in the lifetime of the system (every 8 years). No more replacements are anticipated 
unless parts break unexpectedly. 
The prices proposed for each delivery model and the expected maintenance costs are 
shown in West African CFA Francs in Tables 2 and 39.  
   
                                                
7 The name comes from the ‘Bambadinca Sta Claro’ project described in detail in the following chapters and it 
relates to a different approach suggested by TESE when centralized solutions are not viable.  
8 TESE classified these income groups in the following way:  the Lower income group has a monthly income of 
around 25 USD, the Medium/upper income group has a monthly income of around 34 USD.  
9 The local currency is the West African CFA Franc, also represented as XOF or FCFA. The current conversion 
rate is 633 FCFA to 1 USD. However, prices were calculated based on the 2013 conversion rate (500 FCFA to 
the dollar) when this study was designed. Prices were originally proposed in dollars and converted to the local 
currency when this study was designed in the autumn of 2013. Therefore, in the case of project implementation it 
remains unclear how these prices would change, also given the potential technological advances since.    
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		FIGURE	2	SCHEMATIC	REPRESENTATION	OF	PRODUCT	UNDER	VALUATION	
	
SOLAR	PANEL	WITH	A	CAPACITY	OF	20	PEAK	WATTS	(WP)	AND	A	STORAGE	BATTERY.	THE	SYSTEM	CAN	POWER	4	
FLUORESCENT	LIGHTS	AND	HAS	AN	OUTLET	TO	PLUG	A	MOBILE	CHARGER,	A	RADIO	AND	A	FAN.		
 
 
 
TABLE	2	PROPOSED	PRICES	FOR	EACH	DELIVERY	MODEL		
 Upfront Credit10 Rental 
Price (FCFA) 100,000 4,000 per month 
(for two years) 
 
4,000 per month 
Maintenance Customer Customer (once the 
system is repaid) 
Service company 
 
Information adopted from TESE ‘Lojas Sta Claro’ project proposal 
 
 
TABLE	3	EXPECTED	MAINTENANCE	AND	REPLACEMENT	COSTS	
 Battery Lamps Fuses 
Replacement price 
(FCFA) 
43,300 1,000-2,000 
 
600 
Replacement rates Every 4 years Every 8 years Every 8 years 
 
Information adopted from TESE ‘Lojas Sta Claro’ project proposal 
 
                                                
10 The credit option was not available in the last project proposal by the NGO, but it is still discussed as a potential 
option. Therefore, we kept it as an option in our study.  
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2.3	Location	description	Guinea-Bissau	&	Bafatá	
 
This study took place in the Bafatá region of Guinea-Bissau (See Chapter 1 for a description).  
 
 
3. 	Literature	review	
 
This work is drawing from, and contributing to, three different strands of literature, namely the 
literature on discounting and technology adoption, the literature on applications of stated 
preference methods in renewable energy, and the literature on adoption of SHS in developing 
countries.  
 
 
 
3.1	Discounting	and	technology	adoption		
 
There is a broad number of studies eliciting discount rates. Overall, a number of anomalies 
have been observed as in contrast to expectations from rational economic theory these discount 
rates tend to be higher than expected and to vary between individuals, between different time 
frames and between different goods and to be sensitive to the decision environment (see  
Frederick et al., 2002 for a review).  
These finding have been used to inform policy including energy policy and technology 
adoption in developing countries (see Chapter 1). This study contributes to this literature by 
looking at how some of these anomalies (excessive discounting, hyperbolic discounting, the 
influence of the social context) apply in the case of SHS adoption in developing countries and 
can be addressed by different delivery models. In addition, this study contributes to the 
discounting elicitation literature.  
One way to elicit discount rates is through lab experiments or artefactual field 
experiments where individuals are asked directly to express their time preferences for real or 
hypothetical goods through choice tasks, matching tasks, pricing tasks or rating tasks (e.g. 
Harrison, Lau, & Williams, 2002; Thaler, 1981). 
The other way to elicit discount rates is to observe the actual behaviour of individuals 
in instances where decisions that reveal time preferences are made. These usually look at trade-
offs between upfront payments and recurring costs or choices between one-off receipts and 
recurring receipts. Such studies include, among others, observed purchases for energy 
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consuming appliances, and vehicles which involve a trade-off between capital and operating 
costs.  
Overall, the discount rates found in such studies range widely according to the methods 
used and the technologies studied. Most studies tend to find discount rates that are much higher 
than market interest rates which is in agreement with the ‘efficiency gap’ hypothesis. For 
example, the Hausman, 1979 study, which is the seminal study in the field, looks at purchases 
choices for air conditioners in the United States and finds the average implicit discount rate to 
be 26.4%, with income being an important determinant. Gately, 1980 finds similarly high 
discount rates for refrigerators which range from 45% to 300% depending on the brands and 
price assumptions. In a survey article Train, 1985 finds the range of implicit discount rates to 
be from 2% to above 100% depending on the methods and assumptions used as well as on the 
technology in question.    
  More recently Metcalf & Hassett, 1999 find a 9.7% implicit discount rate for attic 
insulation and Dreyfus & Viscusi, 1995 a range of 11-17% for automobiles. 
Almost no such studies have been conducted in developing countries with the exception 
of Matsumoto & Omata, 2017 that look at the market for air conditioners in Vietnam and find 
the implicit discount rates to range from 11.7% - 312% (depending on size). Demonstrating 
that discount rates are higher in developing countries.   
A number of hypothetical studies have also been conducted. Jaccard & Dennis, 2006 
find a 20.79% implicit discount rate for home retrofits and 9% for space heating. Revelt & 
Train, 1998 find an implicit discount rate of 39% for refrigerators. Using a hypothetical choice 
experiment Min, Azevedo, Michalek, & de Bruin, 2014 find a 100% discount rate for light 
bulbs.  
In all studies, assumptions have to be made concerning the lifetime of the product, the 
usage intensity and the development of future energy prices. In addition, it is not possible to 
factor in hidden costs or irrelevant product attributes that affect the purchase decision and often 
correlate with prices. Finally, even if average costs and benefits are calculated heterogeneity 
of consumers in terms of costs and benefits is not always taken into consideration. All these 
issues, can cause measurement errors  (see Allcott & Greenstone, 2012 for a discussion).  
The use of panel data allows researchers to control for time-invariant product attributes 
that cannot be observed. Using panel data for automobiles Allcott & Wozny, 2014 find a 15% 
discount rate and Busse, Knittel, & Zettelmeyer, 2013 as well as Sallee, West, & Fan, 2009 
find that there is no efficiency gap. This demonstrates that the high levels of implicitly discount 
rates found in previous studies could be largely driven by factors irrelevant to time preference.  
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However, these studies still rely on assumption about prices levels and utilization intensity (see 
Allcott & Greenstone, 2012 for a discussion). 
It is empirically difficult to isolate discounting behaviour from the choice environment 
or other considerations that affect the observed choices and are irrelevant to time preference. 
Research has shown that a number of factors could be affecting these purchase decisions (e.g. 
hyperbolic discounting, bounded rationality issues, social context, liquidity constraints, 
asymmetric information etc.) (See Chapter 1). However, more research is needed in order to 
understand the effects of each potential factor from competing explanations (see Geraden, 
Newell & Stavins, 2015). This is crucial not only for the time preference literature but to also 
understand what drives technology adoption decisions.  
Hypothetical choice experiments provide us with the opportunity to explore these 
effects as they allow us to control the choice environment and to collect additional information 
on the respondents (Geraden, Newell & Stavins, 2015).  
Newell & Siikamäki, 2014; 2015 through a hypothetical choice experiment explore the 
role of information provision on the demand of efficient appliances. They also conduct a 
separate elicitation of time preferences to control for the role of discount rates on these choices. 
They find that simple information provision on total costs has the biggest effect on the demand 
for more efficient appliances. They also find that there is a relationship between discount rates, 
and preference for less efficient energy using products with lower upfront costs  (Newell & 
Siikamäki, 2015; Newell & Siikamäki, 2014).  
 The present study explores these dynamics further by looking not only at the role of 
discount rates on the purchase choices for an energy product, but also at the role of hyperbolic 
discounting and trust for different actors. We are not looking at choices regarding energy 
efficiency purchases, but choices for repayment over time for a SHS, which however also entail 
a time trade-off component. This also gives as the opportunity to explore if findings from other 
studies regarding discounting anomalies translate in the case of the context of SHS demand in 
developing countries.  
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3.2	Stated	preference	methods	and	demand	for	renewable	energy			
A sizeable number of stated preference studies has been conducted to measure renewable 
energy demand and its socio-economic determinants, but these mostly focus on developed 
countries, and predominantly on on-grid rather than off-grid solutions (Batley, Colbourne, 
Fleming, & Urwin, 2001; Bergmann, Hanley, & Wright, 2006; Nomura & Akai, 2004; Wiser, 
2007). 
Two studies apply a hypothetical CE on the study of energy in developing countries. 
Takama et al., 2012 use a hypothetical choice experiment to estimate consumer WTP for 
cookstove attributes in Ethiopia, and Abdullah & Mariel, 2010 use a hypothetical choice 
experiment to look at consumer preferences regarding grid supply reliability improvement in 
Kenya. Abdullah & Jeanty, 2011 use contingent valuation to estimate WTP for grid 
connections and standalone SHS in Kenya. Their study also includes a WTP estimate for one-
off and recurring payments, however there is no focus on the different delivery models of SHS 
and their respective characteristics (Abdullah & Jeanty, 2011).  
A number of studies use responses to state preference methods regarding repayment 
preferences over time to calculate implicit discount rates. Kim & Haab, 2009 conduct a 
contingent valuation to find WTP derived from a value elicitation survey on oyster reef 
restoration programs in the Chesapeake Bay for different payment schedules (one time, annual 
and perpetuity) and find the discount rates to range from 20% to 98% and to decline with the 
time horizon, as is consistent with hyperbolic discounting.  
Kovacs & Larson, 2008 conduct a contingent valuation study to measure WTP for 
public space and the implicit discount rates for four different time frames of monthly 
repayments (for one year, four years, seven years and ten years) they find discount rates to 
range between 50%, 19% and 28% and to be higher for shorter time frames (average 30%).  
Finally, Abdullah & Jeanty, 2011 find discount rates for grid and solar energy in Kenya 
to drop from 165% (grid) and 125% (solar) when compared to one year repayments to 45% 
(grid) and 35% (solar) when compared to five year repayments.  
A larger application of stated preference studies in the study of energy in developing 
countries could help inform policy making for a broad range of issues (payment structure, 
project design, choice of technology etc.) in a field which is central to economic development 
and environmental policy.  Our study is also offering insights of a case study conducted in a 
country with low human development and with severely limited access to energy.  
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3.3	SHS	adoption	literature		
 
A number of studies on SHS adoption in developing countries that use quantitative discrete 
choice models have focused on identifying income and non-income determinants on the 
decision to adopt SHS (Adkins, Eapen, Kaluwile, Nair, & Modi, 2010; Komatsu, Kaneko, 
Shrestha, & Ghosh, 2011; McEachern & Hanson, 2008; Rebane & Barham, 2011; Voravate, 
Barnes, & Bogach, 2000). Household income, ownership of rechargeable batteries, kerosene 
consumption, number of mobile phones are just a few of the factors linked to the adoption 
decision in rural Bangladesh, and the number of children and concern about indoor air pollution 
are linked to the choice of panel size (Komatsu et al., 2011). Rebane & Barham, 2011 find 
adoption of SHS in rural Nicaragua to be predicted by income, geographical location and the 
way knowledge is acquired. They find that knowledge is better predicted by other installed 
SHS and certain individual characteristics. A number of other studies also look into the role of 
knowledge on SHS adoption and how it is achieved. Their findings demonstrate that word of 
mouth and other installed systems predominantly generate knowledge (Acker & Kammen, 
1996; Voravate et al., 2000). McEachern & Hanson, 2008 explore the role of social capital on 
the decision to adopt SHS in Sri Lanka both at the individual and village levels. Their findings 
underscore the importance of breaking down social capital indicators as they conclude that 
different measures of social capital have opposing impacts to adoption decisions.  
This study focuses on how different repayment schemes and maintenance 
responsibilities affect WTP for SHS.  Although the importance of these factors for SHS 
adoption has been underscored in a number of case studies and best practice documents (see 
Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Nieuwenhout et al., 2000 for a comprehensive review), there hasn’t 
been an attempt to quantify preference for delivery method choice and its determinants. 
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				4.	Methodology		
 
4.1	Choice	experiments	
 
Survey based choice experiments belong to the family of stated preference techniques. The CE 
method aims to calculate WTP for a product and its respective attributes by observing the trade-
offs consumers make between the different levels of these attributes. CE have their theoretical 
foundations in the concept that goods are described by their respective attributes (Lancaster, 
1966), and the Random Utility Model.  
  The Random Utility Model holds that individual n selects the alternative i with the 
highest utility Uin amongst his choice set Cn. This utility Uin is expressed in a systematic utility 
component Vin and a random utility component εin. The systematic component can be described 
as a linear function of observable variables describing the attributes of the alternative and 
characteristics of the individual.  
 𝑈"# = 	𝑉"# +	𝜀"# = 𝛽′𝑋"# + 𝜀"#     
  
 
Due to the existence of the error term, which contains everything else that is relevant to the 
choice of the respondent and is not observable, the selection process can be described with the 
following probability formula:  
 𝑃 𝑖 𝐶# = 𝑃 𝑈"# ≥ 𝑈0#	, 𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑗 ∈ 	𝐶#  
                                                    = 	𝑃[𝑉"# + 𝜀"# ≥ 	𝑉0# + 𝜀0#	, 𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑗 ∈ 	𝐶#] 
                                                    = 	𝑃[𝑉"# − 𝑉0# 	≥ 	 𝜀0# −	𝜀"#	, 𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑗 ∈ 	𝐶#] 
 
 
This formula states that an individual n will choose option i over all other alternatives in the 
choice set if the difference in the utility of their systematic parts (observable part), is larger or 
equal than the differences between their error terms (unobservable part).  Including the status 
quo as an option in the choice sets, it renders CE in accordance with demand theory and utility 
maximization, and allows for the measurement of WTP for changes in attribute levels and other 
welfare changes (Bateman & Langford, 1997). 
Using this method, a series of choice sets were presented to respondents with varying 
levels of different attributes of the good in question.  
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4.2	Attributes	and	levels	
 
The attributes of price and maintenance responsibilities were chosen for this study. An 
alternative specific design was chosen with three alternative specific constants representing 
each delivery model. The three delivery models were an upfront scheme where the user must 
pay everything upfront to acquire the system; a credit scheme where the user must pay monthly 
instalments for two years to acquire the system and a rental scheme where the user must pay a 
monthly fee for the entire time he uses the system which is a maximum of ten years (the 
estimated lifetime of the system). This number was used as an approximation to calculate 
discount rates as well as to calculate the total cost information that was presented to consumers 
to limit computational limitations and reduce the salience of upfront cost.   
A labelled experiment (an alternative specific design) was chosen to select the price 
ranges independently for every delivery model. The three delivery models were presented next 
to each other with a fourth option of not buying the product (status quo). This choice framing 
was chosen to be closer to a real choice environment.  
The attributes were chosen, based on the findings of the literature on SHS delivery 
models. Maintenance responsibilities were varied for all the three delivery models between two 
options: 1) all maintenance rests with the user and 2) all maintenance rests with the company 
for the lifetime of the system, with the sole responsibility of the owner to clean the panel once 
a month during the dry season. Regarding the choice of price levels, the prices proposed by the 
NGO and the estimated costs of maintenance, were taken into consideration. We followed a 
method previously used by a number of contingent valuation studies which measured implicit 
discount rates (Kim & Haab, 2009; Kovacs & Larson, 2008).  Price levels were linked to each 
other with a discount rate (20% annual discount rate). In other words, the price levels from the 
upfront payment alternative, were divided by the number of repayment months (24 for credit 
and 120 for rental) and compounded with an annual interest rate of 20%. Following that 
procedure, prices were realistically rounded up and the upper range of the prices of the rental 
scheme were increased to capture the range of demand more appropriately. Seven different 
price levels were ultimately chosen.  A summary of the attributes selected is set out in Table 4. 
Realistically, in the credit and upfront delivery models, the maintenance responsibilities 
rest with the user, and in rental schemes the user has no maintenance responsibilities. Credit 
options could come with a form of insurance which is bundled in the price which exempts the 
user from at least some of the maintenance of the system (Nieuwenhout et al., 2000).  The same 
could also apply for upfront schemes at least in theory. Therefore, the option to allow 
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maintenance to vary with the credit and upfront scheme was not considered problematic. 
However, as there is no case of a rental scheme with maintenance resting with the user, there 
were concerns that allowing maintenance to vary with the rental scheme would be deemed 
unrealistic by respondents, possibly leading to protest responses. However, there was no such 
indication during the pilot survey, and therefore maintenance was varied with all three delivery 
models so that we could disentangle its effects from repayment method preferences.  
Finally, some potentially important attributes were not included in order to not make 
the choice exercise too complicated. Usually credit schemes also come with a smaller upfront 
payment to make sure that the user commits to repay the product (Nieuwenhout et al., 2000). 
In addition, other issues like weekly instead of monthly repayments (to resemble closer current 
energy spending practices), and flexible repayments in times of less income availability, were 
raised during the pilots and focus groups. These could potentially be important in shaping 
consumer preferences.  
 
 
 
TABLE	4	ATTRIBUTES	AND	LEVELS	CHOSEN	FOR	THE	CHOICE	EXPERIMENTAL	DESIGN	
 Upfront Credit Rental 
Price 
(FCFA) 
 
50,000 
70,000 
100,000 
140,000 
200,000 
280,000 
340,000 
 
2,400 
3,400 
4,800 
6,700 
9,600 
13,400 
16,200 
 
900 
1,200 
1,800 
2,500 
3,600 
5,000 
8,000 
 
Maintenance 
responsibilities 
 
User/Company 
 
User/Company 
 
User/Company 
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4.3	Choice	set	design	
 
A full factorial design of attributes produces 2,744 (73 x 23) possible scenarios. An orthogonal 
simultaneous main effects factorial design was generated using SPSS, which limited the 
scenarios to 49.   
During the pilot, some of the respondents specifically expressed preference to upfront 
payments, even if it ended up being costlier to them than the other two options. This meant that 
the scenarios where upfront payments were of costlier overall, than the other two delivery 
models, were not deemed implausible. On the other hand, there were a few scenarios where the 
rental scheme entailed a higher level of monthly repayment than the credit scheme with the 
same maintenance responsibilities. These were deemed implausible. However, they were not 
removed as there was still a valid option between the other two schemes in the payment card. 
In addition, this was a way to check for consistency in responses, as has been done in other 
studies (Saelensminde, 2002). These 49 alternatives were impossible to handle by a single 
individual. Therefore, 4 out of the 49 alternatives were chosen without replacement of each 
individual.  
Other types of experimental designs exist that are more efficient than orthogonal 
designs. However, these efficient designs are deemed appropriate for studies where priors are 
already available, or with large sample sizes (Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007; Lusk & Norwood, 2005). 
This was not the case in our study. 
Images were introduced to reduce the cognitive burden required to interpret the choice 
sets (Figure 3). The hand giving the money represents upfront payments and the two different 
diaries explain the credit and the rental scheme. The price tag informs the respondent about the 
total costs of each option summing up monthly repayments. The image with the mop and 
bucket means that the user is only responsible for cleaning the system. The image with the 
mop, the bucket and the tools means that apart from cleaning the system the respondent is also 
responsible for all the replacements. Respondents were informed how much these maintenance 
responsibilities are expected to cost them. The status quo alternative (of not buying anything) 
is not represented with an image but was repeated every time by the interviewer.   
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		FIGURE	3	EXAMPLE	OF	CHOICE	CARD	
	
THE	HAND	GIVING	THE	MONEY	REPRESENTS	UPFRONT	PAYMENTS	AND	THE	TWO	DIFFERENT	DIARIES	EXPLAIN	THE	
CREDIT	AND	THE	RENTAL	SCHEME.	THE	PRICE	TAG	INFORMS	THE	RESPONDENT	ABOUT	THE	TOTAL	COSTS	OF	EACH	
OPTION	SUMMING	UP	MONTHLY	REPAYMENTS.	THE	IMAGE	WITH	THE	MOP	AND	BUCKET	MEANS	THAT	THE	USER	
IS	ONLY	RESPONSIBLE	FOR	CLEANING	THE	SYSTEM.	THE	IMAGE	WITH	THE	MOP,	THE	BUCKET	AND	THE	TOOLS	MEANS	
THAT	APART	FROM	CLEANING	THE	SYSTEM	THE	RESPONDENT	IS	ALSO	RESPONSIBLE	FOR	ALL	THE	REPLACEMENTS.	
THE	 STATUS	 QUO	 ALTERNATIVE	 (OF	 NOT	 BUYING	 ANYTHING)	 IS	 NOT	 REPRESENTED	WITH	 AN	 IMAGE	 BUT	WAS	
REPEATED	EVERY	TIME	BY	THE	INTERVIEWER.			
 
 
 
4.4	Limitations	
 
A number of biases are prevalent in stated preference methods affecting the validity and 
reliability of the estimates. Mitchell & Carson, 1989 discuss a number of limitations in 
contingent valuation which apply to hypothetical stated preferences methods in general 
including CE. One of the main limitations they refer to is linked to the hypothetical nature of 
stated preference methods which can lead to non-meaningful, often unrealistically high, 
responses.  
This finding, termed by many researches as ‘hypothetical bias’, has been shown to exist 
in a number of experimental studies or meta-analysis comparing real and hypothetical 
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payments both for contingent valuation (Mjelde, Jin, Lee, Kim, & Han, 2012; Murphy, Allen, 
Stevens, & Weatherhead, 2005) and CE (Lusk & Schroeder, 2004). 
Another source of bias discussed by Mitchell & Carson, 1989 is linked with the inability 
of respondents to take into consideration external information when making their choices in a 
hypothetical scenario (budget constraints, substitutes). Similarly, strategic behaviour is also a 
danger in stated preference methods, where responses are not truthful, but instead driven by 
considerations to affect policy regarding the provisions of a good and the levels of payment. 
Protest responses where respondents out of protest to an aspect of the hypothetical market 
refuse to participate or give extreme responses can also bias the results. Finally, a number of 
survey related biases are relevant and can affect the accuracy of responses like interviewer bias 
and the way the information is communicated to respondents (Mitchell & Carson, 1989). 
Other issues that might determine the accuracy of stated preference methods is that the 
choice of the property right can make a substantial difference in the results due to the observed 
discrepancy between between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), with 
WTA being higher also for reasons emanating from behavioural economics like status quo bias 
and endowment effect (see Horowitz & McConnell, 2002 for a review). Finally, in the 
valuation of public goods (with significant non-use values) respondents have been shown to 
state similar values for different levels of goods in contingent valuation surveys (e.g. 
Desvousges et al., 1992 birds and oil spills). One explanation behind this phenomenon is that 
the responses are mostly driven by the gratification individuals get from giving money for 
public goods rather than from the actual economic value of these goods (Kahneman & Knetch, 
1992).  However, this is not an issue in the case of the valuation of private goods and is also 
less relevant in the case of choice experiments (Adamowicz, 1995). 
There are also some biases specific to choice experiments which are more cognitively 
demanding than other stated preference methods. Specifically, responses can be sensitive to 
the study design (choice of attributes, price levels) (Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001). In 
addition, choosing between a different number of goods that each contain different level of 
attributes can result to fatigue and inconsistent behaviour (Hess, Rose, & Polak, 2010) and as 
DeShazo & Fermo, 2002 show this inconsistent behaviour occurs when the complexity of the 
choice experiment increases. Finally, non-trading and/or lexicographic preferences where 
responses are driven only by one or a sub-set of attributes, or by rules of thumb have been also 
observed (Hess, Rose, & Polak, 2010; Campbell, Hutchinson, & Scarpa, 2006). However, these 
lexicographic preferences and non-trading could also be reflecting actual decision making 
patterns (Hess, Rose, & Polak, 2010).  
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Despite these limitations Carson, Flores, Martin, & Wright, 1996 in a review find that 
stated preferences and revealed preference studies give similar results. As Mitchell & Carson, 
1989 stress with the right design (e.g. neutral information, realistic scenarios, good description 
of good and payment vehicle, pretesting) results can be meaningful. 
In addition, a series of meta-analysis studies and experiments find that hypothetical bias 
is reduced with increased familiarity of respondents with the good under valuation (Mjelde, 
Jin, Lee, Kim, & Han, 2012) and when respondents are encouraged to respond truthfully 
(Carlsson, Frykblom, & Lagerkvist, 2005; Cummings & Taylor, 1999). There is also evidence 
that the valuation of private goods leads to lower hypothetical bias possibly due to increased 
familiarity (Murphy et al., 2005; List & Gallet, 2001; Atkinson & Mourato, 2008). Finally, in 
the case of CE smaller number of choices and less complicated tasks reduce the risk of fatigue 
and inconsistent preferences (Hess, Rose, & Polak, 2010). 
A combination of measures was used to reduce the potential sources of bias that were 
relevant for this study namely hypothetical bias, strategic bias, focusing bias and non-trading. 
In our study respondents have high familiarity with the product under valuation as it is already 
available in the marketplace. In addition, the legitimacy of the payment vehicle was reinforced 
through the affiliation with an NGO operating in the area, which is expected to limit strategic 
responses (Mitchell & Carson, 1989).  Before the CE commenced, respondents were 
encouraged to give honest responses. In addition, to limit focusing bias and non-trading, after 
every choice follow up questions were included. This was done to make sure that respondents 
were taking into consideration all the attributes of the choice card as well as their budget 
limitations, and that each choice was independent from previous choices. It was also 
emphasized that responses will not have any effect on how the product will be offered to the 
communities. 
Steps were also taken to limit cognitive limitations and ensure that respondents 
understood the product they were asked to value. Before the CE commenced some familiarity 
questions about SHS were introduced to induce the respondent to start thinking about the 
product. After that, the product and its features were presented to the respondents in detail, 
using images (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Finally, to explain the CE exercise, respondents were 
shown images of the different product attributes and their levels.  
Finally, in the ‘Results’ section we will show that results confirm a number of priors 
regarding consistency with economic theory, as far as the effect of the price and income levels 
are concerned (construct validity) (Carson, Flores & Meade, 2001). 
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4.5	Other	survey	questions	
	
4.5.1	Trust	questions	
 
As is common practice in surveys measuring aspects of social capital (e.g. General Social 
Survey, World Bank Social Capital Initiative11), respondents were asked to report their level 
of agreement with statements expressing their level of trust regarding different actors in a five-
point scale12 (traditional leaders, local government, NGOs and individuals within their 
community).  
	
 
 
4.5.2	Time	preference	questions	
 
A choice task protocol to elicit discount rates was used, drawing from common practices in 
literature (see Frederick et al., 2002). Respondents were asked to report their preference 
between receiving a smaller amount of money now and a larger amount in a month from now. 
‘If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 FCFA today, or a guaranteed 1,500 FCFA in a 
month’s time, which would you prefer?’. The same question was posed 10 times, each time 
increasing the amount offered in the future date,13 until the point where the respondent chose 
the future option. The current amount offered was set to 1,000 FCFA. This amount was chosen 
to be substantial as compared to average consumption habits. There have been similar 
considerations by other authors (Ashraf et al., 2006; Dupas & Robinson, 2013).  We had no 
information about the average household daily expenditure for the region of Bafatá prior to the 
study. However, a baseline survey conducted in the community of Bambadinca, situated in the 
Bafatá region, in 2010 by TESE found the average daily expenditure by household to be 
2,052.75 FCFA (TESE, 2010).  
The midpoint of the range at which the individual chooses the amount offered in the 
future is assumed to be his discount rate. The same sets of choices were offered in a year from 
now to test for preference reversals. ‘If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 FCFA in 12 
months, or a guaranteed 1,500 FCFA in 13 months, which would you prefer?’. The time frame 
                                                
11 The Social Capital Initiative refers to an effort by the World Bank to provide a better definition and measurement 
for the concept of social capital in the context of development. See (Krishna & Shrader, 2000) for an example of 
questionnaire design.  
4 Five-point scale: trust a lot, trust, not trust nor distrust, distrust, distrust a lot. 
 
13 The amounts in FCFA were: 1,500, 2,000, 2,500, 3,000, 3,500, 4,000, 4,500, 5,000, 8,000, 12,000. 
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was moved to a year from now to control for seasonality effects which are prevalent in rural 
Guinea-Bissau. Individuals who exhibited lower discount rates in the second part of the time 
preference questions are assumed to be hyperbolic discounters. Although this could be a 
moderate estimate of hyperbolic discounting (as it was not asked at different points in the 
survey to avoid responses being driven by a desire to give consistent answers) (Ashraf et al., 
2006), it has been shown to remain a robust prediction of hyperbolic preferences and self-
control problems (Bauer et al., 2012). 
      Not all time discounting issues are addressed in this elicitation method (absence of risk 
elicitation, assumption of linearity of utility function, hypothetical choices, absence of front- 
end delay) (Frederick et al., 2002; Harrison, Lau, & Williams, 2002). The absence of risk 
elicitation and real rewards was due to the fact that it was logistically difficult for us to return 
to the field a year latter to make the payments according to the responses on the question 
measuring time preference reversals. It was also linked to our decision to not include monetary 
rewards for survey participants (discussed in Chapter 1). There is a general preference in the 
literature for real payments when eliciting discounting preferences as they are expected to give 
more accurate answers. For example, in an experiment comparing time preference elicitations 
made with real and with hypothetical payments Coller & Williams, 1999 find that results are 
significantly different and that responses with real rewards have a lower unexplained variance. 
However, a number of other similar experiments have shown no significant differences 
between discount rates elicited with real and hypothetical rewards within subjects (Johnson & 
Bickel, 2002; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003) 
In addition, Vischer et al., 2013 find that survey questions measuring impatience predict 
well discount rates elicited with real payments. Finally, the absence of front-end delay is mostly 
linked to bias when real payments are involved (Harrison et al., 2002), which is not the case in 
our study. 
Importantly, time preference elicitations with hypothetical rewards are used in many 
studies (e.g. Thaler, 1981) especially in contexts where flexibility is required (Frederick et al., 
2002). Similar choice tasks to ours have been used in other studies and shown to be robust in 
predicting behaviour in developing countries (Ashraf et al., 2006; Dupas & Robinson, 2013). 
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4.6	Implementation	
 
The design of the survey was led by interviews with local stakeholders and households using 
similar products, two pilot surveys, in some of the surveyed communities and background work 
done by the partnering NGO during the stage of product design.  
The first survey pilot took place between the 9th and the 11th of December 2013 in three 
different villages (tabancas) in the Bafatá region (Bidjini, Bricama, Djabicunda). Overall 8 
individuals were interviewed. The aim was to test the choice cards for their clarity, to try 
different combinations of product attributes and explore the best wording to avoid potential 
bias.  The aim was also to increase comprehension of the choice exercise.  The survey was also 
tested to see how to structure the different parts of the questionnaire. Community dynamics 
and potential problems that could arise during the survey were also detected.  
             Finally, the first two weeks of the actual survey were also designated as a pilot, but as 
no changes were made, surveys were incorporated in the result analysis.  
The final CE survey was undertaken in nine communities of the Bafatá region in 
Guinea-Bissau, presented in Table 5. A non-probabilistic convenience sample was chosen, 
based on considerations to include communities which differ in terms of isolation, energy 
poverty and urbanization. These communities included 4 out of the 6 ‘phase 1’ communities 
indicated from the NGO as the communities with the greater potential for immediate 
dissemination. The rest were peripheral communities considered by the project implementers 
as part of the ‘phase 2’ communities. In addition, households with large visible SHS were not 
surveyed. This is not a representative sample of the Bafatá region. It is however, a convenience 
sample of potential clients of the first stages of the project.  A map of the surveyed communities 
can be found in the Appendix. 
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TABLE	5	SURVEYED	COMMUNITIES	
 Frequency Percent Phase 1 
Communities 
Bidjine     28 18.79   Yes 
Bricama       9   6.04 No 
Buntunsum       5   3.36 No 
Contubel     21 14.09 Yes 
Cuntuba     33 22.15 Yes 
Djabicunda     35   23.49 Yes 
Ga tauda      4   2.68 No 
Gambasse      3   2.01   No 
Tantacosse    11     7.38 No 
Total 149   
 
 
 
A total of 179 households were interviewed from 11th of November 2014 to 17th of March 2015 
by a single enumerator. Respondents were asked if they were interested, in the particular SHS 
product, and their socio-economic information was collected. 149 households that exhibited an 
interest in the product were chosen to conduct the CE. Only lead decision makers were 
surveyed. Surveys were conducted in Creole, the local Portuguese language. Respondents were 
isolated prior to the survey.14  
Following the CE, the respondent was asked a series of social capital questions. 
Questions on time preference to elicit the respondent’s discount rate followed, before 
concluding the survey. A full survey can be found in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 Due to an error in randomization 80 surveys had to be discarded. The numbers stated above are of those of the 
final sample used.   
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4.7	Econometric	modelling	framework	
	
Results were initially estimated through the conditional logit model (Louviere & Hensher, 
1983; McFadden, 1974), an extension of the multinomial logit model, as is common practice 
in literature (Abdullah & Mariel, 2010; MacKerron, Egerton, Gaskell, Parpia, & Mourato, 
2009).  
In a conditional logit model the probability that one alternative will be chosen over 
another can be expressed with the following equation where µ is a scale parameter assumed to 
be 1. The error terms are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with an 
extreme value term. This allows solving the model through a maximum likelihood estimation 
(a series of iterations seek a global maximum that would maximize the probability that the 
model reproduces all its observations).  
 
 𝑃[(𝑈"# > 𝑈0#	∇	𝑖 ≠ 𝑗] = exp	(𝜇𝑉"#)exp	(𝜇𝑉0#) 
 
 
Initially, the simple log model focusing on the choice attributes was tested. Subsequently 
extended models were chosen including socio-economic attributes, trust indicators and latter 
discounting preferences.  
The ratio of coefficients of two attributes, holding utility constant, is their marginal rate 
of substitution. Where a price attribute is included this ratio becomes the marginal WTP for 
changes in attributes: 
 WTP = −1 𝛽FGGH"IJGK𝛽LH"MK  
 
 
The conditional logit model however relies on a number of limiting assumptions, which if they 
don’t hold, might lead to biased estimations, namely the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
and homogeneity of preferences. It has therefore been replaced by more sophisticated models 
(K. Train, 2003). 
A mixed logit model was subsequently tested with the same variables, which through a 
likelihood ratio test proved to have a stronger fit. Here we report these results. Conditional logit 
results can be found in the Appendix.  
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  Mixed logit models (also referred to as random parameters logit models -RPL) relax 
the stringent assumptions discussed for the conditional logit model. Error terms are allowed to 
correlate between alternatives (no reliance on independence of irrelevant alternatives) and 
across choice sets for the same individuals (taking account of the repeated choice data). Finally, 
the model allows to factor in heterogeneity of preferences (D. A. Hensher & Greene, 2003; K. 
E. Train, 2009).  
The Mixed logit model allows the coefficients b to vary randomly across individuals. 
These coefficients can be divided into a population mean β and an unobserved individual 
deviation from that mean ηi, therefore the utility of individual n choosing alternative j can be 
expressed as: 
 
 𝑈#0 = 𝑏#𝑥#0 + 𝜀#0 = 𝛽#𝑥#0 + 𝜂#𝑥#0 + 𝜀#0 
  
 
 
The residual error term εnj is assumed to be independently and identically distributed according 
to the extreme value form. The probability that individual n chooses alternative j is given by 
the following formula: 
 
 
 𝑃#0 = exp 𝑏#𝑥#0exp 𝑏#𝑥#0Q0RS 𝑓( 𝛽# 𝜃 𝑑(𝛽#) 
 
 
 
  
Where θ represents the parameters of the probability distribution of the bn. The integral does 
not have a closed form and is calculated with simulation methods taking the average values 
over a large number of draws of b from a particular distribution θ. These figures are 
subsequently inserted into a simulated log likelihood function to which conventional 
maximization techniques are applied.  
The model selected for this study specifies random normally distributed coefficients for 
all the product attributes, apart from the prices, which were estimated as fixed coefficients. 
This is a common practice in many CE applications using discrete choice models with random 
coefficients (Hensher, Shore, & Train, 2005;  Train, 2003). All the interacted socio-economic 
variables were also estimated as fixed parameters as when they were modelled as random, their 
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standard deviations were found to be insignificant. Both mean and standard deviation 
parameters for the random coefficients are reported. Following a log likelihood ratio test all 
the estimated mixed logit models were found to have a significantly improved fit in comparison 
to the conditional logit estimations. This shows that the mixed logit model fits the data better 
(Campbell, Hutchinson, & Scarpa, 2009; Hall, Fiebig, King, Hossain, & Louviere, 2006; 
Revelt & Train, 1998).  The software used throughout this study, unless otherwise stated, was 
Stata 14.  
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						5.		Results	
 
5.1	Summary	statistics	
 
5.1.1	Demographic	characteristics	
 
Table 6 presents the main socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. The sample 
consists almost exclusively of male individuals, as in most cases the decision maker is male. 
The sample also predominantly consists of individuals with low schooling as only 2% has 
received secondary education, 27% has received primary education, 50% has only received 
religious schooling, and 20% has not received any schooling at all.  
              As far as employment is concerned the predominant majority of households (98%) are 
involved in some form of agricultural activity. Only 7% of households have a member that 
receives a stable salary.  In an effort to further capture the seasonality of income, respondents 
were asked how much they suffer during the rainy season (in terms of economic hardship). 
37% reported to experience ‘a lot of hardship’, 57% reported to experience ‘some hardship’ 
and only 5% reported to experience ‘no hardship at all’.   
The big dependence of the country from help from abroad can be seen by the fact that 
40% of those households sampled, receive remittances from abroad.   
Finally, the nature of the extended households in Guinea-Bissau can be seen by the 
reported household size and the responses regarding family pressures to share money with 
other family members. 49% of households surveyed have 20 or more household members, and 
only 11% of respondents reported to not feel any pressure to share money with other members 
of their household.  
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TABLE	6	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	OF	THE	SAMPLE	
Total households sampled 149 Ethnicity (%)  
Respondent male (%) 98.66   Fula 15.44 
Schooling of respondent (%)  Mandinga 75.17 
Never had any education 20.13 Balanta 1.34 
Only religious education 50.34 Other 8.05 
Primary education 27.52 Children in household (%) 77.85 
Secondary education 2.01 Age of respondent (%)  
Superior education 0 20-29 4.03 
Employment (%)  30-39 28.19 
Agriculture 98.66 40-49 22.15 
Fishing 16.11 50-59 25.50   
Animals 91.28 60+ 20.13 
Large animals 12.75 Household size (%)  
Public employees 1.34 0-8 16.78 
Private employees 6.71 9-13 16.78 
Commerce 26.17 14-19 17.45 
Household receiving fixed salary (%) 7.38 20-30 24.16 
Remittances (%) 40.27 >30 24.83 
Self-reported pressure to share money 
(%) 
 Self-reported financial hardship 
during the rainy season (%) 
 
Not at all 11.41 A lot of hardship 37.58   
A little 75.84 Some hardship 57.05 
A lot 12.75 No hardship at all 5.37   
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5.1.2	Trust	for	different	actors		
 
Guinea-Bissau is a country with a high degree of solidarity and social links that make up for 
the lack of well-functioning institutions. This solidarity can be seen in the high level of trust 
reported in Table 7 for people in the community and traditional leaders. These levels are lower 
for local institutions and NGOs, but are still high.  
 
 
 
TABLE	7	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	ON	SELF-REPORTED	TRUST		
 Trust a lot Trust Not trust nor 
distrust 
Distrust  Distrust a lot 
Trust the people 
in the 
community 
 
44.30% 
 
31.54 % 
 
18.79 % 
 
4.70% 
 
0.67 % 
Trust NGOs  
24.16 % 
 
47.65% 
 
12.75 % 
 
15.44% 
 
Trust traditional 
leaders 
 
54.36 % 
 
34.23 % 
 
7.38 % 
 
3.36% 
 
0.67% 
Trust local 
government 
 
33.56 % 
 
35.57 % 
 
22.15 % 
 
8.72% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two indicators of different measures of trust were created, based on the responses using the 
principal component analysis (PCA), which is a descriptive technique that summarizes 
variables that are correlated. The first indicator is a general level of trust (PC1) with larger 
levels expressing lower levels of trust. The second indicator represent the contrast between 
trusting local informal actors and external institutionalized actors (PC2) with larger levels, 
indicating higher levels of trust for informal local actors, in comparison to institutionalized 
external actors. More details about how these indicators were created can be found in the 
Appendix.  
 
 
5.1.3	Income	indicators	
 
Nearly all the respondents use a combination of candles, flashlights and lamps powered with 
batteries, to meet their lighting needs (detailed information regarding energy use can be found 
in the Appendix).  
	 71	
Very few households receive fixed salaries or have a stable employment, therefore it is 
very difficult to elicit monthly household income. In this type of situations in developing 
countries it is very common to use income proxies in order to classify households according to 
their income (e.g. Takama et al., 2012). Based on the reality of the Bissau-Guinean society an 
income proxy was created based on the possession of energy durables. More precisely 
possession of TV and/or a generator was used as a proxy for income level, as better off families 
tend to possess at least one of the two (26% of our sample).  
This proxy was chosen after the interviews and focus groups. These consultations 
revealed that the income indicator based on household characteristic (often used in developing 
country research) (e.g. Takama et al., 2012), is less robust amongst the different surveyed 
communities, in comparison to the possession of energy durables. Therefore, it was deemed 
appropriate to focus on the possession of energy durables as an income proxy. 
Finally, 99% of respondents have seen a SHS before, although the percent that knows 
how a SHS works is much lower (38%) (Table 9). This is a good indication that respondents 
were familiar with the product during the valuation exercise, which is central to minimizing 
hypothetical bias.  
 
 
 
TABLE	8	INCOME	PROXY	BASED	ON	POSSESSION	OF	DURABLES	
Possession of Generator (%) 16.11 
Possession of Television (%) 24.16 
Possession of TV and/or of a generator (%) 26.53  
 
 
 
TABLE	9	REPORTED	KNOWLEDGE	OF	SHS	
Seen a SHS before (%) 98.66 
Knows how a SHS works (%)  
Yes 35.57 
No 55.03 
Not Sure 9.4 
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5.2	Determinants	of	lack	of	interest	in	the	product	
 
In total 30 out of 179 households reported they were not interested in the SHS under valuation. 
These households did not participate in the CE exercise. Table 10 reports the result of a binary 
logistic regression, which looks at the determinants of not being interested in purchasing the 
SHS. Results suggest that lack of interest in the product is largely driven by the limitations in 
the services offered from the specific SHS product. Possessing a TV is the only variable that 
is significantly and positively correlated with not wanting the product. This finding is also 
consistent with SHS literature, as limitations in uses is considered one of the bigger 
impediments to more SHS adoption, and television is one of the highest demanded applications 
(Nieuwenhout et al., 2001; Nieuwenhout et al., 2000; Urmee et al., 2009).  
 These results suggest that if the NGO chooses not to include a TV as a feature of the 
SHS it will lose many of its clients amongst the pool of those that are better able to pay. Since 
possession of a TV is an indication of being in a higher income level.   
 
 
 
TABLE	10	DETERMINANTS	OF	NOT	BEING	INTERESTED	IN	THE	SHS	OFFERED	
 Coefficient  
(std. err.) 
 
Age of respondent -0.01  
(0.02) 
Family size -0.02   
(0.02) 
Household has children 0.26    
(0.57) 
Household receives a fixed salary -0.18   
(0.74) 
Household receives remittances 0.23   
(0.43) 
Household possesses generator 0.73    
(0.57) 
Household possesses TV 1.18**  
(0.58) 
Constant 
 
-1.45  
(0.95) 
Log likelihood  
 N    
 Prob > chi2       
 
-72.49  
179 
0.018   
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Logistic regression with robust standard errors.   
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5.3	Mixed	logit	results	
 
Table 11 provides a description and the coding of the main variables used in the model of 
delivery model preference.  
 
 
	
TABLE	11	VARIABLES	INCLUDED	IN	THE	MODEL	OF	DELIVERY	MODEL	PREFERENCE	
 Type Description 
CE Model Variables   
Price Upfront  Continuous Price offered for upfront scheme (FCFA) 
scaled to 1/10,000 
Price Credit Continuous Price offered for credit scheme (FCFA) 
scaled to 1/10,000 
Price Rental Continuous Price offered for rental scheme (FCFA) 
scaled to 1/10,000 
Upfront Binary Alternative specific constant 
1= upfront scheme 
Credit Binary Alternative Specific constant 
1= credit scheme 
Rental Binary Alternative Specific constant 
1= rental scheme 
Maintenance Binary 1=consumer has the responsibility of 
maintenance  
Respondent Characteristics    
Energy durables Binary 1= respondent possesses generator or TV 
(income proxy) 
Remittances Binary 1= respondent receives remittances from 
abroad 
PC1 Continuous Principal component score indicating general 
level of trust (higher levels indicate lower 
levels of trust) 
PC2 Continuous Principal component score indicating contrast 
between trust for external actors and actors 
within the community (higher levels indicate 
higher trust for actors within the community) 
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Table 12 reports the mixed logit results of delivery model choice (Model A), and the mixed 
logit results of delivery model choice, interacted with socio-economic variables of the income 
proxy and receiving remittances (Model B and Model C). Prices were scaled in 1/10,000. 
Model A results indicate that all the attributes of the product offered, are highly 
significant and their signs conform to expectations from theory. Both the signs of maintenance 
responsibilities and of prices are negative, as expected. Standard deviations of the random 
parameters are large and highly significant, which confirms that preferences for different 
delivery models are heterogeneous.  
The model remains robust with the introduction of socio-economic variables of income 
indicator and receiving remittances, although these factors do not have a significant effect on 
all delivery models. The income proxy based on possession of energy durables has a positive 
significant effect on demand for upfront and credit payments, and a small positive but 
insignificant effect on the rental scheme. Receiving remittances from abroad has only a positive 
effect on demand for upfront payments. The effect is positive but insignificant for the credit 
scheme, and negative but insignificant for the rental scheme. The way this can be interpreted 
is that lump sum remittances from abroad can help facilitate high one-off payments.  
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TABLE	12	MIXED	LOGIT	MODEL	OF	DELIVERY	MODEL	CHOICE	(MODEL	A)	INCLUDING	INTERACTIONS	WITH	SOCIO-
ECONOMIC	ATTRIBUTES	(MODEL	B	AND	MODEL	C)	
 Model A 
Coefficient 
(std. err.) 
Model A  
Standard 
Deviation 
(std. err.) 
Model B 
Coefficient 
(std. err.) 
Model B  
Standard 
Deviation 
(std. err.) 
Model C 
Coefficient 
(std. err.) 
Model C 
Standard 
Deviation 
(std. err.) 
Upfront 4.80*** 
(1.01) 
5.32*** 
(1.05)  
3.00***  
(1.04) 
4.74***  
(1.03) 
3.05*** 
(1.03) 
4.68*** 
(1.02) 
Credit 7.10*** 
(1.07)  
3.53*** 
(0.65)  
5.86*** 
(0.96) 
3.18*** 
 (0.62) 
6.13*** 
(0.94) 
3.17*** 
(0.61) 
Rental 5.53*** 
(0.85) 
2.87*** 
(0.58) 
5.38***  
(0.87) 
2.64***  
(0.55) 
5.31*** 
(0.81) 
2.69*** 
(0.55) 
Maintenance -5.60*** 
(0.87)  
2.24***  
(0.71)  
-5.46***  
(0.85) 
2.37***  
(0.78) 
-5.41*** 
(0.84) 
2.33*** 
(0.76) 
Price Upfront -0.48*** 
 (0.09)  
 -0.44***  
(0.09) 
 -0.44*** 
(0.09) 
 
Price Credit -0.32*** 
 (0.05)  
 -0.31***  
(0.05) 
 -0.3*** 
(0.05) 
 
Price Rental -0.13*** 
(0.02)  
 -0.12***  
(0.02) 
 -0.12*** 
(0.02) 
 
Energy 
durables*Upfront 
  2.79**  
(1.25) 
 2.59** 
(1.22) 
 
Energy 
durables*Credit 
  2.93***  
(0.96) 
 2.82*** 
(0.92) 
 
Energy 
durables*Rental 
  0.85  
(0.84) 
   
Remittances*Upf
ront 
  1.96*  
(1.12) 
 1.89*  
(1.10) 
 
Remittances*Cre
dit 
  0.71  
(0.78) 
   
Remittances*Ren
tal 
  -0.66  
(0.71) 
   
Log likelihood -435.78  -419.78  -421.32  
Chi2   148.06  127.72   130.52  
Draws 1000  1000  1000  
Observations 574  566  566  
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Prices scaled to 1/10,000. Random parameters assumed to follow normal 
distributions.  
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Table 13 presents mixed logit results of an extended model, using interactions with the two 
indicators expressing trust levels which are created through the method of principal component 
analysis (Model D). Model E includes other socio-economic variables. Low general trust levels 
have a significant negative effect on preference for credit and rental delivery models. The effect 
on the upfront scheme is positive, but small and insignificant. On the other hand, low levels of 
trust for formal actors, external to the community, and high levels of trust for informal actors 
embedded in the community, has a positive significant effect on the demand for rental and 
credit schemes. These results can therefore be interpreted as an indication that lower levels of 
trust of locally embedded actors specifically have a negative effect on demand for delivery 
models which entail monthly repayments. In other words, lack of trust renders individuals more 
hesitant to engage in contracts that require frequent repayments. This could be explained by 
the lack of a social structure to rely upon in case one is unable to repay. These results remain 
robust even after controlling for socio-economic factors (Model E). 
Following a log likelihood ratio test, all the extended models reported have a 
significantly improved fit, in comparison to the basic model.  
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TABLE	13	MIXED	LOGIT	MODEL	OF	DELIVERY	MODEL	CHOICE	INCLUDING	INTERACTIONS	WITH	INDICATORS	
EXPRESSING	RESPONDENTS’	TRUST	LEVELS	(MODEL	D)	AND	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	VARIABLES	(MODEL	E)	
 Model D 
Coefficient 
(std. err.) 
Model D  
Standard 
Deviation  
(std. err.) 
Model E 
Coefficient 
(std. err.) 
Model E 
Standard 
Deviation  
(std. err.) 
Upfront 4.80*** 
(1.03) 
5.36*** 
(1.06) 
3.01*** 
(1.06) 
4.82*** 
(1.02) 
Credit 
 
6.9***  
(0.99) 
3.27*** 
(0.62) 
5.96*** 
(0.88) 
2.92***  
(0.58) 
Rental 5.52*** 
(0.81) 
2.46*** 
(0.57) 
5.36*** 
(0.79) 
2.30*** 
(0.53) 
Maintenance -5.46*** 
(0.82) 
2.09*** 
(0.69) 
-5.34*** 
(0.80) 
2.18*** 
(0.72) 
Price Upfront -0.48*** 
(0.09) 
 -0.44*** 
(0.08) 
 
Price Credit -0.31*** 
(0.05) 
 -0.30*** 
(0.04) 
 
Price Rental -0.13*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.12*** 
(0.02) 
 
PC1*Upfront -0.06 
(0.37) 
 0.05 
(0.35) 
 
PC1*Credit -0.8*** 
(0.29) 
 -0.80*** 
(0.27) 
 
PC1*Rental -0.75***  
(0.23) 
 -0.73*** 
(0.22) 
 
PC2 *Upfront 0.36 
(0.57)  
 0.20 
(0.54) 
 
PC2 *Credit 1.01** 
(0.45)  
 1.09** 
(0.43) 
 
PC2 *Rental 0.86** 
(0.36) 
 0.80** 
(0.35) 
 
Energy 
durables*Upfront 
  2.67** 
(1.26) 
 
Energy durables*Credit 
 
  3.03*** 
(0.89) 
 
Remittances*Upfront 
 
  1.95* 
(1.14)* 
 
Log likelihood -422.26  -406.72  
LRchi2 143.74  125.97  
Draws 1000  1000  
Observations 574  566  
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Prices scaled to 1/10,000. Random parameters assumed to follow normal 
distributions. 
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5.4	Willingness	to	pay	
 
Table 14 reports the mean WTP both for Model A and the extended Model C using the delta 
method. For the credit and the rental options, mean WTP is reported both as a total as well as 
a per month basis15.  
The NGO plans to offer upfront and credit options only, with maintenance 
responsibilities and rental schemes without maintenance responsibilities on a total price of 
100,000 FCFA for the upfront scheme and 4,000 FCFA per month for the credit and rental 
schemes. Therefore, only the mean WTP for the rental scheme without maintenance 
responsibilities (3,595 FCFA per month) is roughly comparable to the price proposed by the 
NGO (4,000 FCFA per month). This does not necessarily mean that the products in these prices 
are not viable. The NGO is planning to offer three different products, therefore only expecting 
to capture a part of the consumer basis with each product and delivery model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 To calculate monthly WTP, the total is divided by 24 for the credit option and by 120 for the rental option. 
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TABLE	14	WTP	FOR	THE	DIFFERENT	DELIVERY	MODELS	OF	THE	SHS	USING	THE		
POPULATION	MEANS	OF	THE	RANDOM	PARAMETERS	INCLUDING	INTERACTIONS		
WITH	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	VARIABLES	
 Model A Implicit price -
FCFA 
(95%conficence Interval) 
Model B Implicit price -
FCFA 
(95%conficence Interval) 
Upfront 99,416  
(71,843 126,990) 
 
 
 
 
69,535 
(32,229 106,841) 
 
 
 
 
Credit 
 
224,243 total 
9,343 per month 
(195,937.7 252,547.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
201,593 total 
8,400 per month 
(171,410 231,775) 
 
 
 
Rental 431,372 total 
3,595 per month 
(368,734.8 494,009.2) 
 
430,497 total 
3,587 per month 
(366,739 494,256) 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintenance for 
Upfront 
-116,058 
(-152,465 -79,650) 
 
 
 
-123,461  
(-164,204 -82,717) 
  
 
 
 
Maintenance for 
Credit 
-177,146 total 
 -7,381 per month 
(-216,315.8 -137,975.3) 
 
 
 
-178,144 total 
-7,423 per month 
(-218,405 -137,883) 
 
 
 
Maintenance for 
Rental 
-436,957 total 
 -3,641per month 
(-544,257.2 -329,657.4) 
 
-438,991 total 
-3,658 per month 
(-551,321.7 -326,659.8) 
Energy 
durables*Upfront 
 
 
 
 
 59,154  
(3,547 114,761) 
 
 
 
Energy 
durables*Credit 
 
 92,871 total 
3870 per month 
(36,841 148,901) 
 
Remittances*Upf
ront 
 
 43,036  
(-5,646 91,719) 
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5.5	Market	shares	
 
Market shares were simulated based on the previous mixed logit estimations (Model A) for a 
range of prices and maintenance responsibilities. Initially the prices and maintenance 
responsibilities proposed by the collaborating NGO were used (Table 15). In this case the 
largest market share is captured by the rental scheme (49.9%) followed by the credit scheme 
(12.7%) and then the upfront scheme (7.4%). In addition, the simulation results indicate that 
with these prices and maintenance responsibilities 29.8% of the potential market is not captured 
at all. In the last row, the market shares estimated by the partnering NGO are higher for the 
upfront scheme and lower for the rental scheme. Overall, simulation results find higher total 
market shares (70%) than were estimated by the NGO (56%). However, it should be noted that 
these figures are not directly comparable as credit schemes were missing from the NGO’s 
calculations, and our calculations are only based on the share of households expressing interest 
in the product.  
 
 
 
TABLE	15	SIMULATED	MARKET	SHARES	FOR	THE	DIFFERENT	DELIVERY	MODELS	FOR	PROPOSED	PRICES	AND	
MAINTENANCE	RESPONSIBILITIES		
 Upfront 
 
Credit Rental 
 
No product 
 
Price 100,000 FCFA 
 
4,000 FCFA per 
month 
4,000 FCFA per 
month 
 
N/A 
Maintenance 
 
User User Company N/A 
Market shares 
 
7.4% 
 
12.7% 
 
49.9% 
 
29.8% 
 
Market share 
estimated by  
TESE 
17%  39%  
 
 
 
Table 16 describes a scenario where credit is offered without maintenance responsibilities for 
the user, and the monthly price doubles. In this case a significantly higher market share is 
captured overall. 5.6% of the market is captured by the upfront scheme, 41.5% by credit, 36.2% 
by rental and 16.5% of the market is not captured at all.  
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TABLE	16	SIMULATED	MARKET	SHARES	FOR	THE	DIFFERENT	DELIVERY	MODELS	FOR	CHANGES	IN	THE	CREDIT	
SCHEME	COMPARED	TO	PROPOSED	PRICES	AND	MAINTENANCE	RESPONSIBILITIES	
 Upfront 
 
Credit 
 
Rental 
 
No product 
 
Price 100,000 FCFA 
 
8,000 FCFA per 
month 
 
4,000 FCFA per 
month 
 
N/A 
Maintenance 
 
User Company Company N/A 
Market shares 
 
5.7% 
 
41.5% 
 
36.3% 
 
16.5% 
 
 
 
 
This effect becomes even larger when upfront schemes are also offered without maintenance 
responsibilities while their prices double (Table 17). Only 12.5% of the market remains not 
captured. The upfront scheme captures 18.9% of the market, the credit scheme 36.8% and the 
rental scheme 31.6%.  
 
 
 
TABLE	17	SIMULATED	MARKET	SHARES	FOR	THE	DIFFERENT	DELIVERY	MODELS	FOR	CHANGES	IN	THE	CREDIT	AND	
UPFRONT	SCHEMES	COMPARED	TO	PROPOSED	PRICES	AND	MAINTENANCE	RESPONSIBILITIES	
 Upfront 
 
Credit 
 
Rental 
 
No product 
 
Price 200,000 FCFA 
 
8,000 FCFA per 
month 
 
4,000 FCFA per 
month 
 
N/A 
Maintenance 
 
Company Company Company N/A 
Market shares 
 
19% 
 
36.8% 
 
31.6% 
 
12.6% 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Table 18 simulates the effect of imposing maintenance responsibilities to the user for 
all delivery models. Market shares decline drastically. 59.2% of the market is not captured. The 
upfront scheme captures 10% of the market share, credit captures 18.11% of the market share 
and the rental scheme captures 12.5% of the market share even if offered in one fourth of the 
previous price.  
Although, these last two simulations reported in Tables 17 and 18 are not realistic in 
terms of market prices and maintenance responsibilities, they are an interesting exercise to see 
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how preferences vary along the different repayment schemes when maintenance 
responsibilities remain constant.  
 
 
 
TABLE	18	SIMULATED	MARKET	SHARES	FOR	THE	DIFFERENT	DELIVERY	MODELS	FOR	CHANGES	IN	THE	RENTAL	
SCHEME	COMPARED	TO	PROPOSED	PRICES	AND	MAINTENANCE	RESPONSIBILITIES		
 Upfront 
 
Credit 
 
Rental 
 
No product 
 
Price 100,000 FCFA 
 
4,000 FCFA per 
month 
 
1,000 FCFA per 
month 
 
N/A 
Maintenance 
 
User User User N/A 
Market shares 
 
10.1% 
 
18.1% 
 
12.5% 
 
59.3% 
 
 
 
 
5.6	Implicit	discount	rates	
 
Table 19 illustrates the implicit discount rates computed from the estimated mean WTP (based 
on the delta method) for the different delivery models in Model A. The following formula was 
used:  
16 
 
Discount rates are very high. In addition, discount rates are not stable and they decline with the 
time horizon or in other words, when larger time intervals are considered (rental), which is 
consistent with hyperbolic discounting.  
 
 
 
TABLE	19	IMPLICIT	DISCOUNT	RATES	INFERRED	FROM	COMPARING	MEAN	WTP	FOR	UPFRONT	AND	CREDIT	
SCHEME	AND	UPFRONT	AND	RENTAL	SCHEME		
 Credit  Rental  
Yearly discount rate 1.84 0.55 
 
Monthly discount rate 0.09 0.04 
 
 
                                                
16 r is the monthly discount rate and n the number of repayment months 
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Table 20 uses mean WTP estimates from Model C to compute implicit discounting amongst 
different socio-economic groups. Households possessing energy durables and receiving 
remittances have much lower discount rates than households with no energy durable 
possessions which receive no remittances. This holds for both time horizons (rental and credit) 
and is consistent with theoretical and empirical work, demonstrating that discount rates fall for 
higher income levels (see Frederick et al., 2002).   
 
 
	
TABLE	20	IMPACT	OF	INCOME	FACTORS	ON	IMPLICIT	DISCOUNT	RATES	
 Credit  Rental  
Household without energy 
durables and not receiving 
remittances 
  
Yearly discount rate 3.35 0.89 
 
Monthly discount rate 0.13 0.05 
Household with energy 
durables and receiving 
remittances 
  
Yearly discount rate 0.93 0.26 
Monthly discount rate 0.056 0.019 
 
 
 
 
5.7	Time	preference	questions	
 
5.7.1	Responses	to	time	preference	questions	
 
Table 21 reports the descriptive results of the time preference questions. 21% of respondents 
have a monthly discount rate that is lower than 25% for trade-offs now and 31% for trade-offs 
in a year from now. Mean monthly discount rates are 5.73 for trade-offs now and 5.47 for trade-
offs in a year from now. In addition, 23% of the respondents are hyperbolic discounters (higher 
discount rates in the second stage of the time preference questions in comparison to the first) 
and 6% are more patient in the future (lower discount rates in the second stage of the time 
preference questions in comparison to the first).  
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TABLE	21	DESCRIPTIVE	STATISTICS	OF	ANSWERS	TO	TIME	PREFERENCE	QUESTIONS	
Discount rates 
 
 
 
Average discount rate now 5.73 
 Average discount rate in a year from now 
 
5.47 
Hyperbolic preferences  
 
23.29 % 
 More patient in the future  
 
6.16% 
 Discount rate 
(Now vs 1 month) 
Percent of respondents 
0.25 21.23 
0.75 6.16 
1.25 5.48   
1.75 4.11 
2.25 1.37 
2.75 2.05 
3.75 13.70 
5.5 2.05 
9 2.05 
11 41.78 
Discount rate 
(12 months vs 13 months) 
Percent of respondents 
0.25 33.10   
0.75 8.28    
1.25 3.45 
1.75 2.07 
3.75 6.90 
5.5 0.69 
9 2.76 
11 42.76 
Hyperbolic preferences: higher discount rates in the present than in the future. More patient in the future: lower discount rates 
in the present than in the future. 
 
 
 
Studies conducted in developed countries find significantly lower rates. For example, Thaler, 
1981 finds yearly discount rates to range from 1% to 345% for hypothetical choices, Coller & 
Williams, 1999 find discount rates for elicitation with real payments between 1 month to 3 
months to range from 15%-25%. 
  Harrison, Lau, & Williams, 2002 also using actual payments find annual discount rates 
to be 28%. Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2008 find an average annual discount rate 
of 10.1% when also controlling for risk preferences. In a developing country setting studies 
conducted also find lower discount rates. Bauer et al., 2012 find three-month discount rates in 
rural India to be 0.244 for current trade-offs, and 0.193 for future trade-offs in elicitations with 
real monetary rewards and controlling for risk preferences. Anderson, Dietz, Gordon, & 
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Klawitter, 2004 find monthly discount rates to range between 0.6% to 66.9% in Vietnam and 
Pender, 1996 find discount rates to range between from 0.26 to 1.19 in India.  
The levels of absolute discount rates are not directly comparable across studies eliciting 
discount rates in the lab or the field as the time frames and the level of monetary gains or losses 
vary. For the objectives of this study what is important is to look at within sample variations 
(Bauer et al., 2012; Thaler, 1981).  
In addition, the percentages of individuals exhibiting time preference reversals are 
comparable with other studies. Bauer et al., 2012 find the percent of individuals who exhibit 
hyperbolic preferences to be 33% and 9.6% to be patient now and impatient in the future. 
Ashraf et al., 2006 find 25.7% to exhibit hyperbolic preferences and 14.6% to be more patient 
in the future. Finally, Dupas & Robinson, 2013 find these numbers to be 16% and 18% 
respectively.  
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5.7.2	Discounting	behaviour	as	a	predictor	of	delivery	model	preference	
 
Table 22 reports the mixed logit results of delivery model preference including interactions 
with discounting preferences. Overall, being impatient now (respondent exhibits discount rates 
larger than 25% for trade-offs now) has a significant negative effect on the demand for upfront 
and credit delivery models (albeit a larger effect for the upfront delivery model). This implies 
a correlation between the two expressions of discounting that retains its significance even after 
controlling for a range of socio-economic indicators including pressures to share money with 
other household members, schooling, age, household size, that have no significant effect 
overall. In addition, being a hyperbolic discounter has a significant positive effect on demand 
for credit schemes. These results show that rental schemes help address barriers to SHS 
adoption associated with high discount rates and credit schemes help address barriers to SHS 
adoption associated with self-control problems.  
It could be argued that sophisticated hyperbolic discounters see credit as a commitment 
mechanism. Upfront payments require savings, and rental schemes indefinite repayments. 
Rental schemes entail less of a commitment as they can be terminated with no costs to users 
(in contrast in the credit scheme termination of repayment entails giving up the opportunity to 
own the system when all repayments are completed). This is in line with other findings in 
literature, however, it should be noted that these studies are finding an association between 
demand for commitment and hyperbolic discounting only for women (Ashraf et al., 2006; 
Dupas & Robinson, 2013, Bauer et al. 2012). Women were unfortunately not represented in 
our study. 
An interesting implication of this last finding is that hyperbolic discounting in the case 
of implicit discounting, based on delivery method choice (discount rates declining with time 
horizon i.e. higher preference for rental schemes in comparison to credit) does not correlate 
with hyperbolic discounting measures based on the time preference questions.  
  However, it should be stressed that the effects of hyperbolic discounting are not robust 
in the conditional logit model (although signs and magnitude are retained) (see Appendix). In 
addition, in the mixed logit model, there is a positive effect, albeit not a significant one, for all 
other delivery models. 
Finally, these results show that implicit discount rates calculated from trade-offs 
between delivery models for SHS are only partly driven by high discount rates, but also by 
income levels, trust for different actors and hyperbolic preferences.  
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TABLE	22	MIXED	LOGIT	MODEL	OF	DELIVERY	MODEL	CHOICE	INCLUDING	INTERACTIONS	WITH	ATTRIBUTES	EXPRESSING	RESPONDENTS’	
DISCOUNTING	BEHAVIOUR	(MODEL	F)	AND	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	VARIABLES	(MODEL	G)	
 Model F 
Coefficient (std. 
err.) 
Model F  
Standard 
Deviation (std. 
err.) 
Model G 
Coefficient (std. 
err.) 
Model G 
Standard 
Deviation  
(std. err.) 
Upfront 7.34*** 
(1.63) 
4.46*** 
(0.96) 
4.15*  
(2.60) 
4.61*** 
(1.01) 
Credit 7.78*** 
(1.31) 
3.31*** 
(0.65) 
7.15*** 
(1.96) 
2.91*** 
(0.61) 
Rental 4.68*** 
(0.99) 
2.76*** 
(0.57) 
6.01***  
(1.72) 
2.29*** 
(0.54) 
Maintenance -5.34*** 
(0.92) 
2.26** 
(1.05) 
-5.55*** 
(0.86) 
2.56*** 
(0.87) 
Price Upfront -0.48*** 
(0.09) 
 -0.47*** 
(0.09) 
 
Price Credit -0.32*** 
(0.05) 
 -0.33*** 
(0.05) 
 
Price Rental -0.12*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.12*** 
(0.02) 
 
Impatient now*Upfront -3.66** 
(1.44) 
 -3.8** 
(1.54) 
 
Impatient now*Credit -1.78* 
(1.03) 
 -1.75* 
(1.04) 
 
Impatient now*Rental 0.65 
(0.9) 
 0.12 
(0.88) 
 
Hyperbolic*Upfront 1.02 
(1.31) 
 1.48 
(1.44) 
 
Hyperbolic*Credit 1.79* 
(0.98) 
 1.98**  
(1.00) 
 
Hyperbolic*Rental 0.37 
(0.87) 
 0.73 
(0.83) 
 
Energy durables*Upfront   2.45* 
(1.43) 
 
Energy durables*Credit 
 
  3.13*** 
(1.08) 
 
Energy durables*Rental   1.30  
(0.89) 
 
Remittances*Upfront 
 
  2.25* 
(1.22) 
 
Remittances*Credit 
 
  0.61 
(0.82) 
 
Remittances*Rental   -0.86 
(0.68) 
 
PC1* Upfront   -0.05 
 (0.34) 
 
PC1* Credit   -0.80*** 
 (0.28) 
 
PC1* Rental   -0.75*** 
(0.24) 
 
PC2* Upfront   0.91 
(0.60) 
 
PC2* Credit   1.09*** 
(0.48) 
 
PC2* Rental   0.94***  
(0.38) 
 
Log likelihood -419.68  -382.89   
Chi2 137.70  113.12  
Draws 1000  1000  
Observations 562  554  
*p-value<0.1**p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Prices scaled to 1/10,000. Random parameters assumed to follow normal distributions. Model 
G controls additionally for household size, age of respondent, schooling level of respondent, and whether the respondent is pressured to share 
money with other household members.  
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								6.	Conclusions	
 
This study uses a choice experiment to measure ‘Willingness to Pay’ for a SHS, its different 
delivery models (upfront, credit and rental) and their attributes (repayments over time, 
maintenance responsibilities). Consumer preferences for delivery models correlate with 
excessive discounting, hyperbolic discounting, trust for different actors and income proxies. 
Finally, not being interested in the product was driven by the fact that TV was not one of its 
features.  
More specifically, households with higher income exhibit higher demand for upfront 
and credit schemes, whereas individuals with high discount rates have a lower preference for 
upfront and credit schemes. In addition, there is some evidence that individuals exhibiting 
hyperbolic discounting have a higher preference for credit schemes. One explanation behind 
this is that credit provides a form of commitment. Finally, lower levels of self-reported trust 
for actors within the community lead to a lower preference for credit and rental schemes 
possibly because individuals feel less comfortable committing to monthly repayments. There 
is no evidence that intra-household pressures to share money affects delivery model choice.  
These results add to the studies looking at upfront cost barriers for technology adoption 
of a number of beneficial technologies in developing countries (Duflo et al., 2011; Dupas & 
Robinson, 2013). So far no study has considered the case of SHS adoption, the impact of 
different delivery models in overcoming adoption barriers and their interaction with socio-
economic, behavioural and social factors.  
This study also informs the discounting elicitation literature that uses revealed 
preference methods to measure time preferences (e.g. Hausman, 1979; Revelt & Train, 1998). 
So far there hasn’t been a thorough investigation of the underlying determinants of implicit 
discount rates. The significant correlation between discounting behaviour, exhibited through 
preference for repayments over time, and discounting behaviour elicited separately by time 
preference questions, confirms that observed inter-temporal choices are driven by time 
preference only to a certain extent, as other factors affect inter-temporal decisions as well 
(hyperbolic discounting, social capital as expressed with trust for a number of actors).  
Finally, implicit discount rates inferred from preferences for delivery models, managed 
to confirm certain priors regarding discounting anomalies that have been outlined in literature 
on discounting, namely excessive discounting, preference heterogeneity and time preference 
reversals (declining discount rates over time). These results underscore the replicability of 
these findings in different settings.  
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The findings of this valuation study, also fill a gap in literature concerning SHS delivery 
model provision which so far has only been descriptive, with no attempt to measure WTP and 
its determinants quantitatively. These findings can be extended further than the application on 
SHS as different types of services or goods could be provided in similar ways in developing 
countries. 
As far as policy implications are concerned this study indicates that there is high 
demand for SHS in the context of rural Guinea-Bissau. This demand is however deterred from 
a number of income, behavioural and social factors that can be address with the right delivery 
model. Rental schemes capture the highest market shares, however as preference amongst 
consumers are heterogeneous it is advised to offer consumers the option to choose the delivery 
model that better suits their preferences. Finally, project implementers should consider the 
option of offering an additional product that includes a TV, which could potentially help 
capture a largest market share depending on the additional costs this would entail.  
There are certain limitations in this study. We do not control for a number of possible 
mediating effects. For example, risk preferences and liquidity constraints were not taken into 
consideration, and they could be mediating income effects and discounting preferences. In 
addition, we are assuming that there no unobservable characteristics correlating with 
discounting and trust measures and with preferences for delivery models. Results remain robust 
to the inclusion of additional controls, however concerns about omitted variable bias cannot be 
eliminated.  
Neighbourhood effects in the demand for SHS were not considered. Having a 
neighbour with a SHS can have both a positive (e.g. through knowledge spillovers) and a 
negative effect (though positive externalities of product services e.g. mobile charging) on 
product demand.  The extent of which is difficult to estimate. In addition, as demonstrated in 
the summary statistics section, households in Guinea-Bissau tend to be large therefore it is not 
unlikely that there might be a demand for more than one system per household. This was not 
however considered as an option, as adding total costs would have been cognitively 
burdensome both for the respondents and the enumerator.  
This survey looked at product valuation from the consumer’s perspective. There are 
some issues crucial to the success of SHS projects that were not the focus of this study, but 
should be taken into consideration by project implementers.  For example, several authors have 
found that resorting to cheap replacements, inability to understand maintenance requirements, 
and neglect of systems by consumers due to lack of ownership are common reasons for project 
failure (Nieuwenhout et al., 2001). Some confusion and misunderstanding about the delivery 
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models for programmes already in place was noted during the survey, interviews and focus 
groups. Project implementers should exercise caution when communicating to consumers, 
exactly what their chosen delivery model entails. Greater variety of delivery model increases 
market penetration and helps meet the preferences of a larger number of consumers, but also 
introduces a greater risk of confusion.  
Due to limitations in the survey some attributes that could be relevant to consumer 
choice were not included, namely smaller upfront payments for credit and rental schemes (to 
increase user commitment), weekly instead of monthly repayments (to better replicate current 
energy spending patterns) and flexible repayments taking into consideration seasonality of 
income. These issues could be tested in a future study to further inform us on what 
considerations are behind preference for SHS delivery models in developing countries and how 
to better design SHS dissemination programs.  
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						8.	Appendix		
 
8.1	Conditional	logit	estimations	
 
TABLE	1	CONDITIONAL	LOGIT	MODEL	OF	DELIVERY	MODEL	CHOICE	(MODEL	A)	INCLUDING	INTERACTIONS	WITH	
SOCIO-ECONOMIC	ATTRIBUTES	(MODEL	B	AND	MODEL	C)	
 Model A 
Coefficient 
(std. err.) 
Model B 
Coefficient  
(std. err.) 
Model C 
Coefficient  
(std. err.) 
Upfront 2.22*** 
(0.35) 
1.55*** 
(0.42) 
1.58*** 
(0.41) 
Credit 
 
3.15*** 
(0.34) 
2.79*** 
(0.38) 
2.97*** 
(0.36) 
Rental 2.6*** 
(0.27) 
2.67*** 
(0.31) 
2.63*** 
(0.27) 
Maintenance -2.2*** 
(0.2) 
-2.29*** 
(0.21) 
-2.27*** 
(0.2) 
Price Upfront -0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.17*** 
(0.03) 
Price Credit -0.14*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
Price Rental -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Energy 
durables*Upfront 
 1.24*** 
(0.51) 
1.16*** 
(0.48) 
Energy durables*Credit  1.31*** 
(0.43) 
1.28*** 
(0.36) 
Energy durables*Rental  0.22 
(0.43) 
 
Remittances*Upfront 
 
 0.84* 
(0.48) 
0.76* 
(0.43) 
Remittances*Credit 
 
 0.48 
(0.38) 
 
Remittances*Rental 
 
 -0.22 
(0.37) 
 
Log likelihood -509.81 -483.63 -486.58 
Wald chi2 198.35 225.7 221.39 
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.38 0.38 
Number of Respondents 146 144 144 
Observations 574 566 566 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Prices scaled to 1/10,000.  
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TABLE	2	CONDITIONAL	LOGIT	MODEL	OF	DELIVERY	MODEL	CHOICE	INCLUDING	INTERACTIONS	WITH	INDICATORS	
EXPRESSING	RESPONDENTS’	TRUST	LEVELS	(MODEL	D)	AND	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	VARIABLES	(MODEL	E)		
 Model D 
Coefficient  
(std. err.) 
Model E 
Coefficient  
(std. err.) 
Upfront 2.33*** 
(0.36) 
1.68*** 
(0.43) 
Credit 
 
3.22*** 
(0.34) 
3.00*** 
(0.35) 
Rental 2.69*** 
(0.26) 
2.74*** 
(0.27) 
Maintenance -2.26*** 
(0.21) 
-2.36*** 
(0.21) 
Price Upfront -0.18*** 
(0.03) 
-0.18*** 
(0.03) 
Price Credit -0.14*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.02) 
Price Rental -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
PC1*Upfront -0.09 
(0.15) 
-0.06 
(0.16)   
PC1*Credit -0.30** 
(0.12) 
-0.32*** 
(0.12) 
PC1*Rental -0.37*** 
(0.11) 
-0.37*** 
(0.11) 
PC2 *Upfront 0.26 
(0.29) 
0.23 
(0.33)   
PC2 *Credit 0.42* 
(0.22) 
0.47** 
(0.23)  
PC2 *Rental 0.37** 
(0.19) 
0.36* 
(0.19) 
Energy durables*Upfront 
 
 1.21** 
(0.5) 
Energy durables*Credit 
 
 1.38*** 
(0.39) 
Remittances*Upfront 
 
 0.80* 
(0.44) 
Log likelihood -494.13 -469.71 
Wald chi2 229.20 243.74 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.40 
Number of Respondents 146 144 
Observations 574 566 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Prices scaled to 1/10,000.  
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TABLE	3	CONDITIONAL	LOGIT	MODEL	OF	DELIVERY	MODEL	CHOICE	INCLUDING	INTERACTIONS	WITH	ATTRIBUTES	EXPRESSING	RESPONDENTS’	
DISCOUNTING	BEHAVIOUR	(MODEL	F)	AND	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	VARIABLES	(MODEL	G)	
 Model F 
Coefficient (std. err.) 
Model G 
Coefficient 
 (std. err.) 
Upfront 3.13*** 
(0.55) 
1.95*  
(1.03) 
Credit 3.73*** 
(0.48) 
3.59***  
(0.98) 
Rental 2.49*** 
(0.48) 
3.62*** 
(0.99) 
Maintenance -2.18*** 
(0.21) 
-2.39*** 
(0.23) 
Price Upfront -0.17*** 
(0.03) 
-0.19*** 
(0.03) 
Price Credit -0.15*** 
(0.02) 
-0.16*** 
(0.03) 
Price Rental -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Impatient now*Upfront -1.22** 
(0.55) 
-1.28* 
(0.71) 
Impatient now*Credit -0.82* 
(0.43) 
-0.62 
(0.52)  
Impatient now*Rental 0.08 
(0.48) 
-0.04 
(0.54) 
Hyperbolic*Upfront  0.05 
(0.57) 
0.27 
(0.63) 
Hyperbolic*Credit     0.59 
(0.46) 
0.62 
(0.46) 
Hyperbolic*Rental 0.06 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(0.44) 
Energy durables*Upfront  0.99* 
(0.59) 
Energy durables*Credit 
 
 1.29** 
(0.54) 
Energy durables*Rental  0.36 
(0.49) 
Remittances*Upfront 
 
 0.87* 
(0.47) 
Remittances*Credit 
 
 0.43 
(0.41) 
Remittances*Rental  -0.36 
(0.38) 
PC1* Upfront  -0.02 
(0.17) 
PC1* Credit  -0.29** 
(0.12) 
PC1* Rental  -0.37*** 
(0.12) 
PC2* Upfront  0.32 
(0.37) 
PC2* Credit  0.41* 
(0.23) 
PC2* Rental  0.40* 
(0.20) 
Log likelihood -488.53 -439.45 
Wald chi2 182.95 304.43 
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.42 
Number of Respondents 143 141 
Observations 562 554 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Prices scaled to 1/10,000. Model G controls additionally for household size, age of 
respondent, schooling level of respondent, and whether respondent is pressured to share money with other household members.  
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8.2	Principal	component	analysis	and	trust	indicators	
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) creates uncorrelated variables, the principal components, 
which are linear combinations of the original variables they represent. This method allows us 
to represent correlated variables with one variable, the principal component (which contains 
most of the information of the original variables), and to explore patterns of relationships 
between them. PCA is often used to summarize correlated variables and create indicators 
(Bartholomew, Steele, Galbraith, & Moustaki, 2008).  
 
More specifically, for P observed variables 𝑥"	(1 = 1, 2, 3, … 𝑝) measured for each unit, 
which are correlated with each other with a total variance: 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥S = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥] + ⋯𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥L) 
 
The principal components yj (j= 1, 2…, p) are linear combinations of the original variables. They are 
derived from the eigenvalue decomposition of the correlation (or covariance matrix of 𝑥S, … 𝑥L 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥0  is the jth eigenvalue and (𝑎S0, 𝑎]0 … 𝑎L0) the corresponding eigenvector. 𝑦S = 	𝑎SS𝑥S + 𝑎]S𝑥] + ⋯+ 𝑎LS𝑥L 𝑦] = 	𝑎S]𝑥S + 𝑎]]𝑥] + ⋯+ 𝑎L]𝑥L 
. 
. 
. 𝑦` = 	𝑎S`𝑥S + 𝑎]`𝑥] + ⋯+ 𝑎L`𝑥L 
 
 
Where the following constraints apply: 
 𝑎"0]L"RS = 1	(𝑗 = 1, 2… 𝑝) 
 𝑎"0L"RS 𝑎"a = 0	(𝑗 ≠ 𝑘; 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑝; 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑝) 
 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦")L0RS = 	 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥")
L
"RS  
 
Principal components are derived and listed in order of decreasing variance. 
 
 
 
The four variables ‘Trust people in the community’, ‘Trust NGOs’, ‘Trust traditional leaders 
and ‘Trust local government’ were assumed to be continuous in the 5-point scale. Larger 
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numbers indicated smaller amounts of trust. Table 4 indicates the eigenvalues and proportion 
of variance explained by the principal components that were created. Only the first two 
components were chosen for further analysis based on the prevalent rule of thumb (more than 
70% of total variation is explained) (Bartholomew et al., 2008). 
  
 
 
TABLE	4	PRINCIPAL	COMPONENTS	EIGENVALUES	AND	
	EXPLAINED	PROPORTIONS	
 Eigenvalue Proportion 
Component1 2.19 0.55 
Component2 0.83 0.21 
Component3 0.54 0.13 
Component4  0.44 0.11 
 
 
The principal component loadings derived for the first two components are presented in Table 
5.  
 
 
TABLE	5	PRINCIPAL	COMPONENT	LOADINGS	
 Component 1 Component 2 
Trust people in 
the community 
0.68 -0.61 
Trust NGOs 0.68 0.58 
Trust traditional 
leaders 
0.82 -0.22 
Trust local 
government 
0.78 0.27 
 
 
  
The first component loadings are large and positive. This first component can be interpreted as 
a general measure of trust. The second component loadings are positive for trust in NGOs and 
local governments, and negative for people in the community and traditional leaders. This 
second component can be interpreted as a measure of the contrast between trust for local 
informal actors embedded in the community and trust for more formal actors outside the 
community. The second component is driven mostly by trust for people in the community and 
trust for NGOs, as component loadings are smaller for traditional leaders and local 
governments. 
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A component score was calculated for every individual using the component loadings 
as weights. The first score indicates the general level of trust (PC1) with larger levels 
expressing lower levels of trust. The second score indicates the contrast between trusting local 
informal actors and external institutionalized actors (PC2) with larger levels, indicating higher 
levels of trust for informal local actors, in comparison to institutionalized external actors. 
	
	
 
8.3	Products	proposed		
 
 Low income 
families 
 
Medium/ upper 
income group 
 
Businesses 
 
Wattage 0.5 20 170 
Equipment 1 light, 1 mobile 
charger 
4 lights, 1 Fan, 1 
Radio, 1 mobile 
charger 
 
4 lights, 1 fridge, 1 
mobile charger  
Price 
 
30 USD 195 USD (upfront) 
8 per USD per 
month (rental) 
 
77 USD 
Delivery models 
offered 
Upfront Upfront  
Rental 
 
Rental 
Market shares 
 
44% 
 
17% (upfront) 
39% (rental) 
 
0.5% 
Information adopted from TESE ‘Lojas Sta Claro’ project proposal 
 
 
	
 
8.4	Summary	statistics	of	reported	energy	use	
 
Around 2% report to actively use generators and 1% possess a normal sized PV (another 2% 
report to have a small panel which usually serves to power one light or charge a mobile phone). 
As far as cooking is concerned almost everyone uses wood for their cooking needs (98%). 
Current average household energy expenditure amounts to 9,700 FCFA, which is more than 
double the amount proposed for the monthly repayments in the credit and rental schemes (see 
Table 6). 
When it comes to energy using equipment 94% of the respondents have mobile phones 
and 92% of them pay to charge them.  81% own radios, but only 5% own fans. 24% of 
respondents own a TV and 16% a generator.  
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TABLE	6	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	OF	REPORTED	ENERGY	USE	
Lighting   
Private Generator (%) 2.68 
Candles (%) 65.10 
Flash light (%) 94.63 
Lamp with batteries (%) 85.91 
Other similar to a lamp with batteries (%) 4.03 
Regular Panel (%) 1.34 
Small Panel (%) 2.01 
Cooking  
Wood (%) 98.66 
Coal (%) 0.67 
Both wood and coal (%) 0.67 
Energy Costs  
Average monthly expenditures for energy per 
household (FCFA) 
9,700  
Mobile phones  
Has mobile phone (%) 93.96 
Pays to charge (%) 91.84   
Other equipment  
Radios (%) 81.21 
Television (%) 24.16 
Generator (%) 16.11 
Fan (%) 5.37 
Fridge (%) 2.68 
Computer (%) 1.34 
Cable TV (%) 7.38 
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8.5	Maps	of	surveyed	communities	
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8.6	Survey	example	
1. Introduction	
 
Note to interviewer: Ask: ‘Who makes the financial decisions and decisions regarding the 
purchase of energy products in this household? Can I talk to this person?’. If not available, ask: 
‘When can I come back to talk to that person?’. After you have established who to talk to, 
communicate the following information: 
 
‘We are conducting a survey in your community that is part of a research initiative carried out 
by a PhD student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, a university in 
London, in partnership with ‘TESE’ an NGO working in Guinea-Bissau on infrastructural 
projects, including energy. The purpose of the questionnaire is to study the potential use of 
solar energy in your community.’ 
We have randomly chosen some of the households in your community and other communities 
in the region to participate in this survey, and your household is amongst the ones selected.  
If you agree to participate we will ask you to make some hypothetical choices regarding the 
purchase of solar energy and you will also be asked questions about your way of life, the kind 
of energy that you consume and your opinion about your community. These questions should 
take around an hour and a half to complete. 
 
Your answers will be strictly confidential and will not be shared with anyone else. 
Answers will only be used anonymously for research purposes.  
 
Participation is voluntary and you can refuse to participate without providing any 
explanation and without any consequences. If you agree to participate in the survey you 
have the right to stop whenever you want.  
 
Your participation is very important to us. We will use the information you and other families 
give us to understand your preferences, and to design better solar products and delivery 
methods for a better future.   
 
Do you have any questions? May I continue interviewing you?  
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It is very important that you give honest answers, not to over or under state the answers, because 
if the information we collect is not true, the outputs of the survey will not be beneficial to your 
community or Guinea-Bissau.’ 
 
(Note to interviewer: Isolate the respondent before beginning the interview). 
 
 
 
Note to interviewer: are you speaking with the 
person who makes the financial decisions and 
decisions regarding the purchase of energy 
products in this household? 
Yes 
No 
Other. Specify____________ 
Name of community  
What is your Mobile number?  
(Note to interviewer: After you ask for the 
mobile number, inform the respondent that the 
survey supervisor might be calling just to check 
if the survey was conducted properly). 
 
What is your name?  
What is the gender of the respondent? Female  
Male 
What is your age? 
(Note to interviewer: If they don’t know their 
age or if they seem to be giving you the wrong 
answer take a note of the age they seem to be. 
As a clue, ask them what is the age of their eldest 
son). 
 
What is your education level? No schooling 
Primary schooling  
Secondary schooling  
Superior schooling 
Other. Specify________ 
 
Are you the head of the household? Yes 
No 
If ‘No’ what is the gender of the head of the 
household? 
Female 
Male 
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2. Socio-economic	questions	
 
2.1	General	socio-economic	questions	
 
Note to interviewer: Start this section by saying: ‘I will begin by asking you a few questions 
on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of your family, your activities the 
house where they live in and the things you possess.’ 
 
How many people live in this household 
including you? By household I mean all 
individuals who normally live and eat their 
meals together in this household and share 
their expenses. 
(Note to interviewer: To make sure we get 
the right response make sure you have a 
short conversation about what the 
relationship is of each member to the 
respondent. Example: Begin by asking who 
else lives here). 
 
What is the ethnicity of the household? Fula  
Mandinga  
Balanta  
Beafada 
Papel 
Cabo-verdiana 
Other. Specify_____________ 
 
How many children do you have in your 
household? 
 
How many years has your household lived in 
this community? 
 
What is the principal economic activity of 
your household? 
(Note to interviewer: you can note more than 
one) 
Public servants. Specify ______________ 
Private employees. Specify ___________ 
Services/ Commerce. Specify _________ 
Agriculture. Specify_________________    
Fishing. Specify ____________________  
Animals. Specify ___________________ 
Other. Specify ______________________  
 
Does any member of the family receive a 
fixed salary? 
Yes 
No 
Is your household negatively affected during 
the months when there is less availability of 
income in the community? (August, 
September, October) 
Not at all 
A little bit 
A lot 
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Does your household receive money from 
abroad? 
Yes 
No 
When you have money available are you 
pressured to share it with others in your 
household? 
Not at all 
A little bit 
A lot 
 
When you have money available are you 
pressured to share it with others outside your 
household? 
Not at all 
A little bit 
A lot 
 
 
 
 
2.2	Energy	use	questions	
 
Note to interviewer: Start this section by saying: ‘Now I would like to ask some questions 
concerning the use of energy in your household.’ 
 
What is the main source of lighting used in 
your household? 
Private provider 
Generator 
Candles 
Flashlights 
Battery powered lamps 
Other. Specify______________ 
 
What is the main source of cooking used in 
your household? 
Firewood 
Coal 
Other. Specify_______________ 
 
Do you have mobile phones in your household? Yes 
No 
How many mobile phones does the household 
have? 
 
Where do you charge them? At home 
Neighbour 
Store inside the community 
Store outside the community 
Other. Specify____________ 
 
Do you pay to charge them?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ go to the next 
section) 
Yes 
No 
How much do you pay to charge one?  
Do you have radios in your household? Yes 
No 
How many radios do you have?  
How do these radios work? Generator 
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Private provider 
Disposable batteries 
Rechargeable batteries 
Other. Specify____________ 
Do you have a generator in your household? Yes 
No 
Do you have a TV in your household? Yes 
No 
Do you have a fan in your household? Yes 
No 
Do you have a fridge in your household? Yes 
No 
Do you have a computer in your household? Yes 
No 
Do you have a satellite dish in your household? Yes 
No 
 
 
 
2.3	Expenditures	
 
What is your family’s expenditure (FCFA) at 
the moment?: 
(Note to interviewer: start by asking about 
daily expenses) 
 
Food Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Water Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Energy  Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Education Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
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3. Valuation	exercise		
 
3.1	Demonstration	of	SHS		
Have you seen a solar home system before? Yes  
No 
Not sure 
Other. Specify_______________ 
Do you know how a solar home system 
works? 
Yes  
No 
Not sure 
Other. Specify__________________ 
 
 
Note to interviewer: Introduce by saying: ‘now I will introduce to you a solar home product 
and afterwards ask you some hypothetical questions about purchasing it. Please remember 
that we are not selling anything to you yet, we are just asking questions to investigate your 
preferences’ 
 
Note to interviewer: show the cards with the pictures and explain: 
 
 
 
‘This solar system has 4 lights and a plug to charge your mobile phone. It also allows you to use a radio 
and a fan. This is the only equipment you can use. For example, you cannot use a television or a 
refrigerator. This is the panel and this is the battery. You can use the lamps 7 hours per day and the 
radio, the fan and the charger a few hours a day depending on the use of each. The panel needs to be 
installed on your roof to create and store electricity from the sun during the day.  These are the lamps 
which you can hang from the ceiling. The lighting quality of each lamp is equivalent to that of 16 
candles.  And this is where you can plug in your mobile charger to charge your phone, your fan and 
your radio.  This is the battery you use when there is no more light and it stores electricity generated by 
the panel. The battery must be kept inside your house. This product is expected to last for 10 years but 
every now and then the battery, the lights and other equipment need to be changed.   
 
Following the demonstration: Do you have any questions?’ 
 
In principle are you interested in purchasing 
this system: 
 
Yes 
No 
Maybe 
If ‘No’ why? 
 
The product is too basic I need it to have more 
functions (extra lights, fridge, TV, etc.) 
The product is too elaborate I don’t need all 
those functions 
I want to decide the functions myself 
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I want to be able to share some of the functions 
with other families 
Not enough functioning hours  
I am satisfied with my current energy situation 
I don’t think I will be able to afford it 
Other. 
Specify___________________________ 
 
(Note to interviewer: if ‘No’ skip the choice 
experiment unless they state as a reason that 
they might not be able to afford it).  
 
 
If ‘Yes’ who will be paying: 
 
Respondent 
Other. Specify________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2	Attribute	description	
 
3.2.1	Repayment	schedules	
 
‘If you are interested there are three different ways to acquire this solar system:  
1) Upfront payment: You can purchase the system upfront where you will be asked to 
pay the whole amount right away to acquire the system. Then you can use the system 
throughout its lifetime, estimated to be 10 years. 
2) Credit: You can acquire the system with credit, and for repayment you will need to 
pay a certain amount every month for the next two years. Then you can use the 
system throughout its lifetime, estimated to be 10 years. 
3) Rental (Fee for service): Finally, you can rent the system. In this case, you must pay a 
certain amount every month for the length that you use the system and this is a 
maximum of 10 years, which is the expected lifetime of the panel.  
 
In the case of credit and rent, the monthly repayments will be received in the beginning of 
every month by a representative of the company who will come to your house. If you are unable 
to meet repayments, the service will be paused until you start repaying again. If you cannot pay 
after a month, the system will be taken from you.’ 
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These payment methods are symbolised with the following symbols. 
 
(Note to interviewer: show picture card and explain what each symbol means)   
 
‘Under the symbol that demonstrates the payment method a corresponding price will be listed.’  
 
(Note to interviewer: explain the example cards that follow).  
 
Finally, this symbol demonstrates the total costs of the different payment methods by adding 
up monthly repayments. 
 
 Note to interviewer: show picture card and explain what the total costs symbol means).   
 
(Note to interviewer: explain the example cards that follow):  
 
 
 
3.2.2 Maintenance responsibilities 
 
‘Finally, solar home systems require some maintenance, which consists of cleaning the panel 
once a month but also repairing the system if something breaks, replacing different parts which 
might need replacing. The parts that usually need replacement are lamps, fuses and batteries. 
Lamps cost between 1000 and 2000 FCFA and fuses cost 600 FCFA each to replace. The lamps 
and the fuses need to be replaced every 8 years. The battery needs to be replaced every 4 years 
depending on the system being used properly and costs 43,300 FCFA. Other equipment is not 
expected to need replacement during the lifetime of the system, but equipment can always 
break or stop working unexpectedly.    
 
 
The following symbols show what type of maintenance the user is responsible for; the rest is 
the responsibility of the company. 
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(Note to interviewer: show picture card and explain what each symbol means).   
 
 
 
1. The maintenance responsibility of the user is to only clean the panel once every month. All 
repairs and replacements are the responsibility of the company.  
2. The maintenance responsibility of the user is to clean the panel and to be responsible for all 
replacements and all possible repairs (including replacements of batteries, lamps and fuses).’  
 
 
 
3.3	Choice	card	presentation	
 
‘We are now going to show you some choice cards. Each one presents three different options 
of acquiring this solar product in terms of prices, repayment methods and maintenance 
responsibilities. We will ask you to select the option you like the best. There is always a fourth 
option of not purchasing the product at all, if you do not wish to. 
 
We will show 4 choice cards and you will choose one of them. The first column will always 
present the option of purchasing the product with a one-off upfront payment. The second 
column will present the option to purchase the product with credit, and the third column will 
always present the option of acquiring the product with a rental scheme. However, levels of 
the prices and the maintenance responsibilities will always vary randomly. Others in the 
community might be presented with different cards.  Your fourth option will be to not purchase 
the system at all.  
 
When you make your choices please remember to be honest in your answers. Please treat this 
exercise as an actual purchase and keep in mind your budget limitations. Remember that your 
family’s money will need to pay for other things like food, health, water, education, phone 
credit and clothes.   
 
If you do not give us honest answers we will not be able to understand your preferences and 
how to make our design of the products better. Keep in mind also that your answers will not 
be able to influence the way that our products will be offered to you in terms of price levels, 
maintenance responsibilities and repayment schedules.’   
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3.4	Valuation	questions	
		
Note to interviewer: introduce each choice card the following way: 
 
‘Imagine that a company offered you one of these three options to acquire the abovementioned 
solar home system’. 
(Note to the interviewer: explain the choices, don’t forget to mention the choice of not buying 
anything). 
(Note to the interviewer: make sure to make the respondent understand that these are the only 
3 options available).  
 
 
 
 
Which would you choose from the following 
choices? 
 
A: Upfront 
B: Credit 
C: Rental 
D: Nothing 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5	Follow	up	questions	(for	respondent)	
 
(Note to interviewer: ask the following questions to the respondent after each choice. Make 
sure to customize your questions in relation to their choice each time) 
 
Are you sure your answer was realistic?  
Don’t you mind? Doing all the maintenance yourself? 
Paying a rental fee for the next 10 years? 
Paying everything upfront? 
Repaying monthly for two years (in the case of 
credit)? 
 
Do you have the money to? 
 
Meet the upfront payment that is required? 
Pay the monthly instalments required? 
Would you buy this product if it was offered to 
you now?  
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3.6 Follow	up	questions	(for	interviewer)	
 
(Note to interviewer: answer the following questions yourself after the choice experiment is 
over).  
 
Did the respondent understand the choice 
card exercise?  
 
Yes 
No 
Other. Specify________________ 
Did someone else choose for them? 
 
Yes 
No 
Other. Specify________________ 
Did the respondent start losing attention at 
some point in the choice card 
demonstration?   
Yes 
No 
Other. Specify________________ 
If ‘Yes’ which card was that? 1 
2 
3 
4 
Did the respondent choose randomly?  Yes 
No 
Other. Specify________________ 
Were the responses realistic? Yes 
No 
Other. Specify________________ 
 
 
	
					4.	Trust	questions	
  
Note to interviewer: Introduce by saying: ‘In every community some people get along and trust 
each other, while others do not. Now I want to ask you how much you trust different types of 
people’.  
 
 
How much do you trust people from your 
community? 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust NGOs? Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust traditional village 
leaders? 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
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Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust local government 
officials? 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
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5.	Time	preference	questions	
 
Note to interviewer: Introduce by saying: ‘In conclusion I will ask you to answer some 
hypothetical questions regarding your preferences for receiving money at different times’:  
	
5.1	Current	trade-offs	
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 1,500 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking, only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page). 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 2,000 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page). 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 2,500 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page. 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 3,000 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page). 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 3,500 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page. 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 4,000 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page. 
Today 
In a month 
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If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 4,500 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer? 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page). 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 5,000 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page). 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 8,000 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’, otherwise stop and 
move to the following page). 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA today, or 12,000 FCFA guaranteed in 1 
month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
 
5.2	Future	trade-offs	
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 1,500 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 2,000 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 2,500 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
12 months 
13 months 
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If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 3,000 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 3,500 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 4,000 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 4,500 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 5,000 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 8,000 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’, otherwise stop 
and conclude the interview). 
 
If someone offered you a guaranteed 1,000 
FCFA in 12 months, or 12,000 FCFA guaranteed 
in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
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Chapter	3		
An	assessment	of	the	determinants	to	connect	to	a	solar	hybrid	mini-
grid	in	Guinea-Bissau:	the	role	of	social	capital	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
Abstract	
 
This study explores the main determinants of the decision to connect to a solar hybrid mini-
grid in Bambadinca, a semi-urban community in Guinea-Bissau, with a focus on the role of 
social capital, as expressed in trust for one’s neighbours, in facilitating connections through 
the informal expansion of the grid. There is some evidence that social capital, as expressed in 
trust for one’s neighbours, has a positive effect on the informal expansion of the grid, whereby 
households use their neighbours’ infrastructure to connect to the service and reduce their 
upfront costs of connection. It has been possible to isolate this effect as, unlike other peer 
effects, it only becomes relevant for households that are farther away from the main grid. 
Results also indicate that the connection decision is driven by standard socio-economic 
variables and namely prior use of electricity, possession of electricity consuming appliances 
and income levels as well as upfront connection costs. Social capital as expressed with trust 
for a number of actors in the community and variables reflecting a households’ integration in 
the community are not found to be affecting the connection decision.  
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1. Introduction	
 
Mini-grids are designed to provide centralised electricity at the community level, which is then 
distributed to the users through a grid (World Energy Outlook, 2011). The technology used 
(diesel, renewable, or hybrid) and the installed capacity, define the type and size of activities 
that can be supported. Overall, mini-grids operate with higher loads than other isolated off-grid 
technologies that deliver electricity at the household level (e.g. solar home systems). In 
addition, mini-grids usually run in alternating current, which allows for the use of a larger 
variety of appliances, and support more income generating activities (see Rolland & Glania, 
2011 for a description). 
Mini-grids address a number of barriers to electrification both from the supply and 
demand side and are therefore seen as a promising solution to energy access problems in 
developing countries (World Energy Outlook, 2011). From the supply side they offer an 
alternative to grid expansion when the latter is not financially or technically feasible. From the 
demand side, social dynamics within the community can be harnessed in order to ensure 
repayments, avoid corruption, render the technology more inclusive and safeguard system 
reliability (Rolland & Glania, 2011). By design, mini-grids are embedded and often managed 
by the community, thus they have a unique ability to draw from and shape community 
dynamics. Therefore, mini-grids are an ideal subject for a study on the interplay of social 
dynamics and how they can pose as barriers and drivers to electrification.  
A number of experimental and non-experimental studies have looked at the role of peer 
effects in technology adoption in developing countries. These applications are mainly on 
agriculture (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Conley & Udry, 2010; Isham, 2002), but there are also 
studies focusing on health (Kremer & Miguel, 2007), water (Devoto, Duflo, Dupas, Parienté, 
& Pons, 2012) and energy (Barron & Torero, 2015; Bernard & Torero, 2015; Adrianzén, 2014). 
Most studies attribute the presence of peer effects to learning or imitation effects, by rejecting 
other potential channels through observations, the use of secondary data and result 
interpretation (Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; Bernard & Torero, 2015; Adrianzén, 2014). The 
conditions under which diffusion is taking place through constraint interactions, when one’s 
adoption decisions incurs externalities on the adoption constraints of others, has been less 
studied despite their highlighted significance (Bernard & Torero, 2015; Lee, Miguel, & 
Wolfram, 2016). 
In the case of electrification connecting households can affect other household’s 
connection decisions through two types of positive externalities. 
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 One is by lowering costs associated with the service for others. One such instance is 
when the upfront connection costs for neighbouring households are lowered as the grid is 
brought closer to them when a neighbour connects to electricity.  
These households now have the opportunity to connect through the grid infrastructure 
already expanded by their neighbour. This can lead to the informal expansion of the grid, 
whereby neighbours come into an agreement to share each others connecting infrastructure and 
therefore the ‘variable costs’ of connections associated with the extension of the grid (cables, 
poles, wires). This becomes more relevant for households that are farther away from the main 
grid. One related phenomenon is when households share the ‘fixed costs’ of connections by 
connecting to the service of a neighbour informally (‘spider webs’) (Bernard & Torero, 2015).  
The second externality appears when households that are not electrified, can use the 
electricity provided by connected households. This can occur both directly (using a neighbour’s 
service to power appliances, or go to the neighbour to watch TV) and indirectly 
(neighbourhood is less dark at night) (Lee et al., 2016). It should be noted that although the 
first externality is expected to affect households’ adoption decision positively, the second 
externality affects households’ decisions to connect negatively. 
This chapter investigates how social capital at the neighbourhood level as measured in 
self-reported trust for one’s neighbour can affect the likelihood of connection to a community 
solar hybrid mini-grid in rural Guinea-Bissau through encouraging the informal expansion of 
the grid infrastructure. This refers to only sharing grid infrastructure, and not informal 
connections as monitoring was in place to avoid illegal connections. Trust for one’s neighbour 
is expected to play a positive role in the informal expansion of the grid as neighbours need to 
come to an agreement about how to share the costs or to allow each other to use their 
infrastructure. Therefore, the level of trust underpinning their relationship can affect the 
success of this process.  
The potential effect of constraint interactions through the informal expansion of the 
grid can have important implications for electrification since high upfront connection costs are 
found to constitute one of the most important barriers to electrification (Bernard & Torero, 
2015; Lee et al., 2016). Therefore, a better understanding of the environment under which it 
can materialise is warranted.  
This exercise is also aiming to inform the literature that looks at the channels through 
which trust as a measure of social capital can enhance technology adoption. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1 trust can only capture social capital partially. Either seen as a one of its components 
((Putnam 1995: 67 in (Krishna & Shrader, 2000)) or as an outcome of social capital (Woolcock, 
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1998). Despite this limitation a number of scholars have used self-reported trust as an indicator 
of social capital to explain a broad range of economic phenomena including technology 
adoption (e.g. Adrianzén, 2014; McEachern & Hanson, 2008).  
More specifically, this study focuses on a solar hybrid mini-grid installed in the semi-
urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau. A variation on how the informal grid 
expanded in relation to the distance from the grid is used. This is in order to isolate the effect 
of trusting one’s neighbour on the development of informal infrastructure from the potential 
effect of trust on other channels of diffusion (learning, imitation, other types of constraint 
interactions).  
The effect of trust as well as the main determinants of household decisions to connect 
to the service are being explored through survey elicitation, prior to service commencement, 
of 396 randomly selected households in the community and through observation of their 
subsequent decision to connect. The survey also included questions on self-reported trust for 
neighbours as well as for different actors within the community and questions regarding the 
household’s integration in the community and participation in the project. This was, done to 
control for other social effects that might be relevant to adoption, in particular drawing from 
the community driven development literature. After the service commencement, connection 
patterns were mapped out in detail, to measure each household’s distance from the grid and to 
observe at which point using the neighbour’s infrastructure to benefit from lower upfront 
connection costs, became relevant.   
Results indicate that there is some evidence that trusting one’s neighbours can affect 
connections through constraint interactions positively, through inducing the informal 
expansion of the grid, as the net effect of trusting one’s neighbour on connections is positive 
for households that are farther away from the grid. The decision to connect to the grid was also 
driven positively by income level, number of adults in the household, ownership status, 
appliance ownership, prior use of electricity, and negatively by upfront connection costs (as 
‘proxied’ by distance to the grid) and having a female household head. No other trust questions 
or questions regarding the household’s integration in the community were found to be relevant 
in the general adoption decision. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study looking at the underlying social dynamics of 
constraint interactions, expressed through informal grid expansion. Finally, by looking at the 
determinants of mini-grid connections I am also informing the electrification and mini-grid 
literature. To my knowledge this is the first quantitative study looking at the drivers of adoption 
to community mini-grids and the first study looking at the role of trust on mini-grid adoption.  
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These findings are important for policy as they show that the social context, appliance 
possession, income and prior use of electricity should be taken into consideration in the design 
of electrification projects. Credit schemes and subsidies should also be considered to limit the 
negative effect of upfront costs on connections and ensure the inclusiveness of groups that are 
less able to pay.   
One of the main limitations of this study like in other studies looking at the role of peer 
effects in technology adoption is omitted variable bias, in other words the control of 
unobservables (e.g. unobservable shocks that affect the whole network, or similarities shared 
amongst households in the same network), that could be driving technology adoption outcomes 
within groups. Omitted variable bias would be present in this study if an omitted variable 
correlates with trust for neighbours as well as the connection outcome. Neighbourhoods are 
compared between them only in comparison to their distance from the grid. However, distance 
from the grid is not random and a number of household socio-economic characteristics differ 
according to distance from the grid therefore, the concerns regarding omitted variable bias 
cannot be eliminated. However, results are robust to controlling for a number of adoption 
determinants. 
This chapter proceeds in the following way: Section 2, presents the case study. Section 
3 provides a literature review, Section 4 presents the data collection and Section 5 presents the 
conceptual framework. Section 6, presents the estimation results and Section 7 concludes with 
a discussion.  
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					2.	Case	study	
 
2.1	Country	description	and	‘Bambadinca	Sta	Claro’	project	
 
This study took place in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca, which is situated in the 
Bafatá region in the Northeast part of Guinea-Bissau (See Chapter 1). 
The semi-urban community of Bambadinca is the capital of a sector17 with the same 
name. According to the latest census Bambadinca has a population of 6,437 inhabitants 
(RGPH, 2009), this number, has since grown18 and continues to grow due to a combination of 
factors which are mostly linked to its geographic location (commerce opportunities, recent 
infrastructural improvements).   
Until 2007 Bambadinca was receiving its energy from a power plant in the city of 
Bafatá which was operating with diesel generators through a 30KV transmission line. 
However, after this plant stopped operating and the cables were subsequently stolen, 
Bambadinca was left literally in the dark. Its population had to rely predominantly on 
traditional forms of energy (flash lights, candles) and expensive and inefficient alternatives to 
electrification (including private generators and a private provider called Badora19) to meet its 
lighting and cooking needs. This was until November 2014 when a new solar hybrid mini-grid 
started operating and made electricity available once again to households, businesses and 
institutions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 The Bafatá region has seven sectors in total 
18 According to a survey conducted by DIVUTEC one of the project’s implementing partners in 2012; the 
population was estimated to be 8,201 with a total of 780 households (DIVUTEC, 2010). 
19 Badora, serviced Bambadinca (apart from distant areas) only at night through a 115 KVA diesel generator since 
2010. In total Badora had 115 clients. Of them only 70 were paying (religious leaders, religious schools and some 
families were given the service for free). Prices ranged according to installed wattage of equipment, but were 
overall much higher than what the current mini-grid service is charging (e.g. 1 lamp 40-60 watt would cost 5,000 
FCFA per month).  
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FIGURE	1	MAP	OF	GUINEA-BISSAU	AND	BAMBADINCA	
 
 
 
 
 
This hybrid photovoltaic is the outcome of ‘Bambadinca Sta Claro20 - Programme for 
Renewable Energy Access’, an innovative project implemented by a Portuguese NGO TESE 
Development Association(TESE)21 and financed by the European Union and the Camões 
Language and Cooperation Institute as well as United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) and ECOWAS Center for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
(ECREE)22. The mini-grid has a 312 kW of installed capacity of 1,248 photovoltaic panels, 
216 batteries with a total of 69.000 Ah of storage capacity and three diesel generators of total 
of 290 kVA back up capacity. It operates under a public community partnership model as 
Bambadinca’s Development Community Association (ACDB), through the Community 
Energy Service of Bambadinca (SCEB), manages the service and retains the right to generate, 
transmit, distribute and sell electricity. 
The mini-grid started operating on the 15th of November 2014 with initially 120 clients, 
through a pilot phase to test the power plant and grid. In this pilot phase the grid was not yet 
                                                
20 ‘Bambadinca Sta Claro’ in Creole Portuguese means ‘Bambadinca is illuminated’. 
21 Other project partners include Bambadinca’s Development Community Association (ACDB), the General 
Directorate of Energy (DGE), the Guinean NGO DIVUTEC and the University of Lisbon. More specifically, 
ACDB an organization so far responsible for water management in the community was responsible for community 
mobilization, for project activities and ensuring the provision of the service (through the creation of SCEB which 
is the energy unit). DIVUTEC was responsible for the information campaign, to organize microcredit activities 
and a saving scheme in order to help the population meet the upfront connection costs. The University of Lisbon 
was responsible for sizing of the power plant and LV/MV grid design, training of local technicians and TESE for 
the execution of the project.  
22 The total cost (excluding costs for grid expansion) were 2,140,724 € with 1,605,543€ coming from the ACP 
European Union Energy Facility and 535,181€ from the Portuguese cooperation (Camoes CICL). UNIDO and 
ECREE financed the grid extension that was implemented one year after the initial commencement of operations 
and the technical assistance for operation and management of the grid and the power plant.  
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fully operational. In that phase clients were charged a flat rate of 3,000 FCFA23 per month for 
households and 6,000 FCFA per month for businesses and institutions, regardless of how much 
electricity they consumed. In April 2015 meters were installed and since then clients are being 
charged according to how much electricity they consume and at what time of the day they 
consume this electricity24 25.  The payment system is based on prepaid meters that clients have 
to refill every time they run out of credit and update their meters. By November 2015, 373 
clients had connected to the grid including 271 households, 9 institutions and 93 businesses.  
  The connection costs include the meter rental, which is 15,000 FCFA for households 
and institutions and 30,000 FCFA for businesses. Clients had to pay another 23,500 FCFA to 
install the circuit breaker and the electric quadrant, which was mandatory by DGE for security 
reasons26. Therefore, in total, each household/institution had to pay 38,500 FCFA in addition 
to the costs to connect to the grid (poles and cables), which varied according to the distance. 
Every meters of cable costs around 500 FCFA. Poles had to be placed every 35 meters. Small 
poles cost between 4,500 and 5,500  FCFA and large poles between 5,000 and 6,500 FCFA. 
For contracts made until 14th of November 2014, 30 meters of free cable were provided to 
incentivize connections.  
 A map of the initial main grid can be seen in Figure 2. The main grid was extended in 
two phases one in the summer of 2015 and one in the spring of 2016. However, for this study 
only distances from the first phase are relevant as I am focusing on the first stage of connections 
(connection patterns within the first year until November, 2015). A  map with the finalized 
form of the grid is available in the Appendix.  
 As far as the informal extension of the grid is concerned some clients came together to 
share pole and cable costs. In addition, some clients who made the pole and cable investments 
themselves, sometimes informally charged their neighbours to connect through their 
infrastructure, and sometimes let them do it for free. The official policy of the service operators 
was that households who wanted to use their neighbour’s infrastructure in order to connect, 
had to come to an agreement with their neighbours first. In this study this process is what is 
called the informal extension of the grid. This refers only to the use of the neighbour’s 
connecting infrastructure. As long as the neighbours came to an agreement it was permitted by 
                                                
23 The local currency is the Central African Franc (CFA), also represented as XOF or FCFA. The current 
conversion rate is 633 FCFA to 1 USD.   
24 09h-19h= 250 FCFA per kwh, 19h-24h= 320 FCFA per kwh, 24h-09h = 560 FCFA per kwh.  
25 Lower income groups (judged by energy poverty and not income) are charged the first tariff until midnight. 
26 Clients could buy these products by themselves.		
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the service operators. All households had to install a meter and pay for the electricity they 
consumed regardless of how they connected. No illegal or informal connections were observed. 
As the service is managed by technicians from the community it is easy to monitor for 
irregularities.27  
 
 
FIGURE	2	MAP	OF	BAMBADINCA	AND	THE	MAIN	GRID	(BEFORE	EXTENSIONS)		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 Some ‘spider web’ connections were allowed at a later stage of the project, due to a shortage in meters. 
However, this took place much latter than the time period covered in this study.  
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2.2	Geography	of	Bambadinca	and	community	dynamics	
 
All the information in this section was collected during qualitative work conducted prior to the 
survey, which is discussed in the data and methods section. 
Bambadinca consists of three large divisions the ‘Bairros’ (neighbourhoods). As these 
neighbourhoods have traditionally been distinct entities with different spheres of influence, 
there has been animosity between them including issues regarding infrastructure sharing. 
Overall, the community has 5 traditional leaders which consist of decedents of the first families 
that moved to Bambadinca, and they exert large influence. One of them represents 
neighbourhood 1, two of them neighbourhood 2 and two more neighbourhood 3.  
Apart from the different neighbourhoods there are further 21 smaller subdivisions 
called ‘zonas’ (zones). These zones were formed either because they had been inhabited by a 
particular family, ethnic or professional group, or because they used to form separate entities 
before the expansion of Bambadinca, or due to the timing that they were inhabited. Although 
the role of the zones used to be more pronounced in the past they still define certain geographic 
parties within the community. A map with the different neighbourhoods and zones can be 
found in the Appendix.  
Although the leaders were included from the beginning in the consultation processes 
for the mini-grid project, conflicts have arisen at times. These have been relevant to connection 
fees, location of infrastructure and the staffing of the service management team. Specifically, 
leaders from neighbourhood 2 have opposed the project a number of times and have tried to 
exert their influence on others as well, in order to get concessions from the project providers 
such as fee reduction. Leaders of neighbourhood 3 and 1, have always been cooperative with 
project implementers.  
Like the rest of the country, Bambadinca is a mix of different ethnicities and religions. 
The two predominant ethnicities are Fulas and Mandingas who are Muslim, followed by 
Balantas who are Animists or Christians. Historically within the country there have been 
tensions between the different ethnicities. More specifically, Balantas tend to be more 
marginalised. There have also been tensions between the Fulas and Mandingas.  
   Despite the tensions however, Bambadinca is a community that has been relatively 
harmonious, and there is a lot of intermarriage between the different ethnicities. Indicative of 
this, is that one of the reasons that Bambadinca was chosen as the site for the project, was that 
the community had been successfully managing a communal water supply project through 
ACDB.  
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During the set-up of the mini-grid project the implementing partners tried to be 
inclusive of all ethnicities and neighbourhoods in Bambadinca. However, Mandginas and Fulas 
dominate both the administration of ACDB and SCEB as well as the two focus groups formed 
to discuss issues related to the service.  
 
 
3. Literature	review	
 
Overall, the studies looking at electricity adoption in developing countries focus mostly on the 
socio-economic drivers of connections.  
A number of studies have found that electrification in developing countries depends to 
a varying extent on certain household characteristics, such as household size, income, 
education, age and gender of household head, employment and appliance possession (Aklin, 
Bayer, Harish, & Urpelainen, 2015; Kemmler, 2007; Louw, Conradie, Howells, & Dekenah, 
2008; Rao & Reddy, 2007; Reddy & Srinivas, 2009), but also on external factors like quality 
of electricity, tariffs, connection costs, availability of appliances and system reliability (Prasad, 
2006 in Louw et al., 2008; Bernard, 2010; Lee et al., 2016). 
These studies compare characteristics of electricity users to non-users with the 
exception of a few experimental studies (Barron & Torero, 2015; Bernard & Torero, 2015; Lee 
et al., 2016). 
Only two studies to my knowledge have looked at the role of peer effects on electricity 
adoption in developing countries. Barron & Torero, 2015 and Bernard & Torero, 2015 
randomly assigned different levels of discount vouchers reducing upfront connection costs and 
use the variation, to measure the effect of peers on adoption (In El Salvador and Ethiopia 
respectively). Both studies find a positive effect of discount vouchers on connection decisions 
and both find evidence of spill-overs (although Barron & Torero, 2015 find these effects to be 
less strong).  
Bernard & Torero, 2015 attribute the effects of these spill-overs on ‘preference 
interactions’, whereby neighbours try to keep up with connected households as electricity is 
associated with a social status. Barron & Torero, 2015 attribute these spill-overs to a mix of 
both learning and imitation effects. 
The main limitation of these studies is that, like other studies looking at peer effects on 
technology adoption, the data does not allow to isolate the exact channels through which peer 
effects operate. For example, in the Bernard & Torero, 2015 study the hypothesis that peer 
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effects can be affecting adoption through social learning is rejected, with the claim that the 
nature of the technology is such that makes it easily observable (Bernard & Torero, 2015). 
They also present evidence that prior knowledge of electrification and its benefits and how to 
connect was high. Constraint interactions are also rejected with the claim that there was no 
evidence of informal connections.  Similarly, other technology adoption studies have resorted 
to result interpretation to understand the way technology diffuses (e.g. Bandiera & Rasul, 2006; 
Adriazen, 2010).  
To my knowledge no study has looked at the underlying social dynamics of constraint 
interactions, in the case of electrification, even if their importance has been highlighted 
(Bernard & Torero, 2015; Lee et al., 2016). Barron and Torero, 2015 is the only study looking 
at the role of informal connections to electrification, albeit focusing on the potentially negative 
side of informal connections (spider webs) and the implications they might have on the formal 
connection decisions. The study finds that households with previously informal connections 
are more likely to undertake a formal connection. The study does not however try to identify 
the social dynamics that drive these informal connections (Barron & Torero, 2015).  
The present study looks at the effect of social capital as measured with trusting one’s 
neighbour on constraint interactions. I exploit a variation caused from distance to the main grid, 
to isolate the effect of social capital on informal grid expansion from other relevant peer effects. 
This effect is measured through the interaction of distance from the main grid with social 
capital measured as trust for neighbours.  
Adrianzén, 2014 study isolates the role of social capital in social learning for the 
adoption of cooking stoves in the Peruvian Andes. The study shows that the effect of social 
capital on cookstove usage is present only in communities that have a positive experience with 
the cookstove, the study demonstrates that social learning is the dimension of social capital 
influencing adoption decisions. Two measures of social capital are elicited, which are 
aggregated at the village level. One is trust for neighbours measuring internal social capital at 
the community level (bonding capital), and the other is trust for strangers measuring external 
ties with other communities (bridging capital). It is demonstrated that only bonding social 
capital affects adoption decisions through its interaction with successful adoption by others 
(Adrianzén, 2014). 
This study similarly tests if trust for neighbours only has a positive effect on connection 
decisions for households that are farther away from the grid, which would be an indication that 
trust for neighbours enhances collaboration between neighbours to bring about the informal 
expansion of the grid.   
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The choice of reference group is also important in the study of peer effects. Some 
studies resort to specific reference groups at the neighbourhood, school or community levels 
and others to self-reporting (e.g. Conley & Udry, 2010). Kremer & Miguel, 2007 find this 
choice to have significant implications on their findings. In the present study, as by definition 
infrastructure sharing is relevant within neighbourhoods, the level of the social group is by 
definition the neighbourhood.  
Finally, this study contributes to literature on mini-grids. To my knowledge no study 
up until now has tried to measure quantitatively what drives connections to mini-grids and the 
underlying economic, social and spatial dynamics.  The existing literature on mini-grids 
consists of descriptive case studies (Chakrabarti & Chakrabarti, 2002; Kivaisi, 2000) and 
analysis of the technical performance and cost effectiveness, in comparison with other isolated 
off-grid solutions (Chaurey & Kandpal, 2010; Jiayi, Chuanwen, & Rong, 2008; Moharil & 
Kulkarni, 2009). In addition, a number of largely descriptive studies have looked on the 
financial sustainability of mini-grids, focusing on the ability of mini-grids to cover operating 
costs, the role of local authorities and local populations, maintenance procedures, and 
availability of spare parts (Kirubi, Jacobson, Kammen, & Mills, 2009; Nouni, Mullick, & 
Kandpal, 2006). Finally, a number of studies have looked at the socio-economic effects of 
mini-grids (Chakrabarti & Chakrabarti, 2002; Kirubi et al., 2009). (Ulsrud, Winther, Palit, 
Rohracher, & Sandgren, 2011provide a discussion). 
The importance of community participation for the success of rural electrification has 
been underscored in a number of studies (see Schillebeeckx, Parikh, Bansal, & George, 2012; 
Hirmer & Cruickshank, 2014)  as has the role of social dynamics on the success of mini-grid 
projects (Rolland & Glania, 2011). However, it “hasn’t yet been empirically studied if local 
participation leads to better suited and hence more efficient and more sustainable designs or to 
elite capture and lower performance” (Bernard, 2010). 
Community based and community driven projects are thought to have a certain number 
of advantages as they allow for better use of local knowledge, encourage the building of social 
capital, render the benefits of the projects more inclusive and empower the more marginalized 
strands of the society. However, empirical evidence is mixed, suggesting that these projects 
can create effective infrastructure, but are not necessarily effective in reaching the poor, as 
benefits are often captured by powerful elites (See Mansuri & Rao, 2004 for a review). This 
elite domination, is more pronounced in unequal and more heterogeneous societies (on 
“factional, ethnic, or religious identity”) where leaders are not accountable (in Mansuri & Rao, 
2004). 
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This study also looks at how these highlighted concerns might apply in the case of a 
community mini-grid, by looking at how participation in the project, marginalisation, 
embeddedness in the community, divisions within the community and the role of leaders in 
aggravating these divisions can affect the decision to connect. However, these effects are only 
measured with survey indicators (e.g. trust for different actors, collective action, participation 
in the project).  
 
 
4. Data	and	methods	
 
The main determinants of household decisions to connect to the service are being explored 
through survey elicitation, prior to service commencement, of 396 randomly selected 
households in the community and through observation of their subsequent decision to connect 
after the service operation started.  
A baseline survey was undertaken to gather information on current energy 
consumption, income and other socio-economic information three months prior to the service 
commencement.  The survey took place between 16/6/2014- 23/7/2014 with three enumerators. 
Each survey lasted around 1 hour.  The survey was conducted in the local Portuguese Creole 
language.  396 households were surveyed with no businesses included. A random probabilistic 
sample at the household level of the community was selected, based on information on 
inhabitants collected prior to the survey.  
As it was not possible to acquire lists of inhabitants from the census, a list of the 
inhabitants was created using google maps. I took samples from the whole targeted population, 
and randomized from smaller subdivisions (stratified sampling at the neighbourhood level) in 
order to make sure that there would be a balanced geographic representation. The person who 
was responsible for energy purchase decisions was interviewed, or if that person was not there 
a person that was knowledgeable about the household’s affairs was interviewed instead. If no 
one was available, the enumerators were instructed to return later or move to the next household 
on the list. Overall, only 3 households refused to participate in the survey, and the enumerators 
were not able to reach 9.5% of the initial draw28.  
Prior to the survey a number of interviews with project implementers and two focus 
groups, one with community leaders and one with inhabitants, helped formulate and test the 
                                                
28 I assume MCAR (missing completely at random): non response probability the same for everyone. 
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questionnaire so as to understand better intra-household and community dynamics and energy 
use patterns. 
The survey included standard demographic questions and questions about energy use 
patterns. In addition, as the majority of households do not receive a stable income, a number 
of questions regarding the quality of the dwelling as well as the household’s possessions, were 
included to construct an income indicator. This is explained in more detail in the Appendix. 
Apart from self-reported trust for one’s neighbours a number of other trust, and 
questions regarding the household’s integration in the community and participation in the 
project were also elicited. This was done to test the general effects of trust on project success 
and the potential effects of divisions within the community on the decision to connect.  
Following a widely practiced method (e.g. General Social Survey, World Bank Social 
Capital Initiative29), households were asked to state their level of agreement with statements, 
expressing their level of trust regarding different actors in Bambadinca in a five-point scale 
(the community, friends, neighbours, relatives, people of other ethnicities, people of other 
neighbourhoods). They were also asked to state their level of trust for formal and informal 
institutions (traditional leaders, NGOs, local government) and generally state their feeling of 
belonging in the community. These were thought to encompass all potential expression of 
social capital influencing project success, and to express all potential divisions within the 
community30. To be able to fully explore the role of potential differences between groups 
within the community, questions about the household’s ethnicity, religion and years residing 
in Bambadinca were also elicited. 
In addition, questions were asked about membership to community organisations, work 
done for the community and one’s ability to borrow money in time of need. Finally, questions 
regarding familiarity with the service and level of household participation in the service, were 
included, to check whether knowledge and participation affect service adoption.  A complete 
draft of the survey can be found in the Appendix. 
Interviewed households were marked in a map in order to observe their decision to 
adopt to the service and to study the spatial dynamics (distance from the grid, neighbourhood). 
All clients using the service were also marked in a map, in order to be able to match them with 
                                                
29 The Social Capital Initiative refers to an effort by the World Bank to provide a better definition and measurement 
for concept for social capital in the context of development (see (Krishna & Shrader, 2000) for an example of 
questionnaire design). 
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surveyed households. The process of informal grid expansion was also mapped. ‘GoogleEarth’ 
was used for the initial mapping and ArcGIS for the measurement of distances.  
Only the connection patterns of the first year were studied (clients that had connected 
until November, 2015). The main reason for this is to ensure that surveyed households are 
properly matched with the service clients. This has been done for all clients until November 
2015. In addition, it is assumed that with the passage of time there is a higher likelihood that 
surveyed households could start moving around or outside the community. 
 
 
5. Estimated	model	of	binary	logistic	regression	
 
The impact of the household characteristics on the dichotomous decision to connect or not to 
the mini-grid, is initially analysed through a binary logistic regression model, which is 
commonly used in technology adoption studies (Bhandari & Jana, 2010; Walekhwa, Mugisha, 
& Drake, 2009). Probit and linear probability models were subsequently also tested to ensure 
the robustness of results. 
The logistic regression model is used when the dependent variable describes a binary 
discrete outcome. The logistic model is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation. 
The dependent variable is transformed into a logit variable, which estimates the natural log 
odds (odds are the ratio of the probabilities of the event and the non-event) of the occurrence 
of a particular event.  
More specifically, the binary logistic model is specified for the logit transformed odds 
of 𝑌" = 1  as follows: 
 
 𝑌" = 𝑙𝑛 𝜋"1 − 𝜋" 	= 𝑎 +	𝛽S𝑋S" + ⋯+ 𝛽h𝑋a" 
 
 
𝜋" = 𝑒Fj	klmlnj⋯jklmon1 +	𝑒Fj	klmlnj⋯jklmon = 	 11 +	𝑒p(Fj	klmlnj⋯jklmon) 
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Where Y is a binary response variable with values 0 and 1 and observations 𝑌" are statistically 
independent of each other. The log of the odds ratio (called the logit) is a linear function of the 
k explanatory variables	𝑋S + ⋯+ 𝑋a. P(𝑌" = 1 = 𝜋")	 is the probability ranging between 0 and 
1 and it is a non-linear function of the independent variables. 𝛽S +⋯+ 𝛽a  are the parameter 
of the model, which are interpreted as partial (log) odd ratios. This holds for n observations i= 
1,…., n. 
Alternatively, instead of interpreting the coefficients on the log-odds scale one can take the 
exponential and interpret coefficients directly as odds ratios. 
The odds ratio is expressed as: 
 𝜋"1 −	𝜋" = 	1 +	𝑒(Fj	klmlnj⋯jkomon)1 +	𝑒(Fj	klmlnj⋯jkomon) = 	 𝑒(Fj	klmlnj⋯jkomon) 
 
For the present study this model can be described as 𝜋" being the probability of connecting to 
the grid (judged by observed connections of surveyed households) and 𝑋S +⋯+ 𝑋a the 
independent variables influencing the probability of connecting to the mini-grids. 𝛽S +⋯+ 𝛽a  
are the estimated coefficients.  
Two relationships with distance to the main grid are explored. A threshold effect and 
an effect which increases with distance. For the threshold effect, a binary distinction is made 
between households that are close to the grid and do not benefit from the informal grid 
expansion, and households that are farther away from the grid and therefore the informal 
expansion of the grid could potentially reduce their connection costs. From observed 
connection patterns it was established that no infrastructure sharing took place below a 30-
meter distance from the main grid (a map with connection patterns is available in the 
Appendix).  
Therefore, a 30-meter distance from the grid was established as the threshold effect. 
Being at least 30 meter away from the grid is interacted with trust for neighbours to measure 
the possible separate effect of social capital. The second relationship assumes that the effect of 
social capital on informal grid expansion increases with distance from the main grid. Therefore, 
the log distance from the main grid is interacted with trust for neighbours.  
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					6.	Descriptive	statistics		
 
6.1	Household	characteristics	
 
Tables 1 and 2 list the summary statistics of the sample as far as the main household 
characteristics are concerned. 396 households were interviewed. Around 58% of respondents 
were the head of the family and 74% reported to be direct decision makers regarding the choice 
on energy purchase. 54% of respondents were male with the average age being 40.5. The 
average household size was found to be 11.3. In addition, 19% of households reported to have 
a female head31 and 28% of households reported that they receive remittances from abroad. 
 Overall, the sample consists of households that have lived in Bambadinca for a long 
time. The majority of these households also own the houses they live in (78%). The grand 
majority has children, and these children are going to school, although education levels are 
low.   
As far as employment is concerned the most common occupation is some form of 
commerce or agricultural activity and only 30% of households have a member that receives a 
fixed salary. Households overall report to save very little and experience at least some hardship 
during the rainy season (seasonality of income).  
Regarding geographic representation 11% of surveys took place in neighbourhood 1, 
62 in neighbourhood 2 and 26% in neighbourhood 3. In an internal survey that took place in 
2011 from one of the implementing partners the percentage of the population was found to be 
11% in neighbourhood 1 64% in neighbourhood 2 and 24% in neighbourhood 3 (DIVUTEC, 
2010). Therefore, each neighbourhood was well represented in the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31	These numbers demonstrate that in Bambadinca women have a significantly higher participation in decision 
making in the household than in the other communities in Bafatá surveyed in Chapter 1.		
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							TABLE	1	DESCRIPTIVE	STATISTICS	OF	HOUSEHOLD	CHARACTERISTICS	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
								TABLE	2	DESCRIPTIVE	STATISTICS	OF	HOUSEHOLD	CHARACTERISTICS	(CONTINUED)	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 The survey took place at a time when the majority of civil servants were not receiving their salaries due to 
political problems. For this reason, respondents were asked to state if there was someone in the household who 
normally received a fixed salary.   
Sample size  396 Households who have a female 
head 
18.94% 
Household connected by 
November 2015 
28.25% Households who receive 
remittances from abroad 
27.78% 
Respondent is decision maker 
about energy 
73.74% Households with children 95.45% 
Respondent is male  54.04% Average number of children 4.69 
Respondent is head of the 
family 
57.83% Households whose children go to 
school 
86.11% 
Average age of respondent 40.51 Households who receive a fixed 
salary32 
30.71% 
Average household size  11.3 Households who reside in 
Bambadinca for more than 40 years 
48.23 % 
Household  owns house 78.03% Households who reside in 
Bambadinca for more than 5 and up 
to 40 years 
33.59%  
  Households who moved to 
Bambadinca in the last 5 years 
13.13% 
Respondent’s schooling   Ethnicity  
Never went to school 39.49% Fula  46.97% 
Primary education 32.66% Mandinga 17.68% 
Secondary education 24.56% Balanta 17.42% 
Higher education 3.29% Beafada 4.29% 
Higher schooling in the family   Papel 2.02% 
Never went to school 4.29% Other 11.61% 
Primary education 29.8% Household employment  
Secondary education 60.10% Public employee 19.44% 
Superior education 5.81% Private employee 16.16% 
Neighbourhood 1  11.62%  Commerce & Services 40.66% 
Neighbourhood 2  62.12%  Agriculture 70.2% 
Neighbourhood 3  26.26%  Fisheries 3.03% 
  Small commerce 60.86% 
  Animals 4.55% 
  Other 6.82% 
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6.2	Energy	use	
 
The majority of the households in Bambadinca used traditional forms of lighting (candles, 
flashlights and battery powered lamps) prior to the commencement of the service (Table 3). 
Electricity (Badora, frequently used generators, solar panels) was used by a very small fraction 
of the population. It should be clarified that although a substantial proportion of the population 
possessed generators (25%) they tended to use them infrequently and not in order to meet their 
daily energy needs. 
 However, a larger fraction of the population possessed energy durables. The most 
common being TVs, DVDs and lamps, followed by fans, TV antennas, fridges, computers and 
irons. This can be attributed to the fact that 26.5% of the population was previously connected 
to the public grid. The large percentage of households possessing radios (85%), and mobile 
phones (98%), can be attributed to the fact that they had alternative means to power them 
(batteries, charge in stores). 
 
 
 
TABLE	3	HOUSEHOLD	ENERGY	USE	PATTERNS	
Lighting   Possession of energy 
durables  
 
Household uses candles  40.66% Lamps 30.05 % 
 
Household uses 
flashlight 
92.17% TV 34.60 % 
 
Household uses battery 
powered lamp 
72.22 % Fan 14.39 % 
 
Household uses other 
equipment with batteries 
(for lighting) 
2.02 % Fridge 8.08 % 
 
Household uses solar 
panels 
1.26% Computer 6.57 % 
 
Household uses car 
batteries 
0.75% Iron  6.57 % 
 
Household possess 
generator 
24.75% Satellite dish 9.09 % 
 
Household uses 
generator frequently 
4.8% DVD 30.3% 
Household was client of 
Badora 
8.33% Radio 85.61% 
Household was 
connected to the public 
grid 
26.58% Mobile phone 98.23% 
  Other   2.53 % 
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6.3	Self-reported	trust	
 
Overall the level of trust in Bambadinca is high (Table 4). Households demonstrate very high 
levels of trust for the majority of the community in general as well as their families. These 
numbers are slightly lower for traditional leaders, friends, and neighbours, and much lower for 
people of other ethnicities and other neighbourhoods. As far as more formal actors and 
institutions external to the community are concerned, trust for NGO’s in general and the mini-
grid project in particular is high. Trust for the local government is lower although still relatively 
high.  
Responses to trust questions are assumed to be the proxy of social capital for the 
household level, as we were not always able to interview the decision maker.  
More descriptive statistics regarding households’ participation in the project, 
knowledge of the project as well as membership in organisations and participation in collective 
action action for the community are presented in the Appendix.  
 
 
 
TABLE	4	SELF-REPORTED	TRUST	QUESTIONS	
 Trust a lot Trust Neither trust 
nor distrust 
Distrust Distrust a lot 
People in the 
community 
32.58% 60.10% 4.04% 2.02% 1.26% 
Family 71.72% 24.24% 0.76% 2.53% 0.76% 
Friends 32.32 % 52.02 % 8.84 % 6.06 % 0.76 % 
Neighbours 23.04 % 54.18 % 9.87 % 12.15 % 0.76 % 
Traditional 
leaders 
46.21% 41.92% 7.32% 3.03% 1.52% 
Other 
neighbourhoods 
8.33% 40.15% 25.00% 23.74% 2.78% 
Other 
ethnicities 
14.68% 47.09% 18.48% 18.48% 1.27% 
Implementers 
of the mini-grid 
project 
55.70% 34.68% 7.09% 2.53%  
The local 
government 
19.70% 52.02% 15.66% 12.12% 0.51% 
NGOs 35.44% 48.35% 9.62% 6.33% 0.25% 
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6.4	Statistics	of	distance	from	the	grid	
 
Table 5 reports the summary statistics of the distance from the main grid of all surveyed 
households, and also separately for the surveyed households that ended up connecting to the 
service. Around 30% of surveyed households are below a 30-meter distance from the main grid 
and 75% of surveyed households are up to roughly 120 meter away from the main grid. The 
maximum distance from the main grid of a connected household is 415 meters, however the 
majority who connected was 70 meters away from the grid or closer.  
Table 6 provides an estimation of how distance to the grid translates to connection costs 
based on the cost information presented in Section 2. As pole costs can vary the average cost 
of each pole is assumed to be 5,000 FCFA for this estimation. It becomes clear that these 
variable costs constitute a large part of the connection costs. The variable costs become the 
largest part of the connection costs for households that are 70 meters away from the grid. As 
distances increase even more these variable costs become very high.  
 
 
 
TABLE	5	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	OF	DISTANCE	FROM	THE	GRID	FOR	SURVEYED	HOUSEHOLDS	
Surveyed households Distance from the main 
grid in meters 
Surveyed households 
who connected  
Distance from the main 
grid in meters 
25% 24.24 25% 19.39 
50% 64.85 50% 39.16 
75% 121.24  75% 71.78 
99% 596.64 99% 253.15 
Largest 634.39 Largest 414.53 
Mean  88.79 Mean   57.95 
Surveyed households 
located below 30 
meters from the main 
grid 
30.25%   
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TABLE	6	ESTIMATED	CONNECTION	COSTS	ACCORDING	TO	DISTANCE	FROM	THE	GRID	
Distance from the grid (in 
meters) 
Estimated variable costs of 
connection (FCFA) 
Total costs of connection: 
Including  fixed costs  and 
variable costs (FCFA) 
0 0 38,500 
35 22,500 61,000 
70 45,000 83,500 
105 67,500 106,000 
140 90,000 128,500 
175 112,500 151,000 
210 135,000 173,500 
245 157,500 196,000 
280 180,000 218,500 
Variable costs: Assuming one pole is needed for each 35 meters, 500 FCFA per meter of cable, 5000 FCFA per pole. 
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7. Results	
 
7.1	Effects	of	trust	for	neighbours	on	the	informal	expansion	of	the	grid	
 
Table 7, 8 and 9 show the effect of trusting one’s neighbour on the informal expansion of the 
grid. 
For the logistic regression model, as well as the probit and OLS models trusting one’s 
neighbour has no effect on the overall connection decisions at the community level (column 
1). However, interactions with distance from the grid show a significant additional positive 
effect of trust levels for one’s neighbour on connection decisions for households that are 30 
meters away from the grid (column 3). This is attributed to the effect of trusting one’s 
neighbour on informal grid expansion. The overall effect of trusting ones’ neighbour for 
households that are 30 meters away from the grid is also positive and significant. It is also 
possible that the negative baseline is driven by the presence of other peer effects that have a 
negative effect on connections (e.g. ability to use the electricity of a connected neighbour). 
However, the baseline is not significant in the OLS model.  
The effect of trusting one’s neighbour interacted with the log distance from the grid, is 
also significant with the same signs. However, it looses significance for the OLS model. This 
demonstrates that it is less clear if the effect of co-operation for informal grid expansion 
increases the farther away one moves from the grid. One explanations behind this is that as 
most connections occur within a certain distance from the grid the informal expansion of the 
grid might be less relevant for households located very far.   
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TABLE	7	LOGISTIC	REGRESSION	MODEL	ON	CONNECTION	DETERMINANTS	WITH	TRUST	FOR	NEIGHBOURS	
INTERACTED	WITH	DISTANCE	FROM	THE	MAIN	GRID	
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Marginal 
effect 
(std. err) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Marginal 
effects (std. 
err) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Marginal 
effects 
(std. err) 
Log distance -0.426*   
(0.231) 
-0.057*      
(0.032) 
-0.886***   
(0.336) 
-0.110**      
(0.046) 
-1.429**  
(0.645) 
-0.190**     
(0.08) 
Trust neighbours 0.026  
(0.210) 
0.003      
(0.028) 
-0.944**   
(0.437) 
-0.117***      
(0.044) 
-0.995*   
(0.597) 
-0.132*      
(0.07) 
Trust neighbours 
*30meters 
  1.287**   
(0.553) 
0.160***      
(0.052) 
  
30 meters   -4.032**   
(2.031) 
-0.695**      
(0.274) 
  
Trust neighbours 
*Log distance 
    0.250*   
(0.145) 
0.033*      
(0.018) 
Log likelihood -122.71  -117.87  -122.04  
N 383  383  383  
Pseudo R2 0.46  0.48  0.46  
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. All regressions in this table control for all variables included in the regression 
in table 10. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the zone (smaller divisions of the neighbourhoods) level.  
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TABLE	8	PROBIT	REGRESSION	MODEL	ON	CONNECTION	DETERMINANTS	WITH	TRUST	FOR	NEIGHBOURS	
INTERACTED	WITH	DISTANCE	FROM	THE	MAIN	GRID	
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Marginal 
effects 
(std. err) 
Coefficie
nt 
(std. err) 
Marginal 
effects 
(std. err) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Marginal 
effects 
(std. err) 
Log distance -0.255**    
(0.129) 
-0.064**   
(0.032) 
-0.513***   
0.187 
-0.122***      
(0.04) 
-0.772**   
(0.337) 
-0.193**    
(0.080) 
Trust neighbours -0.0008  
(0.106) 
-0.0002     
(0.026) 
-0.487**  
(0.211) 
-0.116***      
(0.043) 
-0.526*   
(0.297) 
-0.131*      
(0.070) 
Trust neighbours 
*30meters 
  0.647**   
(0.271) 
0.154***      
(0.055) 
  
30 meters   -1.977**   
(0.971) 
-0.59**      
(0.266) 
  
Trust neighbours 
*Log distance 
    0.129*   
(0.075) 
0.032*      
(0.018) 
Log likelihood -121.95  -117.72  -120.01  
N 383  383  383  
Pseudo R2 0.46  0.48  0.47  
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. All regressions in this table control for all variables included in the regression 
in table 10. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the zone (smaller divisions of the neighbourhoods) level. 
	
TABLE	9	OLS	REGRESSION	MODEL	ON	CONNECTION	DETERMINANTS	WITH		
TRUST	FOR	NEIGHBOURS	INTERACTED	WITH	DISTANCE	FROM	THE	MAIN	GRID	
      (1) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
      (2) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
      (3) 
Coefficient 
(std. err) 
Log distance -0.044*   
(0.024) 
-0.065**    
(0.030) 
-0.102**   
(0.043) 
Trust neighbours 0.012  
(0.020) 
-0.057  
(0.034) 
-0.048   
(0.051) 
Trust neighbours 
*30meters 
 0.098*   
(0.046) 
 
30 meters  -0.335*   
(0.163) 
 
Trust neighbours 
*Log distance 
  0.014 
(0.012) 
N 383 383 383 
R2 0.45 0.47 0.46 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. All regressions in this table control for all variables included in the regression 
in table 10. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the zone level (smaller divisions of the neighbourhoods) 
level.  
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7.2	Other	connection	determinants	
 
Table 10 reports the determinants of connecting to the grid. A table with an explanation of all 
variable names used in the regressions can be found in the Appendix. Most of the determinants 
that were found to have no significant effect are not presented in the table, but are included as 
controls in the regressions. All the included controls were checked for multicollinearity.  
Most of the results in the models are expected by theory. Holding all else constant 
distance from the grid has a significantly negative effect on households’ connections. The main 
reason behind this is that distance from the grid increases the variable costs of connection since 
more cable and poles are required.  The negative effect of the size of upfront connection costs 
on electrification has been shown in a number of other studies (e.g. Bernard & Torero, 2015; 
Lee et al., 2016). 
Income indicators were included as dummies, with setting the poorest bracket as the 
baseline. Expectations from theory were confirmed. Lower medium, higher medium and richer 
income brackets, in comparison to the poor income bracket have a positive significant effect 
on connecting, which increases with the income category. The number of adults in the 
household also has a significant positive effect on connection.  
Having a head of the household who is female also has a significant negative effect on 
connection. One explanation behind this is that overall the income levels of female headed 
households are lower, but this is not the case in our sample therefore it is harder to interpret 
this finding.  
Equipment possession prior to connection not only reveals higher socio-economic 
status for the household and a prior experience with electricity, but also lowers costs associated 
with connections and entails higher benefits associated from the use of electricity. As expected 
possessing a TV and a fridge have a positive significant effect on connecting.  
In addition, as expected previous use of electricity and specifically being a Badora 
customer prior to the connection have a positive effect on connecting to the new service, as is 
to be expected. 
Being an owner of the house the family resides in, has a large positive significant effect. 
This is expected as non-ownership of one’s house renders the investment of electricity more 
uncertain (Barron & Torero, 2015).   
 Participation in an activity related to the administration or technical implementation of 
the project has a positive significant effect. But participation in activities related to the 
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construction process has no effect33. No trust variables or other variables capturing the 
respondent’s integration in the community (collective action, ability to borrow money in times 
of need, membership in community organisations and residing in Bambadinca for less than 5 
years) did not appear to have any effect on connecting to the service. And neither does 
household ethnicity or the neighbourhood one is located in.  
Household employment in commerce has a negative effect on connections. This result 
runs contrary to my priors, as households who were involved in commerce are expected to be 
better off and have a higher demand for connections. A possible explanation is that households 
who ran a commerce are more likely to have electricity for their business, which they could 
use to connect their households and avoid additional connection costs.  
Overall, the results are largely in line with other findings in the literature of 
electrification underscoring the importance of previous experience with electricity, income 
levels and possession of appliances as main determinants for connections (e.g. Barron & 
Torero, 2015).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
33 33% of surveyed households had a member who actively participated in the project the majority of which 
participated in construction (28%) and much fewer (5%) participated in an activity related to the administration 
or technical implementation of the project. 
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TABLE	10	CONNECTION	DETERMINANTS	
 Logistic model Probit model OLS model 
  
Co-efficient  
(std. err) 
 
Marginal 
effects (std. 
err) 
 
Co-efficient 
(std. err) 
 
Marginal 
effects (std. 
err) 
 
Co-efficient 
(std. err) 
Log distance  -0.426*    
(0.231) 
-0.057*      
 (0.032) 
-0.255** 
(0.129) 
-0.064**      
(0.032) 
-0.044*    
(0.024) 
Number of adults 0.068** 
(0.034) 
0.009*       
(0.004) 
0.040**    
(0.019) 
0.010**        
(0.005) 
0.008*    
(0.004) 
Female head -0.807**    
(0.351) 
-0.091*       
(0.036) 
-0.410**   
(0.179) 
-0.090**      
(0.036) 
-0.075  
(0.048) 
Private business -0.884**  
(0.362) 
-0.111**      
(0.043) 
-0.534***    
(0.203) 
-0.126***       
(0.047) 
-0.069***  
(0.040) 
Fridge 1.147*    
(0.597) 
0.204      
(0.141) 
0.687**  
(0.320) 
0.215*       
(0.124) 
0.181**   
(0.075) 
TV 1.229***  
(0.402) 
0.187**      
(0.075) 
0.671***   
(0.214) 
0.184***      
(0.067) 
0.202***   
(0.048) 
Generator 1.202    
(0.873) 
0.221       
(0.198) 
0.752  
(0.496) 
(0.243)       
(0.188) 
0.170  
(0.143) 
Badora 2.109*    
(1.100) 
0.429*       
(0.265) 
1.158**   
(0.524) 
0.394*       
(0.206) 
0.254*    
(0.124) 
Lower medium income 
level 
1.271***    
(0.395) 
0.205***       
(0.077) 
0.681***  
(0.192) 
0.194***      
0.063 
0.116**    
(0.043) 
Upper medium income 
level 
1.293**  
(0.549) 
0.217**      
(0.112) 
0.744*** 
(0.266) 
0.221**      
(0.091) 
0.126**    
(0.052) 
Richest income level 2.441***    
(0.491) 
0.454***      
(0.102) 
1.363***    
(0.238) 
0.432***        
(0.083) 
0.269***    
(0.061) 
Owner of house 2.753***    
(0.458) 
0.234***      
(0.039) 
1.566***   
(0.229) 
0.252***        
(0.036) 
0.192***   
(0.041) 
Neighbourhood 2 -1.223  
(0.832) 
-0.181 
(0.140) 
-0.700  
(0.442) 
-0.189 
(0.130) 
-0.103  
(0.105) 
Participation 1.716**   
(0.777) 
0.344*       
(0.186) 
1.028**  
(0.435) 
0.351**   
(0.168) 
0.246**    
(0.109) 
Constant -3.085** 
 (1.226) 
 -1.619**    
(0.645) 
 0.123 
(0.153) 
Log likelihood -122.71  -121.95   
N 383  383  383 
Pseudo R2 /R-squared 0.46  0.46  0.4586 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the zone (smaller 
divisions of the neighbourhoods) level. The regression controls additionally for other variables regarding socio-economic 
characteristics of the household and  the respondent (number of children, level of education, ethnicity, receiving remittances 
from abroad, receiving a fixed salary, being employed only in agriculture), energy usage patterns (being connected in the past 
to the public electricity service, owning a fan, owning a computer, owning an iron), self-reported trust (for other ethnicities, 
government officials, NGOs, neighbours, friends) and other variables regarding the household’s integration in the community 
and participation in the project (frequency with which  respondent undertakes collective action in the community, ability to 
borrow money in time of need, household membership in community organizations, living in Bambadinca for less than 5 
years, household participation in the construction of the project).   
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7.3	Limitations		
 
One of the main limitations of studies measuring peer effects on technology adoption is omitted 
variable bias, in other words, not controlling for unobservables. These could be either common 
shocks, that are experienced equally by the whole social group and also affecting technology 
adoption decisions, or common characteristics shared by a social group, that also affect 
technology adoption decisions (see Adrianzén, 2014 for a discussion).  
In this study is is possible that an omitted variable correlates both with the level of trust 
for neighbours and the connection decision.  
The main grid was not designed at random but follows closely to patterns of the 
previous public grid or the grid used from Badora, therefore it tends to pass closer from the 
centre of commercial activity. Households who are better off tend to be closer to the grid. 
However, the grid also passes from other less vibrant parts of the community.  The findings 
could therefore be biased if households closer to the grid differ from those farther from the grid 
in certain characteristics that correlate with trust between neighbours and connection decisions. 
These limitations cannot be fully addressed. However, results are robust to controlling for a 
number of adoption determinants. In addition, Table 11 reports no indication that levels of trust 
for one’s neighbours change according to the distance from the grid. 
Finally, another potential bias would arise if higher connection density affected peer 
effects, as connections are higher the closer one is to the main grid due to lower upfront 
connection costs and higher income levels. If that were the case the effect of trust for 
neighbours in the informal expansion of the grid can not be fully isolated, from other potential 
channels by which it could be affecting the connection decision, with using distance from the 
grid as a criterion. However, as the study is within the community level, overall distances 
between households are small and therefore it is unlikely that differences in connection density 
would affect peer effects drastically.  
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TABLE	11	RELATIONSHIP	OF	TRUST	AND	DISTANCE	FROM	THE	GRID	
 Below 30 
meters from 
the grid 
Above 30 
meters from 
the grid 
P-value 
Trust neighbours (5-
point scale 1=distrust 
a lot 5= trust a lot) 
3.892 3.854 0.71 
The table validates that the two groups in the survey are balanced across self-reported  
trust for neighbours. The p-value is derived from a t-test.  
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8. Conclusions	
 
This study looks at the effect of social capital as measured in trust for one’s neighbours in 
connections to a solar hybrid mini-grid that started operating in the fall of 2014 in the semi-
urban community of Bambadinca in Guinea-Bissau. A variation on informal grid expansion 
due to distance from the main grid is used in order to isolate the effect of social capital as 
expressed with trust in neighbours on informal grid expansion from other potential peer effects. 
The level of trust amongst neighbours is expected to affect the successful informal expansion 
of the grid as neighbours need to come to an agreement on how to share the costs or to allow 
each other to use their infrastructure. In addition, the main determinants of household decisions 
to connect to the service are explored through survey elicitation prior to service commencement 
of the 396 randomly selected households in the community, and through observation of their 
subsequent decision to connect.  
Results demonstrate that for households that are at least 30 meters away from the grid, 
trusting their neighbour has an additional positive effect on connecting, as opposed to 
households living less than 30 meters away from the grid. However, the total effect of trust for 
this group is small. 
Results demonstrate that the decision to connect to the mini-grid is driven positively by 
income level, house ownership, appliance ownership (TV, fridge), the number of adults in the 
household and previous electricity use patterns, and negatively by having a female household 
head and upfront connection costs (as ‘proxied’ by the distance to the grid). The majority of 
these findings have been confirmed in a number of studies (Aklin et al., 2015; Gaunt, 2005; 
Kemmler, 2007; Louw et al., 2008; Barron & Torero, 2015; Bernard, 2010; Bernard & Torero, 
2015; Lee et al., 2016; Rao & Reddy, 2007; Reddy & Srinivas, 2009). 
As far as variables capturing the household’s integration in the community and 
participation in the project, only participation in an activity related to the administration or 
technical implementation of the project has a positive significant effect. However, this type of 
participation concerns only a small share of the population. No other trust or other social capital 
question (collective action, ability to borrow money in times of need, membership in 
community organisations, year residing in Bambadinca) appeared to have any effect. These 
findings indicate that embeddedness in the community and level of marginalisation do not play 
a role in the connection decision. 
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However, although community divisions do not seem to play a negative role on 
connections to the service, some groups are still benefiting less from the service judging from 
the low connection rates of female headed households and of lower income households.  
To my knowledge this is the first study which looks at the drivers of adoption to 
community mini-grids, and the first study which researches social capital effects on mini-grid 
adoption. In addition, it is one of the few studies that looks at the effect of social capital on 
electrification. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the different channels of social 
capital are captured not only through using a variety of trust questions, but also though 
exploiting a variation of distance from the grid and therefore isolating the effect of social capital 
on informal grid expansion. To my knowledge it is also the first work which studies the 
potential positive effect of informal grid expansion on electrification and its underlying social 
dynamics. So far informal grid expansion has been widely ignored and these type of constraint 
interactions have been only studied in the form of informal connections and their potential 
barrier to formal connections (Barron & Torero, 2015). It is important to acquire a broader 
understanding of such a prevalent phenomenon in developing countries that can significantly 
reduce technology adoption costs.  
There are some limitations in this study. I am assuming that there are no unobservable 
characteristics, that differ between households that are closer and farther away from the grid, 
and correlate with trust for one’s neighbours and the decision to connect. The concerns 
regarding omitted variable bias cannot be eliminated. However, results are robust to controlling 
for a number of adoption determinants. 
 Finally, I assume that other peer effects are similar across Bambadinca, which could 
not hold if for example connection density influences the magnitude of peer effects. 
As far as the other findings are concerned, this study does not control for all the possible 
mediating effects. For example, discounting, risk preferences and liquidity constraints were not 
taken into consideration, and they could be mediating income effects.  
These findings are important for policy as they shed more light on the underlying 
dynamics of electricity adoption decisions. As a number of electrification projects suffer from 
low adoption rates it is crucial that we are able to understand the drivers of connection 
decisions. This study shows that electrification projects are more likely to achieve higher 
connection rates in environments where households have higher income means and already use 
some form of electricity and possess appliances. The provision of credit and subsidies to reduce 
the burden of connection costs should be considered as well. Attention should be placed not 
only in alleviating the ‘fixed costs’ of connection but also on the ‘variable costs’, which can 
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constitute an even bigger impediment. The provision of subsidies should also be considered in 
order to reach the poorest strands of the society.  
This study demonstrates some evidence that trust for one’s neighbours can indeed 
increase connections through the informal expansion of the grid. Therefore, the social context 
can play a role for the success of electrification projects.  
More research however is necessary to understand the other channels by which social 
capital can operate on the connection decisions and how they can potentially cancel each other 
before making more conclusive recommendation about the benefits of certain social contexts.  
The need to isolate properly peer effects on electrification, as they could be neutralizing each 
other, has also been underlined from other authors (Lee et al., 2016).  
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10. Appendix	
 
10.1	Explanation	of	variable	names	used	in	regressions	
 
 Definition 
Log distance  The natural logarithm of distance to the gird in meters 
Number of adults Number of adults in household 
Female head Dummy; 1= household has a female head 
Private business Dummy; 1= household is running a private business 
Fridge Dummy; 1= household owns a Fridge 
TV Dummy; 1= household owns a TV 
Generator Dummy; 1= household used a generator frequently prior to the 
service 
Badora Dummy; 1= household used the service of Badora prior to the 
service 
Lower medium income level Dummy; 1=household belongs to the medium income category 
 
Upper medium income level Dummy; 1=household belongs to the upper medium  income 
category 
Richest income level Dummy; 1=household belongs to the richest income category 
 
Owner of house Dummy; 1=household owns their house 
Neighbourhood 2 Dummy; 1=household lives in neighbourhood 2 
Participation Dummy; 1=household participated in the of the service in some 
capacity other than the construction of the mini-grid 
Trust neighbours 5-point scale; 1=respondent reported to distrust people from the 
neighbourhood a lot 5=respondent reported to trust people from the 
neighbourhood a lot. 
 
30 meters Dummy; 1=household is located 30 meters away from the grid  
Trust neighbours *30meters Interaction between ‘Trust neighbours’ and ‘30 meters’ 
Trust neighbours *Log 
distance 
Interaction between ‘Trust neighbours’ and ‘Log distance’ 
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10.2 	Income	indicator	
 
In this study the collection of accurate income data has not been possible due to the fact that 
very few households receive a stable income. This is a common problem in developing country 
research (Sahn & Stifel, 2003). A number of methods have been suggested in order to overcome 
this limitation and classify households according to their socio-economic status. One method 
is to measure a household’s consumption expenditure. Another method is to create asset based 
indicators. Although some issues exist with the method of asset based indicators (inability to 
incorporate short run shocks or the potential varying quality of included assets, inability to 
compare the same assets between different cities or countries) this method is thought to reduce 
the number of biases linked to the consumption expenditure method (measurement errors like 
recall bias, seasonality of consumption, and time considerations) (See Vyas & Kumaranayake, 
2006 for a discussion).  
 This study is therefore following the asset based method to proxy for household socio-
economic status whereby information of possession of a number of durable assets and 
household characteristics were used in order to create an indicator using principal component 
analysis (PCA) (Filmer D & Pritchett LH., 2001; McKenzie, 2003)34. Households were then 
assigned to four socio-economic groups accordingly: the poorest income group, the lower 
medium income group, the upper medium income group and the richest income group.   
PCA is a descriptive technique that summarizes variables which are correlated. More 
specifically PCA creates uncorrelated variables, the principal components, which are linear 
weighed combinations of the initial variables they represent. This method allows to represent 
correlated variables with one variable, the principal component, which contains most of the 
information of the original variables, and to investigate patterns of associations between them 
(See Bartholomew, Steele, Galbraith, & Moustaki, 2008 for a description).  
 
P observed variables 𝑥"	(1 = 1, 2, 3, … 𝑝) are elicited for each unit, which are correlated with 
each other with a total variance: 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥S = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥] + ⋯𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥L) 
 
                                                
34 PCA is a method used for continuous data and therefore using it for discrete data is seen as a limitation. Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is similar to PCA, but it is for discrete data and a number of studies use MCA 
instead of PCA to construct asset based indexes. However, studies have found that these two measures give very 
similar results (Booysen, Van Der Berg, Burger, Von Maltitz, & Du Rand, 2008; in Howe, Hargreaves, & Huttly, 
2008). This was confirmed in this study as well. PCA was used in this study as recommended by Howe and co 
authors (Howe et al., 2008).  
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The principal components yj (j= 1, 2…, p) are linear weighted combinations of the initial 
variables. The weights derive from the eigenvalue decomposition of the correlation (or if the 
original variables are standardized from covariance matrix) of 𝑥S, … 𝑥L. 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑥0  is the jth 
eigenvalue and (𝑎S0, 𝑎]0 …𝑎L0) the analogous eigenvector (weights). 𝑦S = 	𝑎SS𝑥S + 𝑎]S𝑥] + ⋯+ 𝑎LS𝑥L 𝑦] = 	𝑎S]𝑥S + 𝑎]]𝑥] + ⋯+ 𝑎L]𝑥L 
. 
. 
. 𝑦` = 	𝑎S`𝑥S + 𝑎]`𝑥] + ⋯+ 𝑎L`𝑥L 
 
The following constraints apply: 
 𝑎"0]L"RS = 1	(𝑗 = 1, 2…𝑝) 
 𝑎"0L"RS 𝑎"a = 0	(𝑗 ≠ 𝑘; 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝; 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑝) 
 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦")L0RS = 	 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥")
L
"RS  
 
The principal components are derived in declining variance with the first component capturing 
the largest level of variation of the original data. For constructing the asset based index, it is 
usually assumed that the first principal component provides a measure of income level (see 
Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006 for a discussion). The weights or factor scores for each indicator 
from this first principal component, are used to generate a household score, which has a mean 
equal to zero, and a standard deviation equal to one. The higher the score the higher the socio-
economic status of the household.  
Table 1 lists the summary statistics of the characteristics of the households and their 
possessions, which were used to classify (prior to consultation with the community) the 
households according to their socio-economic status, as well classifying the corresponding 
factor scores of the first principal component derived from the PCA. This principal component 
explains 22.46% of the variance. In other studies this has been found to range from 12% 
(Houweling, Kunst, & Mackenbach, 2003) to 27% (McKenzie, 2003) (discussed in Vyas & 
Kumaranayake, 2006). Generally, a variable with a positive factor score is associated with 
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higher socio-economic status, and conversely a variable with a negative factor score is 
associated with lower socio-economic status. 
 
 
 
TABLE	1	DESCRIPTIVE	STATISTICS	OF	VARIABLES	USED	TO	CREATE	INCOME	INDICATOR	AND	THEIR	
CORRESPONDING	FACTOR	SCORES	
Household roof  Factor scores Possessions  Factor scores 
Straw 9.6% -0.3662  Bike 60.35% 0.0557  
Zinc 89.9% 0.3399 Motorbikes 20.71% 0.2064   
Tiles 0.51% 0.0767 Cars 9.87% 0.1989  
Household 
construction 
 Factor scores Floor  Factor scores 
Definitive 1.26% 0.1168 Mosaic 1.26% 0.0790 
Precarious 91.92% -0.3082  Cement 61.36% 0.4323   
Precarious with 
improvements 
6.82% 0.2815 Mud 37.37% -0.4534  
Main water resource  Factor scores Household 
cooking fuel 
 Factor scores 
Domestic connection 0.25%  Coal 41.67 %  
ACDB fountain 50.89%  Biomass 49.75 % -0.2318  
Fountain other 17.72 %  Coal and biomass 8.08 %  
Well 30.63% -0.1373  Gas 0.25 %  
Other 0.51%  Gas and Coal 0.25  %  
 
 
 
As expected living in a house with a roof made of straw and a mud floor, a precarious 
construction, using water from the well35 as a primary drinking source, using biomass36 as a 
main cooking fuel, and not possessing motorbikes and cars, are all associated with a lower 
socio-economic status. Whereas living in a house with tiles or zinc on the roof or cement or 
mosaic on the floor, a definitive or a non-definitive construction with improvements, 
possessing a car or a motorbike and using coal or a combination of coal and biomass, or coal 
and gas, are all associated with a higher socio-economic status.  
 As discussed by Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006 two limitations with using PCA to 
create income indicators are clumping, whereby households are not evenly distributed but are 
grouped together in small clusters, and truncation, whereby households are only distributed 
                                                
35 In the case of the main drinking water source only the distinction between drinking water from the well or from 
another source was introduced in the PCA (as differences between all other sources largely depend on 
geographical location of the household and not on socio-economic level).   
36 As in the case of water; cooking fuels were introduced in the PCA as a binary variable distinguishing between 
households who only use biomass and households who use coal or a combination of coal and biomass or coal and 
gas.	
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amongst a limited scope. The following histogram demonstrates that although the distribution 
of the derived socio-economic scores are not perfectly normal, there are also no serious 
indications of clumping and truncation. 
 
 
 
FIGURE	1	DISTRIBUTION	OF	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	SCORES	DERIVED	FROM	PRINCIPAL	COMPONENT	ANALYSIS	
 
 
 
The socio-economic score generated for each household was not included in the regression, 
but it was divided into four roughly equal categories (quartiles) for further analysis, 
representing the poorest, the lower medium, the upper medium and the richest groups of the 
community (there is a variety of ways these classifications are done see Vyas & 
Kumaranayake, 2006 for a discussion). Table 2 lists the mean socio-economic score of each 
income group.  
 
 
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
De
ns
ity
-4 -2 0 2 4
Scores for component 1
	 159	
TABLE	2	MEAN	SOCIO-ECONOMIC	SCORE	OF	DIFFERENT	INCOME	GROUPS	
 Poorest Lower 
medium 
Upper 
medium 
Richest 
Score -2.23 -0.21 0.80 2.04 
 
 
Overall, the number of variables used to derive this asset indicator is smaller than in most 
studies (usually it ranges from 10 to 30 see Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006 for a discussion). A 
number of additional variables often used in income classification exercises such as education 
and gender of household head, receiving remittances from abroad, receiving a fixed salary as 
well as possession of energy durables, were not introduced in the PCA in order to study their 
effect on the household’s decision to connect to the mini-grid separately. 
 
 
10.3	Other	questions	on	integration	in	the	community	and	participation	in	the	project		
 
At the time of the survey, knowledge in the community regarding the service was high. 98% 
of respondents stated that they knew about the project. The grand majority was informed 
informally through family, friends and neighbours and less from the marketing campaign 
undertaken by project implementers. However, much less people had more informed 
knowledge about the service, as measured by the ability to name one of the project 
implementers. 33 % of surveyed households had a member who actively participated in the 
project (the majority of which participated in construction (28%) and much fewer (5%) 
participated only in an activity related to the administration or technical implementation of the 
project.  
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TABLE	3	QUESTIONS	ABOUT	THE	PROJECT	
Respondent knows 
about the service 
97.98% Respondent can name 
project facilitators? 
16.41% 
How did respondent 
find out about the 
service 
 ACDB 61.54% 
Family 17.53% Divutec  61.54% 
Friends 21.65% TESE 50.77% 
Neighbours 23.20% University of Lisbon 9.23% 
Market 2.06% DRE 1.54% 
Newspaper 0.26% Other (Portugal, EU, 
SNV) 
12.3% 
Radio 15.98% Respondent has visited 
the mini-grid station 
56.81% 
Television 0.52% Family member 
worked for the mini-
grid37 
33.33% 
Groups/Associations 0.26% Focus group A 2.31% 
Community leaders 1.55% Focus group B 6.92% 
DIVUTEC 4.38% Group of influence 2.31% 
ACDB 3.61% Construction 83.08% 
Posters 2.06% ACDB administration 3.08% 
Other38  8.51% 
 
Technical administration 
team  
1.54 % 
  Do not know what 
exactly  
2.31% 
  Family member 
worked for the mini-
grid station39  
4.87% 
  Participation in 
construction 
  28.03% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
37 Focus group A, Focus group B and Group of influence, are community groups that were formed in order to 
inform the implementation process. Group of influence included influential people within the community 
including community chiefs and religious leaders. Focus group A worked closely with the group of influence in 
order to ensure community participation in decisions about the projects. Focus group B represented the community 
in work undertaken by DIVUTEC.  
38 Majority of other probably is from TESE, ACDB or DIVUTEC as respondents referred vaguely to a meeting.  
39 Apart from construction and don’t know.	
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Bambadinca scores high on indicators, concerning participation and solidarity within the 
community. The majority of the respondents have participated at least once in a collective 
action for the benefit of the community, in addition 44% of surveyed households have at least 
one member who is a member of a community organisation. The grand majority also reported 
to have at least one person to turn to when they are in need of money.  
   
 
 
TABLE	4	OTHER	SOCIAL	CAPITAL	QUESTIONS	
Have you ever worked for the benefit of the community?  
Never 43.43% 
Once 12.63% 
Sometimes 27.27% 
Always 16.67% 
Who do you rely on for money in time of need?  
No one 21.97% 
Do not know/never had to  2.77% 
Friends  65.77% 
Family 38.26% 
Neighbours 12.08% 
Community leaders 1.34% 
Religious leaders 2.68% 
Other 2.68% 
Someone in the household is a member of an organisation in the 
community 
43.69% 
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10.4 	Additional	maps		
 
FIGURE	2	REPRESENTATION	OF	THE	DIFFERENT	NEIGHBOURHOODS	(BAIRROS)	OF	BAMBADINCA	
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE	3	FINALIZED	MAIN	GRID	AFTER	THE	TWO	PHASES	OF	EXTENSION	
 
RED LINES: INITIAL GRID, YELLOW LINES: FIRST EXTENSION STAGE (SUMMER OF 2015), WHITE LINES: SECOND 
EXTENSION STAGE (SPRING OF 2016) 
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FIGURE	4	REPRESENTATION	OF	THE	DIFFERENT	ZONES	(ZONAS)	OF	BAMBADINCA	
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE	5	MAP	OF	CONNECTION	PATTERNS	OF	ALL	CONNECTED	HOUSEHOLDS	UNTIL	NOVEMBER	2015	
 
Households in yellow represent connected households who are situated less than 30 meters away from the grid. None of these 
households benefited from their neighbours’ infrastructure to connect to the grid.  Households in red represent connected 
households who are situated more than 30 meters away from the grid and did not benefit from their neighbours’ infrastructure 
to connect to the service.  Households in green represent connected households who are situated more than 30 meters away 
from the grid and benefited from their neighbours’ infrastructure to connect to the service.   
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10.5 	Survey	draft	
1. Introduction	
 
Choice of who to interview (note to interviewer): 
• Present yourself briefly 
• Ask: “Who makes the financial decisions, pays for the energy bills and makes the decision 
regarding the purchase of energy products in this household? Can I talk to this person?” 
• If not available ask: “When can I come back to talk to that person?” 
• If not possible to talk to this person especially if this person does not want to be interviewed 
or if someone else in the family prefers to respond to the survey try to insist and underscore 
that the participation of this person to this survey is very important to us in order to get the 
right information 
• As a last resort agree to talk to someone who is well informed of the household’s daily 
activities and forms an important part in the household’s decision making process 
 
 
Note to interviewer:  
After you have established who to talk to communicate the following information: 
 
We are conducting a survey in your community as part of a research project undertaken by a 
PhD student at London School of Economics and Political Science a University in London. 
The intention of this research is to understand what factors affect the adoption of the new 
energy service that will be provided soon to your community. This service is promoted by 
TESE, ACDB, Divutec and University of Lisbon. We have randomly chosen a number of 
households in Bambadinca to participate in this survey and your household is amongst the ones 
selected.  
 
The survey consists of questions about how you are living, what type of energy you are 
consuming and your opinion about certain issues regarding your daily activities and your 
community. These questions should take around one hour to complete. Your answers will be 
strictly confidential and will not be shared with anyone else. Answers will only be used 
anonymously for research purposes. The information generated by the study may be published, 
but no details will be released from which the participant could be identified.  Participation is 
voluntary you can refuse to participate without providing any explanation and without any 
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consequences. If you agree to participate in the survey you have the right to stop whenever you 
want.  
 
Your participation is very important to us. We will use the information you and other families 
give us to better understand the factors that affect the success of the new electricity project and 
advance academic knowledge and inform future energy policies in Guinea-Bissau.  
 
 
Do you have any questions? May I continue with interviewing you?  
 
Your responses will not have any effect on the way the service will be provided. It is 
important that you give us honest responses. If the information that we collect is not correct 
the results of our research will not benefit Bambadinca nor Guinea-Bissau. 
(Note to the interviewer: Isolate the interview before beginning the survey) 
 
 
 
Household number  
Zone number  
Note to interviewer: are 
you speaking with the 
person who makes the 
financial decisions and 
decisions regarding the 
purchase of energy 
products in this 
household? 
Yes 
No 
Other. 
Specify____________ 
How many households 
share this building 
including yours? 
 
What are the names of the 
other household heads? 
 
What is your Mobile 
number?  
(Note to interviewer: After 
you ask for the mobile 
number inform the 
respondent that the survey 
supervisor might be 
calling just to check if the 
survey was conducted 
properly) 
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What is your name?  
What is the gender of the 
respondent? 
Female  
Male 
What is your age? 
(Note to interviewer: If 
they do not know their age 
or if they seem to be 
giving you the wrong 
answer take a note of the 
age they seem to have. As 
a clue, ask them what is 
the age of their eldest son) 
 
What is your education 
level? 
No education 
Primary education 
Secondary education  
Higher education 
Other. 
Specify________ 
 
Are you the household 
head? 
Yes 
No 
 
 
Note to interviewer: ask the following questions if respondent is not the household head 
 
 
What is the name of the household head?  
What is the gender of the household head? Female 
Male 
What is your relationship with the 
household head? 
 
What is the age of the household head?  
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2. Socio-economic	questions	
 
Note to interviewer: Start this section by saying: “I will begin by asking you a few questions 
on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of your family, your activities the 
house where you live in and the things you possess”. 
 
How many people live in this household 
including you? By household I mean all 
individuals who normally live and eat their 
meals together in this household and share 
their expenses. 
(Note to interviewer: Here in order to make 
sure we get the right response make sure to 
make a short conversation about what the 
relationship of each member is to the 
respondent. Example: Begin by asking who 
else lives here) 
 
What is the ethnicity of the household? Fula  
Mandinga  
Balanta  
Beafada 
Papel 
Cabo-Verde 
Other. Specify_____________ 
 
What is the religion of the household? Muslim 
Christian 
Animist 
Other. Specify_____________ 
 
How many household members are between 
0-16 years old? 
 
Do you have children that are currently 
attending school? 
Yes 
No 
How many years has your household lived in 
Bambadinca? 
 
What is the highest level of education in this 
household? 
No education 
Primary education  
Secondary education 
Higher education 
Other. Specify________ 
 
What is the principal economic activity of 
your household? 
Public servants. Specify ______________ 
Private employees. Specify ___________ 
Services/ Commerce. Specify _________ 
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(Note to interviewer: you can note more than 
one) 
Agriculture. Specify_________________    
Fishing. Specify ____________________  
Animals. Specify ___________________ 
Other. Specify ______________________  
 
Did individuals in your household 
operate commercial activities over the 
past month? (Note to interviewer: if ‘No’ 
move to the following page) 
 
Yes 
No 
If ‘Yes’ what type of commercial activity?  
Where do you operate the enterprise?  Home, inside residence 
Home, outside residence 
Traditional market 
Commercial area shop  
Roadside 
Other fixed place 
Mobile 
Do you use electricity for your enterprise? 
 
Yes 
No 
Does any member of the family receive a 
fixed salary? 
Yes 
No 
Is your household negatively affected during 
the months when there is less income 
availability in the community? (August, 
September, October) 
Not at all 
A little bit 
A lot 
 
Does your household receive money from 
abroad? 
Yes 
No 
At this moment what is your family’s 
expenditure (FCFA) in: 
(Note to interviewer: start by asking about daily 
expenses) 
 
Food Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Water Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Transport Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
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Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Communications Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Health Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Education Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Entertainment Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Clothes and shoes Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
Other Per day__________________________ 
Per week_________________________ 
Per month________________________ 
Other. Specify____________________ 
 
 
 
 
What is the type of ceiling in this household 
unit? 
(Note to interviewer: answer this question on 
your own through observation) 
Straw 
Zinc 
Other. Specify______________ 
What is the construction type of this household 
unit? 
(Note to interviewer: answer this question on 
your own through observation) 
Definitive 
Precarious 
Precarious improved 
Hut 
Other. Specify________________ 
 
What is the material used on the pavement 
of this household unit? 
Mosaic	
Cement 
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 Mud 
Other. Specify________________ 
This household unit is: Occupied by the owner  
Rented 
Borrowed 
Other. Specify________ 
What main source of drinking water does your 
household use? 
 
Domestic	connection	
ACDB	fountain	
Other	fountain	
Well	
Other.	Specify__________ 
Do you have bicycles in your household? 
 
Yes 
No 
If ‘Yes’ how many bicycles?  
Do you have motorbikes in your household? 
 
Yes 
No 
If ‘Yes’ how many motorbikes?  
Do you have cars in your household? 
 
Yes 
No 
If ‘Yes’ how many cars?  
 
 
3. Energy	use	questions	
 
Note to interviewer: Start this section by saying: “Now I would like to ask some questions 
concerning the use of energy in your household.” 
 
Do you use candles in your household?   
(Note to interviewer:  If ‘No’ move to the 
next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many hours per day do you use candles?   
(Note to interviewer: make sure to ask for the 
whole household. If some candles are used 
less than others make a note). 
Lighting________ 
Other___________ 
Cannot Say 
In what units do you purchase these candles? 
 
Individual 
Box. Specify quantity________ 
What sizes do you usually purchase? Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify_________ 
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What is the price per unit of this(these) 
size(s)? 
 
Small___________ 
Medium_________ 
Large__________ 
Other. Specify_________ 
 
How many units of candles does your 
household consume (Note to interviewer: they 
can respond per day, week or other, make a 
note accordingly) 
 
 
Small Per day_____ 
Other______ 
 
Medium Per day_____ 
Other______ 
 
Large Per day_____ 
Other______ 
 
Other size Per day_____ 
Other______ 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you use radios in your household?   (Note 
to interviewer:  If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many radios do you have?  
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How do these radios operate? Electricity 
Batteries 
Other. Specify______ 
 
How do you choose your radios?  Price  
Duration  
Number of batteries  
Size of batteries  
USB portal  
Size  
Quality of sound  
Appearance  
Other ____________________ 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
radios? 
With batteries  ____________________ 
With electricity ____________________ 
With other ____________________ 
Can’t tell  
 
(Note to interviewer: Continue this section 
only if the household uses radios that operate 
with batteries if ‘No’ move to the following 
section) 
 
In what units do you purchase the batteries? 
 
 
Charge (2 batteries)  
Box (12 batteries)  
Other  ____________________ 
 
What battery sizes do you usually purchase 
for your Radios? (Nota to 
interviewer:  Specify for each radio) 
 
Radio 1 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Radio 2 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
 Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
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Radio 3 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Radio 4 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Other radios  
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
What is the price per unit of this(these) 
size(s)? 
 
Small_________________ 
Medium________________ 
Large___________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
How many batteries each of the radios takes? 
(Note to interviewer: take a note for each 
radio individually)  
Radio 1____________________ 
Radio 2 ____________________ 
Radio 3 ____________________ 
Radio 4 ____________________ 
Other radios ____________________ 
 
How long do these batteries last? (Note to 
interviewer: take a note for each radio. Note 
to interviewer: they can respond per day, per 
week or other, make a note accordingly) 
 
Radio 1 
 
Per day ____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
Radio 2 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Radio 3 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Radio 4 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
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Other radio 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Do you use flash lights in your household?   
(Note to interviewer:  If ‘No’ move to the 
next page) 
 
Yes 
No 
How many flash lights do you use?  
How do these flash lights operate? Electricity_____ 
Batteries_____ 
Other. Specify______ 
 
How do you choose your flashlights?  Price  
Duration  
Number of batteries  
Size of batteries  
Quality of illumination 
Size  
Appearance  
Other ____________________ 
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How many hours per day do you use these 
flashlights? 
Flashlight 1  ____________________ 
Flashlight 2____________________ 
Flashlight 3____________________ 
Flashlight 4____________________ 
Other flashlight ____________________ 
Can’t tell  
 
(Note to interviewer: Continue this section 
only if the household uses flash lights that 
operate with batteries if ‘No’ move to the 
following section) 
 
In what units do you purchase the batteries? 
 
Charge (2 batteries)  
Box (12 batteries)  
Other  ____________________ 
 
What battery sizes do you usually purchase 
for your flashlight? (Note to 
interviewer:  Specify for each flashlight) 
 
Flashlight 1 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Flashlight 2 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Flashlight 3 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Flashlight 4 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Other flashlight  
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
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What is the price per unit of this(these) 
size(s)? 
 
Small_________________ 
Medium________________ 
Large___________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
How many batteries each of the radios takes? 
(Note to interviewer: take a note for each 
radio individually) 
Flashlight 1____________________ 
Flashlight 2 ____________________ 
Flashlight 3 ____________________ 
Flashlight 4 ____________________ 
Other flashlight ____________________ 
 
How long do these batteries last? (Note to 
interviewer: take a note for each flashlight. 
Note to interviewer: they can respond per day, 
per week or other, make a note accordingly) 
 
Flashlight 1 
 
Per day ____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
Flashlight 2 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Flashlight 3 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Flashlight 4 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Other flashlight 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
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Do you use battery powered lamps in your 
household?   (Note to interviewer:  If ‘No’ 
move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many battery powered lamps do you 
use?  
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
battery powered lamps? 
Lamp 1  ____________________ 
Lamp 2____________________ 
Lamp 3____________________ 
Lamp 4____________________ 
Other lamp ____________________ 
Can’t tell  
 
In what units do you purchase the batteries? 
 
Charge (2 batteries)  
Box (12 batteries)  
Other  ____________________ 
 
What battery sizes do you usually purchase 
for your lamps? (Note to interviewer:  Specify 
for each radio) 
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Lamp 1 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Lamp 2 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Lamp 3 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Lamp 4 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
Other lamp 
 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Other. Specify ____________________ 
 
What is the price per unit of this(these) 
size(s)? 
 
Small_________________ 
Medium________________ 
Large___________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
How many batteries each of the lamps takes? 
(Note to interviewer: take a note for each 
radio individually) 
Lamp 1____________________ 
Lamp 2 ____________________ 
Lamp 3 ____________________ 
Lamp 4 ____________________ 
Other lamp ____________________ 
 
How long do these batteries last? (Note to 
interviewer: take a note for each lamp. Note to 
interviewer: they can respond per day, per 
week or other, make a note accordingly) 
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Lamp 1 
 
Per day ____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
Lamp 2 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Lamp 3 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Lamp 4 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
Other lamp 
 
Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Do you use batteries in your household for 
other equipment apart from radio, flashlight 
and battery powered lamps? (Note to 
interviewer:  If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
 
Yes 
No 
What do you use these batteries for? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use this 
equipment? 
 
In what units do you purchase the batteries? 
 
Charge (2 batteries)  
Box (12 batteries)  
Other  ____________________ 
 
What battery sizes do you usually purchase 
for your lamps? (Note to interviewer:  Specify 
for each equipment) 
Small_________________ 
Medium________________ 
Large___________________ 
Other ____________________ 
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What is the price per unit of this(these) 
size(s)? 
 
Small_________________ 
Medium________________ 
Large___________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
How many batteries each equipment 
consumes? (Note to interviewer: take a note 
for each individually. Note to interviewer: 
they can respond per day, per week or other, 
make a note accordingly) 
Per day ____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
What is the main source of cooking used in 
your household? 
Firewood 
Coal 
Other. Specify_______________ 
 
How much do you pay? Per day____________________ 
Per week ____________________ 
Other____________________ 
 
 
 
 
In the past were you connected to the grid? 
 
Yes 
No 
Other__________ 
Are you using the Badora service now? Yes 
No 
 
If ‘No’ were you using the Badora service in 
the past? 
 
Yes 
No 
Are you using electricity from another private 
provider? 
Yes. Specify________ 
Other 
 (Note to interviewer: If household is not 
currently using Badora or the service of 
another private provider pass to the following 
page) 
 
 
If ‘Yes’ what is your monthly expenditure? 
 
 
If ‘Yes’ what were your connection costs? 
 
 
Do you sell electricity services to you 
neighbours? 
Yes 
No 
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(Note to interviewer if ‘No’ move to the 
following page) 
 
If ‘Yes’ what type of services? Electricity 
Mobile charging 
Charging f other equipment 
Other. Specify___________ 
 
If ‘Yes’ how much do you make each month 
from these services? 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you have a generator? (Note to 
interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the following 
page) 
Yes 
No 
With what frequency do you use your 
generator?  
Never 
Rarely 
Frequently 
Every day  
Other________________ 
 
(Note to interviewer: If ‘Never’ or ‘Rarely’ 
move to the following page) 
 
 
How much do you spend each month in 
Gasoline (FCFA)? 
 
 
How much do you spend each year in 
maintenance for the generator? 
 
Do you sell electricity services to you 
neighbours? 
(Note to interviewer if ‘No’ move to the 
following page) 
 
Yes 
No 
If ‘Yes’ what type of services? Electricity 
Mobile charging 
Charging f other equipment 
Other. Specify___________ 
 
If ‘Yes’ how much do you make each month 
from these services? 
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Do you use other sources of energy in your 
household apart from the ones mentioned 
above? 
(if ‘No’, move to the following page) 
 
Yes 
No 
Which ones? (Specify)  
How many hours per day?  
In what units do you usually purchase them?  
What is the price per unit?  
How many units does your household 
normally consume? (Note to interviewer: the 
can respond per day, per week or other, take a 
note accordingly) 
 
Do you have mobile phones in your 
household? 
Yes 
No 
How many mobile phones does the household 
have? 
 
Where do you charge them? At home 
Neighbour 
Store  
Other. Specify____________ 
 
Do you pay to charge them?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ go to the next 
section) 
Yes 
No 
How much do you pay to charge one?  
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Do you have lamps in your household?  (Note 
to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many lamps do you have? 
 
 
These lamps are normal or efficient? 
 
Normal  
Efficient  
Other  
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
lamps?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer 
to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these lamps operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Do you have televisions in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
How many televisions do you have? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
televisions?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these televisions operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Do you have fans in your household?  (Note 
to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
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How many fans do you have? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
fans?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer to 
report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these fans operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Do you have fridges in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
How many fridges do you have? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
fridges?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer 
to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these fridges operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Do you have computers in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
How many computers do you have? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
computers?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
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How do you make these computers operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Stores 
Neighbours 
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Do you have electric irons in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
How many electric irons do you have? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
electric irons?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these electric irons 
operate? 
Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you have satellite dishes in your 
household?  (Note to interviewer: If 
‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many satellite dishes do you have? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
satellite dish?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these satellite dish operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
Do you have DVDs in your household?  (Note 
to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
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How many DVDs do you have? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
DVDs?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer 
to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these DVDs operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
Does your household possess other 
equipment?  (Note to interviewer: If 
‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
Specify 
 
 
Quantity  
How many hours per day do you use these 
equipment?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
How do you make these equipment operate? Generator  
Private operator  
Other  ____________________ 
 
 
 
4. Questions	about	‘Bambadinca	Sta	Claro’	
 
Do you know about the new energy service 
that will be available briefly in Bambadinca? 
(the ‘Bambadinca Sta Claro’ project) 
Yes 
No 
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If ‘Yes’ how did you find out? Family 
Friends 
Neighbours 
Local market 
National newspaper 
Radio  
Television 
Groups and associations 
Community leaders 
Divutec 
ACDB 
Posters 
Other___________ 
 
Do you know the project partners? 
 
Yes 
No 
Not sure 
Can you name the project partners? ACDB  
DIVUTEC  
TESE  
University of Lisbon 
General energy directory 
No 
Other________ 
 
Have you visited the power plant? Yes 
No 
Did any member of your household 
participate actively in the project? (Note to 
interviewer: prompt if necessary) 
 
Yes 
No 
If ‘Yes’, Specify: Focus group A 
Focus group B 
Group of influence 
Construction 
ACDB administration 
Technical administration team 
Other. Specify___________ 
 
Are you planning to connect? Yes 
No 
Not sure____________________ 
 
Has any member of your household started 
saving to meet the upfront connection costs of 
the energy service? 
 
Yes 
No 
Not Sure 
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If ‘Yes’ which member of the family is 
saving? 
(Note to interviewer: if not respondent ask 
about the relationship of that person with 
respondent) 
 
 
If ‘Yes’ how are you saving? Not saving 
Bank account 
Burra 
Community saving group 
Divutec 
Other. Inside the household 
Other. Specify_______ 
 
 
 
5. Social	Capital	questions	
 
Is anyone in your household a member of any 
community organizations in Bambadinca? 
Like for example: 
 
ACDB  
Conselho Islâmico  
Afas Bam  
Amus Bam  
Titina Silla  
Fans Club  
Lala Queima  
Comunidade Ingrejia Evangélica  
Tene Diritu  
AJUB  
Amizade de Nema  
Wantanara  
Costa Largo  
Djokere Endan  
Other. Specify  ____________________ 
No 
Introduce by saying: 
“In every community, some people get 
along with others and trust each other, 
while other people do not. Now, I would 
like to talk to you about trust and solidarity 
in your community”.  
 
 
Do you agree or disagree that: “Most people 
who live in this community can be 
trusted” 
Agree strongly 
Agree somewhat 
Neither agree nor disagree  
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Disagree somewhat 
Disagree strongly 
Do you agree or disagree that: “I	feel	accepted	as	a	member	of	this	community” 
 
Agree strongly 
Agree somewhat 
Neither agree nor disagree  
Disagree somewhat 
Disagree strongly 
  
Introduce by saying: “Now I want to ask 
you how much you trust different types of 
people” 
 
 
How much do you trust people in your 
family? 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust your friends? 
 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust your neighbours? Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust people in other 
neighbourhoods? 
 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust people of other 
ethnicities? 
 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust the implementers of 
the project ‘Bambadinca Sta Claro’? 
 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust officials from the 
local government? 
 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
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Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust NGOs? Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
How much do you trust the traditional leaders 
of the community?  
 
Trust a lot 
Trust 
Neither trust nor distrust 
Distrust 
Distrust a lot 
Have you worked with others in your 
community to do something for the benefit 
of the community?  
 
Never 
Once 
A couple of times 
Frequently  
 
If you suddenly needed a small amount of 
money (enough to pay for expenses for your 
household for one week) how many people 
beyond your immediate household could you 
turn to who would be willing to provide this 
money? 
 
Who are these people? Friends 
Family 
Neighbours 
Community leaders 
Religious leaders 
Other___________ 
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Chapter	4	
The	 role	 of	 recall	 periods	 in	 improving	 the	 accuracy	 of	 energy	
expenditure	elicitation	in	surveys:	empirical	results	from	Guinea-Bissau	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract		
 
This study tests the accuracy of reported energy expenditure in surveys when using differently 
defined recall periods, that is a ‘usual’ week versus a ‘specific’ (i.e. last) week. We compare 
real expenditure data for prepaid meters for energy from a community solar hybrid mini-grid 
in rural Guinea-Bissau, with answers elicited from a survey where the two different recall 
periods are randomly assigned. Overall, our results show that respondents tend to over-report 
the level and frequency of their energy expenditures, but reporting is more accurate when the 
‘specific’ period rather than the ‘usual’ period is used. Expenditure specific characteristics 
have a stronger effect on the level of misreporting than individual and household specific 
characteristics. However, we find evidence that respondents that report higher dissatisfaction 
with the service over-report their expenditures. The level of expenditure as well as the level of 
irregularity of weekly payment frequency, retain a robust effect on all the different measures 
of error used. There is also evidence that the irregularity of weekly payment frequency affects 
negatively reporting error in the ‘specific’ period rather than in the ‘usual’ period, which is 
attributed to the use of different response strategies and their varying effects on accuracy. 
However, this is robust for most models of error on payment frequency reporting but less so 
for error on expenditure level reporting.    
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1. Introduction	
 
Comprehensive information on household consumption expenditures is central to the study of 
a range of issues of interest to economists such as the welfare of individuals, household 
decision making processes, responses to policy and shocks, inequality, poverty and theories of 
consumption and saving. This information is even more important for developing countries 
where, due to lack of stable income sources, economists often rely on household expenditure 
information for the measurement of living standards (Deaton & Grosh, 2000). Due to a lack of 
administrative or third party data on household consumption (e.g. tax records, scanner data, e-
commerce websites), both in developed and developing countries, economists have relied 
either on diary approaches (where households are asked to provide detailed information on 
their daily expenditures) or more commonly on expenditure surveys. This is predominantly 
due to their ease of implementation (see Browning, Crossley, & Winter, 2014). However, a 
broad literature has demonstrated that self-reported measures of expenditure are prone to a 
number of errors (see for reviews Browning, Crossley, & Weber, 2003; Crossley et al., 2014; 
Deaton & Grosh, 2000). Understanding the source of these errors and how to minimize them 
enables us to collect more accurate responses.  
The main sources of measurement error in expenditure surveys are recall errors due to 
memory limitations, telescoping due to misplacing of events (or expenses), as well as social 
pressures, respondent effects, interviewer effects, instrument design or survey conditioning 
(see Deaton & Grosh, 2000 for a discussion). The study of these errors draws from the 
behavioural economics literature, namely the strand of behavioural economics that focuses on 
the effects of bounded rationality and the social context on survey reporting.  
Due to computational difficulties, limited attention and biased reasoning  individuals 
tend to simplify complex decisions through estimation strategies (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002; Congdon et al., 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975) (see Chapter 1). In 
survey responses this translates to respondents often resorting to response simplification 
strategies that are either related to the survey instrument or to information that is available in 
the memory linked to the nature of the activity that they are reporting on, or both (Menon, 
1993; Menon, Raghubir, & Schwarz, 1995). Social pressures and response desirability have 
also been linked to intentional biases of over-reporting or under-reporting in surveys (Schnell, 
2013).  
Studies on self-reported household expenditure errors have drawn from the 
abovementioned literature to identify the magnitude and sources of these errors, but also to 
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understand what type of interventions will lead to more accurate and efficient measures. Some 
of these studies have used random designs of different aspects of relevance (e.g. nature and 
length of recall periods, level of disaggregation of expenditures, determining who to talk to, 
open ended vs closed response formats and use of prompts) to isolate their effects on 
measurement errors (Comerford, Delaney, & Harmon, 2009). Other studies have exploited pre-
existing variations in survey design caused by diverging survey practices across statistical 
offices or within statistical offices over time (Deaton & Grosh, 2000). 
One of the major limitations of these studies is that it is usually impossible to 
corroborate survey responses with actual practices. Therefore, the effects of survey design are 
usually assessed in comparison to other self-reported measures or at best, in comparison to 
validation measures such as benchmarks that are believed to be closer to reality (e.g. diary 
approach with frequent supervision) (Beegle, De Weerdt, Friedman, & Gibson, 2012; NSSO 
Expert Group, 2003), or some external indicators (e.g. income, administrative and third party 
data) (Koijen, Van Nieuwerburgh, & Vestman, 2013; Kreiner, Lassen, & Leth-Petersen, 2013). 
These external indicators are however limited in developed countries and absent in developing 
countries.  
Compared to other categories of household expenditure, information on real energy 
expenditure is becoming increasingly available to researchers, both in developed and 
developing countries (e.g. Brutscher, 2011; Qiu et al., 2016; Jack and Smith, 2016) 
This provides a great opportunity to test the effect of different aspects of survey design 
on expenditure elicitation by using real expenditure information as a comparison. This is 
especially the case when it comes to energy consumption based on prepaid meters (in contrast 
with traditional monthly energy payments), as these expenditures have similar characteristics 
to other recurring household expenditures (clients control the level and frequency of their 
payments, which is closely connected with energy use). In addition, a better understanding of 
the intricacies of energy expenditure reporting and how to improve it is important as surveys 
are often used to inform energy, environmental and development policies and projects.  
This study tests the accuracy of reported energy expenditure in surveys and how it 
changes when using differently defined recall periods. Specifically, a random design is used to 
test the effect of using the ‘usual’ week instead of a ‘specific’ week (i.e. last week) in eliciting 
information on the levels of energy expenditure and frequency of these purchases. We use the 
actual information on prepaid meter top ups from a solar-hybrid mini-grid in rural Guinea-
Bissau and compare it to the survey elicited information on these expenditures.  
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In the ‘specific’ period, respondents are asked to state their expenses within a specific 
time frame, in this case the ‘last week’ (or last 7 days), whilst in the ‘usual’ period respondents 
are asked to state their expenses within a usual time frame, in this case a ‘usual week’. So far, 
theory and empirical evidence have shown the ‘specific’ period to be less demanding in terms 
of memory, but more prone to volatility compared to the ‘usual’ period, as it does not 
necessarily reflect the expenditures of a typical week  (Angrisani, Kapteyn, & Schuh, 2015). 
The ‘usual’ period is seen to be more of a abstract concept and therefore more prone to rounding 
and other cognitive errors (Beegle et al., 2012). In addition a number of biases, such as 
anchoring, can affect responses to both periods (Comerford et al., 2009; Tourangeau, Rips, & 
Rasinski, 2000).  
 However, none of these issues have yet been corroborated with real data or in the 
context of energy expenditure in developing countries.  
In addition, detailed knowledge about actual recent expenditure patterns allow us to 
closely study the potential effect of response strategies on accuracy of responses. Namely the 
effects of ‘recall and count’ in comparison to ‘rate based’ response strategies. ‘Recall and 
count’ response strategies occur when respondents resort to retrieving all the relevant events 
to enable them to respond to questions about frequencies or expenditure levels. ‘Rate based’ 
estimates occur when respondents construct a rate of occurrence of the event in question and 
base their responses on that rate. The latter strategy belongs to the category of simplification 
strategies (see Menon, 1993 for a description). 
Most of the research on response strategies focuses on frequency reporting which, 
however, has direct application to expenditure reporting.  
The choice of response strategy in survey frequency reporting for ‘specific’ periods and 
namely the choice between using a ‘recall and count’ or a ‘rate based’ response strategy has 
been found to be largely affected by the characteristics of the reported action. For example, to 
report infrequent behaviour, individuals undertake ‘recall and count’ strategies, whereas for 
frequent behaviour the degree of similarity (the degree to which reported events closely 
resemble one another) and regularity (the degree to which reported events occur in stable time 
intervals) of the action reported tends to define this strategy. In other words, individuals resort 
to some ‘rate based’ estimate when the actions they are reporting are more frequent, regular 
and similar (Tourangeau et al., 2000).  
 However, there is no consensus on how these estimation strategies are associated with 
reporting errors. Simplification strategies are by definition an approximation of the reality, but 
could also be seen as efficient strategies used to avoid “painstaking retrieval strategies” and 
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“produce better answers” (Tourangeau et al., 2000). There is also a prevalent agreement that 
‘recall and count’ strategies require a higher cognitive effort (Menon, 1993; Tourangeau et al., 
2000).   
 A number of studies have produced conflicting results (Blair & Burton, 1987; Menon, 
1993). This is further complicated by the fact that it is hard to isolate the effect of the response 
strategy on accuracy from that of the effect of the nature of the question the respondent is 
answering, as the latter influences both accuracy and the choice of response strategy (Menon, 
1993; Tourangeau et al., 2000). For example, Menon, 1993, finds that when it comes to 
frequency reporting for ‘specific’ periods, ‘rate based’ estimates are evoked for more regular 
and similar events. These produce more accurate responses than ‘recall and count’ strategies 
(Menon, 1993). However, it is not clear if this accuracy is due to the use of a ‘rate based’ 
estimate or to the fact that it is easier to report accurately more regular and similar events.  
The nature of the reporting period has also been associated with different reporting 
strategies, with respondents resorting to ‘recall and count’ strategies to answer the ‘specific’ 
period, and to ‘rate based’ strategies to answer the ‘usual’ period (Angrisani et al., 2015). These 
‘recall and count’ strategies are however not stable for the ‘specific period’, as for more similar 
and regular events respondents resort to ‘rate based’ estimates (Menon, 1993). This allows to 
isolate the effect of the reporting strategy on response error by looking at the interaction of the 
nature of the reporting period with the regularity and similarity of the reported activity and its 
effect on error.  For the case of energy expenditures, regularity is assumed to be captured by 
the level of regularity of the weekly payment frequency. As far as similarity is concerned, all 
events are assumed to be similar (the payment always happens the same way in the same 
location). 
Specifically, this study assesses the size and determinants of measurement error for 
energy expenditure reporting in surveys as well as the effect of using the ‘specific’ and the 
‘usual’ period on the accuracy of the responses, both for the reporting of the level and the 
frequency of these expenditures. In addition, in order to capture the different effects that 
different reporting strategies have on accuracy this study tests if the level of irregularity of 
weekly payment frequency has a negative effect on the accuracy of the responses and if this 
negative effect on the accuracy of responses differs when using the ‘specific’ in comparison to 
the ‘usual’ period.  
Results overall demonstrate that respondents tend to over-report the level and frequency 
of their energy expenditures and that this reporting is more accurate when the ‘specific’ period 
rather than when the ‘usual’ period is used. Expenditure specific characteristics are more 
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important than individual and household specific characteristics when it comes to misreporting. 
However, there is some evidence that respondents that are dissatisfied with the service over-
report their expenditures. We find that the level of expenditure as well as the irregularity of 
weekly payment frequency retain a strong effect for all the different measures of error used. 
The irregularity of weekly payment frequency affects negatively measurement error in the 
‘specific’ period rather than in the ‘usual’ period. This last result is an indication that ‘recall 
and count’ strategies are more associated with inaccuracies than ‘rate based’ estimates. 
However, this finding is robust for most models of error on payment frequency reporting, but 
less so for error on expenditure level reporting. These findings have implications for policy 
regarding the right choice of the recall period in survey design and the interpretation of energy 
expenditure information elicited by surveys.   
This chapter proceeds in the following way. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. 
Section 3 discusses the data and the survey design. Section 4 provides the results, whilst 
Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Literature	review		
 
As noted above, some studies have looked at how different aspects of survey design can reduce 
errors in survey expenditure reporting by varying design characteristics or by exploring 
existing differences. More specifically, authors have looked into the effects of varying the 
nature and length of the reference period for which consumption is reported, the level of 
disaggregation of expenditures, response formats, as well as who to talk to and the use of survey 
prompts (Comerford et al., 2009). This has been done for different types of expenditures both 
in developed and in developing countries.  
In terms of energy expenditure reporting these issues remain largely unexplored. The 
limited research on this topic has focused solely on developed countries. Through a field 
experiment Fairbrother, 2014 looks at how different ways of approaching survey participants 
affect their reporting regarding energy readings (compliance and data quality). Through an ex 
post analysis of energy expenditures responses in the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), 
Pudney, 2008 concludes by looking at peaks in distributions, that respondents use a number of 
response strategies, namely annual rounding, weekly rounding and monthly rounding. Pudney, 
2008 does not attempt however to look at the effects of different aspects of survey design. 
This study introduces a case study of energy expenditure reported in a developing 
country.  
In terms of the use of ‘usual’ or ‘specific’ recall periods in expenditure reporting, 
studies have shown that there are some advantages and disadvantages to each method, but the 
literature is not proposing one particular method over the other (see Browning et al., 2014).  
               Previous studies indicate that responses to the ‘specific’ period tend to have an overall 
higher means (less forgetfulness) and larger dispersion measures (higher volatility). This 
indicates that the usual period gives les accurate results but is a better representation of the 
general trends. Angrisani et al., 2015 conduct a survey with a random design in the United 
States to measure among other things the effects of ‘usual’ and ‘specific’ periods on the 
elicitation of expenditures in surveys, and find that “the reported amounts spent were 
systematically lower” for the ‘usual’ periods. Results for ‘specific’ periods also exhibited 
higher variances. This seemed to matter more for shorter recall periods. Beegle et al., 2012 
conduct a survey with a random design in Tanzania where they look at the effects of ‘usual’ 
and ‘specific’ periods on elicitation of household consumption by comparing them to a diary 
approach. Results show that the ‘usual’ period substantially reduced the accuracy of results. 
Neither of these studies have validated the findings by comparing them with information on 
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actual expenditures.   
The Deaton & Grosh, 2000 review, of Living Standards Measurement Studies (LSMS) 
and other expenditure surveys in eliciting consumption data in developing countries, draws 
more conflicting conclusions. The priors about the respective impacts of the two time frames 
do not seem to hold, in the reporting of food expenditures, as the estimates tend to be very 
similar between the ‘last visit’ and the ‘usual month’ period. When there are differences, they 
do not conform to the expected pattern that the ‘usual’ month period would lead to lower means 
and dispersion measures. However, in the case of non-food items, that have smaller purchase 
frequencies, results tend to conform with priors (i.e. lower means and dispersion measures for 
the ‘usual’ month period). These small differences can be an indication that both types of 
reporting periods fare well, at least when it comes to reporting frequent purchases. However, 
these results could also be affected by the limitations of the methods used in the study in 
question as it is not based on a random design. In addition, the comparison between the ‘last 
visit’ and the ‘general month’ also differs in terms of recall period size. Finally, both periods 
were presented to the same respondents. Therefore, the possibility of survey conditioning and 
within frame anchoring cannot be ruled out (Deaton & Grosh, 2000). Despite the potential 
limitations of the Deaton & Grosh, 2000 study, their findings highlight the role of mediation 
of good specific characteristics, including purchase frequency, on the impact of the effects of 
the two time frames (‘specific’ and ‘usual’) for self-reported expenditure reporting in 
developing countries.  
Our study adds to the abovementioned literature by looking at how the findings 
regarding the relative strength of the ‘specific’ and the ‘usual’ recall periods apply in the case 
of energy expenditure reporting. In addition, it is the first study to be using information on 
actual expenditure as a comparison. Finally, this study aims to increase comprehension about 
the role of the response strategy used on response accuracy.  
Menon, 1993, looks at how for frequent behaviours the regularity of an event 
determines the response strategy used by respondents who recall the frequency by which they 
conducted a number of different activities the previous week (last week): more regular and 
similar events led to reporting a ‘rate based’ estimate, while irregular and dissimilar events led 
to a ‘recall and count’ estimate. This is done by directly eliciting the response strategy of each 
respondent (by asking respondents to explain the way they formed their responses) and 
combining a diary approach to check the accuracy of responses. The study finds that in this 
context the ‘rate based’ estimate gives more accurate results and is less cognitively demanding 
than the ‘recall and count’ approach. However, the increased accuracy could have been caused 
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by the fact that regular events are easier to report more accurately. Other studies have found 
different results. For example, Burton & Blair, 1991, using a similar response strategy 
elicitation method, find that accuracy improves with ‘recall and count’ for ATM transactions. 
But even here the effect of the reporting strategy on accuracy cannot be disentangled from the 
nature of the activity reported (i.e. people with fewer ATM transaction were using ‘recall and 
count’ strategies).  
This discussion refers to studies looking at response strategies for frequency reporting 
where ‘specific’ periods are concerned. Overall, the ‘usual’ period is expected to evoke ‘rate 
based’ responses due to the general nature of the question in comparison to the ‘specific’ period 
(Angrisani et al., 2015).  Edgar, 2009, looks at how response strategies regarding routine 
spending habits can change for ‘usual’ periods. The study, also uses a direct response strategy 
elicitation, and finds that response strategies on ‘usual’ period questions do not follow similar 
patterns to response strategies on ‘specific’ period questions. More specifically, Edgar, 2009 
finds that responses to ‘usual’ periods about levels of expenditures usually follow some ‘rate 
based’ estimates and to a lesser extent estimates that are based on other type of simplification 
strategies such as budget calculations, guesses, single event retrievals and general impression. 
No work was done however to understand what induces these different response strategies. 
Apart from the Edgar, 2009, study response strategies for expenditure reporting have 
been studied much less than those for frequency reporting. Although it is often assumed that 
they have many similarities as usually the latter is based on the former (Edgar, 2009), very few 
studies have compared the two of them. Beegle et al., 2012, conclude that the two processes 
are different as they discover different results in the comparison of reported expenditure levels 
than in the comparison of reported expenditure frequency. In contrary to results concerning 
expenditure levels, the median and the average number of reported payments were higher in 
‘usual’ recall periods than in ‘specific’ ones (Beegle et al., 2012).  
This study looks at both refill frequency and expenditure level reporting to test if some 
of the findings regarding frequency reporting, also apply in the realm of expenditure level 
reporting.  
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3. Data	and	methodology	
 
3.1	Case	study	
 
The study took place in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca situated in the Bafatá region 
of the Northeast part of Guinea-Bissau (see Chapter 1& Chapter 3). Payment data was extracted 
from clients of a solar hybrid mini-grid operating in the community since November 2014 (see 
Chapter 3 for a description).  
 
 
 
3.2	Actual	expenditure	data	
 
The payment system for the clients of the mini-grid is based on prepaid meters that clients must 
refill every time they run out of credit. Credit is purchased in the mini-grid station. Clients have 
top-up cards which are updated in relation to the amount purchased each time. These cards are 
subsequently used to update the meter at home. A comprehensive database regarding the time, 
date and size of these top-ups was made available to us by SCEB. This constitutes our actual 
expenditure dataset40. 
 
 
 
3.3	Expenditure	survey	
 
We designed a household survey containing a series of questions on the level of energy 
expenditures and frequency of payments.  A random design was used. The randomization was 
undertaken at the household level. Half of the respondents were asked to state how much they 
paid to buy electricity and how many times they went to buy refills ‘last week’ (the question 
was phrased the ‘previous seven days’ to avoid confusion about what constitutes the ‘last 
week’). This was the ‘specific’ period (see Fig.1). 
 
 
                                                
40 There have been some errors in this database, due to some technical problems related to card refill and the 
updating of meters. However, the database has been monitored closely and corrected by the SCEB personnel and 
therefore it is assumed that these errors are negligible.  
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How much did you spend in the previous 
seven days (last week) for credit refills for 
your electricity meter? 
Last week 
Other_____________ 
 
How many times did you go the previous 
seven days (last week) to buy these credit 
refills? 
Last week 
Other_____________ 
 
Fig 1: ‘Specific period’ 
 
 
The other half of respondents were asked to state how much they paid to buy electricity and 
how many times they went to buy refills per week (referring to a normal generic week). This 
was the ‘usual’ period (see Fig.2)  
 
 
How much do you spend per week normally 
for credit refills for your electricity meter? 
Per week 
Other_____________ 
 
How many times per week do you normally go 
to buy these credit refills? 
Per week 
Other_____________ 
 
Fig. 2: ‘Usual’ period 
 
 
Although questions were asked on a weekly basis, respondents were permitted to answer for 
another period if they preferred, allowing us to capture more successfully the more infrequent 
payments. Information on relevant socio-economic characteristics was also collected along 
with information on household energy decision making, purchase habits and satisfaction with 
the service. The full survey can be found in the Appendix.  
The survey was implemented in two waves. The first wave took place between the 7th 
and 26th of November 2015. The population of interest are households who receive electricity 
from the Community Energy Service of Bambadinca. At the time of this first survey, SCEB 
had 373 clients in total: 271 were households, 93 businesses and 11 institutions. All household 
clients of the service at the time were contacted and overall 241 household clients participated. 
Of these, 12 observations had to be dropped as we were not able to identify the client in the 
SCEB client expenditure database. This was because some clients shared the same name and 
could not be distinguished. An additional 9 clients were dropped because there was not enough 
information in the database. This was either because clients reported to have not used the 
service for a while or because they had just started using the service. An additional 28 clients 
were interviewed in the second wave of the survey, between 2nd and 5th of May 2016. In all 
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cases, the person who makes the decision regarding meter top-ups was interviewed.  If they 
were not available another member of the household was interviewed who was knowledgeable 
on the household’s energy expenditures.  
The survey was originally written in Portuguese and the enumerator translated orally 
the questions from Portuguese to the local Creole dialect. Each survey took on average 10 
minutes to complete.  
 
 
 
3.4	Modelling	framework	
 
Three measures for reported accuracy were constructed, drawing from common practices in 
literature (Koijen et al., 2013; Kreiner et al., 2013; Menon, 1993). 
The first measure of accuracy looks at correlations between reported and actual levels 
of expenditure and refill frequencies. The following OLS models are estimated (these models 
are tested separately for the ‘usual’ and the ‘specific’ period):  
 𝑌0FMGJFrKsLK#t"GJHK = 𝑎 + 	𝛽𝑋0HKLuHGKtKsLK#t"GJHK + 𝜀0 𝑌0FMGJFrHKv"rrvHKwJK#Mx = 𝑎 + 	𝛽𝑋0HKLuHGKtHKv"rrvHKwJK#Mx + 𝜀0 
 
 
Where 𝑌FMGJFrKsLK#t"GJHK is the real level of expenditure and 𝑋HKLuHGKtKsLK#t"GJHK is the 
reported expenditure in the survey, and 𝑌FMGJFrHKv"rrvHKwJK#Mx is the real level of refill frequency 
and 𝑋HKLuHGKtHKv"rrvHKwJK#Mx is the refill frequency reported in the survey. 
The second measure looks at absolute total differences between reported spending in 
the survey and actual expenditures. For the ‘specific’ period this refers to the absolute 
difference between survey reporting and actual expenditures last week, and for the ‘usual’ 
period this refers to the absolute difference between survey reporting and average weekly 
expenditures in the previous month. The third measure looks at the absolute relative differences 
between reported spending and actual expenditures (reported spending minus actual 
expenditure divided by actual expenditures), reported as percentages. These last two measures 
will be referred to as total and relative measurement errors. Usually one of the two measures 
is reported in similar studies (Koijen et al., 2013; Kreiner et al., 2013; Menon, 1993). The same 
measures are also constructed for the case of frequency of refills. 
The random assignment of the two alternative recall periods allows us to study the 
effect they each have on accuracy i.e. on the total and relative measurement errors.  Random 
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assignment, at least in theory, means that relevant respondent and household characteristics, 
both unobserved and observable, are orthogonal to the causal mechanism of interest.  
Therefore, to estimate the average effects on measurement error of the two different 
periods (i.e. the ‘specific’ and the ‘usual’ periods), the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
models are estimated:  
 𝑌0FIyurJGKKHHuHKsLK#t"GJHK = 𝑎 +	𝛽L𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑0 + 𝛽s𝛸0 + 𝜀0 𝑌0FIyurJGKKHHuHHKv"rry = 𝑎 +	𝛽L𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑0 + 𝛽s𝛸0 + 𝜀0 𝑌0HKrFG"~KKHHuHKsLK#tGJHK = 𝑎 +	𝛽L𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑0 + 𝛽s𝛸0 + 𝜀0 𝑌0HKrFG"~KKHHuHHKv"rry = 𝑎 +	𝛽L𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑0 + 𝛽s𝛸0 + 𝜀0 
 
 
Where Yj represents the various measurement errors considered (total and relative, for 
expenditure levels and for refill frequency),  𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑0 = 1 when respondent is asked to 
report on the ‘usual’ period and 𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑0 = 0 when respondent is asked to report on the 
‘specific’ period. Therefore 𝛽L measures the average effect on accuracy between the two 
different periods. 𝛽s𝛸0 are additional controls on observable characteristics, and  𝜀0 is an error 
term.  
One of these controls is a measure of irregularity. We use as a measure of the 
irregularity of weekly refill frequency the standard deviation for weekly refill rate last month. 
To be able to make comparisons across different expenditure levels and refill frequency levels 
for this measure of irregularity we divided the standard deviations with the mean. To assess 
the role of reporting strategy on accuracy this measure of irregularity is interacted with 𝑈𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑0.	 The coefficient of this interaction is the effect of the ‘rate based’ response 
strategy on accuracy in comparison to the ‘recall and count’ response strategy. 
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4. Results	
 
4.1	Summary	statistics	
4.1.1	Sample	characteristics	
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the relevant sample characteristics on demographics and energy use 
patterns, habits and attitudes for the whole sample and for the sub-samples answering the 
‘specific’ and the ‘usual’ period questions. In addition, the randomization procedure is 
validated through an estimation of differences between the means of the different sub-samples 
(last column in each table). Overall, there are no observable significant differences in any of 
the relevant characteristics. 
Table 1 presents the demographics of the sample41. Around 45% of respondents are 
female. The average age of respondents is approximately 35 years and the average household 
size is 13. Just under 20% of respondents have had no education, 31% had only primary school 
education, 41% had secondary education and only 8% had some university education.  As far 
as household income level is concerned, due to high income variability and the absence of 
stable sources of income for most of Bambadinca’s households, we had to resort to a direct 
subjective assessment of household income. The enumerator, who had local knowledge, was 
asked to choose between four different levels of income classification for each household, 
following the conclusion of each interview: ‘high income’, ‘medium income’, ‘poor’ and ‘very 
poor’. Subsequently, roughly 19% of households were classified as ‘high income’, 49% as 
‘medium income’ and 32% as ‘poor’. None of the households was classified as ‘very poor’ 
reflecting the fact that households from the lowest income group in Bambadinca had not made 
an electricity connection at the time of the survey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 The sample is not representative of the Bambadinca population, as only households using the electricity service 
(the target population) were interviewed.  But it is representative of the clients of the electricity service, since a 
large proportion of the population was interviewed. 
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TABLE	1	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	AND	VALIDATION	OF	RANDOMIZATION	FOR	RESPONDENT	AND	HOUSEHOLD	
CHARACTERISTICS	
 
The table validates that the two groups in the survey are balanced across respondent and household characteristics. The p-
values are derived from t-tests.  
 
 
 
Table 2 reports households’ energy using habits and experience with the service. The great 
majority of households (94%) have had their meters installed for at least three months at the 
time of the survey. Around a third of respondents do not participate in decision making 
regarding energy use, 13% decide jointly with someone else, and 54% are the sole decision 
makers. In terms of purchasing credit for the meter the role is reversed as only 21% of 
respondents reported always going in person to buy more credit, with 17% reporting that they 
only buy credit in person sometimes. The remaining 62% never buys credit in person. Finally, 
overall reported satisfaction with the service is relatively high with 2.01 average on a five-point 
scale (1 being very satisfied and 5 very dissatisfied). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Whole 
sample 
 Specific 
period ‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual 
period ‘Per 
Week’ 
P-value 
Number of observations 248 126 122  
Respondent is female (%) 44.94 44 45.90 0.77 
Average age of respondent (years) 35.43 35.45 35.41 0.98 
Average household size 13.08 12.99 13.18 0.85 
Respondent never had any schooling (%) 19.76 19.84 19.67 0.97 
Respondent received primary education (%) 31.05 27.78 34.43 0.26 
Respondent received secondary education (%) 41.13  44.44  37.70  0.28 
Respondent received university education (%) 8.07 7.94 8.2 0.94  
High income household (%) 19.35 18.25 20.49 0.66 
Medium income household (%) 48.79 49.21 48.36 0.89 
Poor household (%) 31.85 32.54 31.15 0.81 
Very poor household (%) 0 0 0  
	 206	
TABLE	2	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	AND	VALIDATION	OF	RANDOMIZATION	FOR	ENERGY	USING	PATTERNS	AND	
ATTITUDE	TOWARDS	THE	SERVICE	
 Whole 
sample 
 Specific 
period ‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual 
period ‘Per 
Week’ 
P-
value 
Respondent is a decision maker for energy (%) 53.63   52.38 54.92 0.69 
Respondent is a partial decision maker for energy (%) 12.90 12.7   13.11 0.92 
Respondent is not a decision maker for energy (%)   33.47 34.92 31.97 0.62 
Respondent always recharges himself (%) 20.56 19.84 21.31 0.78 
Respondent sometimes recharges himself (%) 17.34 19.84 14.75 0.29  
Respondent never recharges himself (%)   62.1 60.32 63.93 0.56 
Meter has been installed in the household for at least 
3months (%) 
93.55 93.65 93.44 0.95 
Meter has been installed in the household for 2 months 
only (%) 
3.23 3.97 2.46 0.5 
Meter has been installed in the household for 1 month 
only (%) 
3.23 2.38 4.1 0.45 
Average level of dissatisfaction with service (5-point 
scale 1= very satisfied, 5=very dissatisfied) 
2.01 1.95 2.07 0.25 
The table validates that the two groups in the survey are balanced across energy using habits and attitude towards the service. 
The p-values are derived from t-tests.  
 
 
Table 3 reports the characteristics of energy expenditures. Results show that the week before 
they were surveyed households spent on average 2733 FCFA to refill their meters and went on 
average 1.99 times to buy this credit. The average weekly expenditure in the last month was 
lower however (2362 FCFA), and so was the average weekly refill frequency (1.83).  
 
 
 
TABLE	3	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	AND	VALIDATION	OF	RANDOMIZATION	FOR	ENERGY	EXPENDITURE		
 Whole 
sample 
 Specific 
period ‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual period 
‘Per Week’ 
P-value 
Average expenditure last week (FCFA) 2733 2770 2694 0.84 
Average refill frequency last week  1.99 2.01 1.97 0.86  
Average weekly expenditure last month 
(FCFA) 
2362  2318 2408 0.78  
Average weekly refill frequency last month  1.83 
 
1.83 1.82 0.95 
Average irregularity of weekly refill 
frequency last month 
0.48 0.48 0.47 0.83 
The table validates that the two groups in the survey are balanced across energy expenditures. The p-values are derived from 
t-tests. The irregularity measure is the standard deviation divided with the mean.  
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4.1.2	Reported	expenditure		
 
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the reported expenditure, broken down by sub-sample. 
As can be seen for both elicitation frameworks, reported spending is higher than the actual 
spending reported in Table 3. This demonstrates that there is a general tendency to over-report 
energy expenditures in the survey regardless of the elicitation method that is being used. Both 
the mean and the median as well as the standard deviation of reported expenditure is lower 
when elicited with the ‘specific’ as opposed to when elicited with the ‘usual’ period. A similar 
relationship holds for the reporting on average weekly refill frequency, although in this case 
the median of the two measures is equal. These findings are contrary to expectations from the 
literature, which finds that ‘specific’ periods elicit higher and more variable measures 
(Angrisani, Kapteyn, & Schuh, 2015; Beegle et al., 2012).  
 
 
 
TABLE	4	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	OF	REPORTED	EXPENDITURE		
Reported average weekly/last week expenditure 
(FCFA) 
Reported average refill frequency per 
week/last week 
 Specific period 
‘Last Week’ 
Usual period 
‘Per Week’ 
Specific period 
‘Last Week’ 
Usual period ‘Per 
Week’ 
Mean 3434 4271 2.28 2.74 
Median 2340   2800 2 
 
 2 
Standard 
deviation 
3015 4547 1.95 2.86 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Measures	of	response	accuracy			
 
The summary statistics of the total and relative measurement errors, are reported in Table 5. 
Total measurement errors are smaller in the case of the ‘specific’ period than in the case of the 
‘usual’ period as far as the mean and their median are concerned. This difference of the means 
is also statistically significant. This holds in both cases of reported levels of expenditure and 
refill frequency. Similar patterns hold for the relative measurement errors (Table 6).  
This suggests therefore that the ‘specific’ period gives significantly more accurate 
results. This is in line with other findings in literature (Beegle et al., 2012). The lower mean 
results of the ‘specific’ period found in this study contrary to expectations, is due to the fact 
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that there is an over-reporting of expenditure. This signifies the more accurate the measure, the 
lower the means. 
  It is also interesting to note that in reported spending, in the ‘specific’ period more than 
25% of responses were fully accurate (i.e. zero measurement error); this goes to over 50% for 
the case of reported refill frequency. In contrast in the ‘usual’ period this figure drops to 1% 
and 5% respectively.  
 
 
 
TABLE	5	MEASURES	OF	DISPERSION	OF	TOTAL	ERROR	IN	LEVEL	OF	EXPENDITURE	AND	REFILL	FREQUENCY	
REPORTING	
                     Total expenditure error                       Total refill frequency error 
 Specific 
period 
‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual 
period 
‘Per 
Week’ 
P-value  Specific 
period 
‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual 
period 
‘Per 
Week’ 
P-value 
Mean 1023.59 2018.39 0.0008 Mean 0.56 1.18 0.0003 
Median   500 1030    Median 0 0.6  
Standard 
deviation 
1838.63 2617.27  Standard 
deviation 
 0.96 1.54  
Percentiles    Percentiles    
1% 0 0  1% 0 0  
5% 0 60  5% 0 0  
10% 0 160  10% 0 0.1  
25% 0 360  25% 0 0.2  
50% 500 1030  50% 0 0.6  
75% 1000 2530  75% 1 1.5  
90% 2500 5440  90% 2 3.8  
95% 4000 7900  95% 2.4 4.8  
99% 8000 11170  99% 4 6.5  
Total expenditure error: Absolute total differences between reported spending and actual expenditure last week or per week; 
Total refill frequency error: Absolute total differences between reported refill frequency and actual refill frequency last week 
or per week. The p-values are derived from t-tests. 
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TABLE	6	MEASURES	OF	DISPERSION	OF	RELATIVE	ERROR	IN	LEVEL	OF	EXPENDITURE	AND	REFILL	FREQUENCY					
REPORTING	
                          Relative expenditure error                         Relative refill frequency error 
 Specific 
period 
‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual 
period ‘Per 
Week’ 
P-value  Specific 
period 
‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual 
period 
‘Per 
Week’ 
P-value 
Mean 78.94 161.15 0.05 Mean 47.31 106.73 0.01 
Median   20   52.51   Median 0 42.857   
Standard 
deviation 
259.34 288.54  Standard 
deviation 
118.94 191.58  
Percentiles    Percentiles    
1% 0 0  1% 0 0  
5% 0 5.41  5% 0 0  
10% 0 9.38  10% 0 4.76  
25% 0 22.73  25% 0 16.67  
50% 20 52.51  50% 0  42.86  
75% 52.05 157.35  75% 40 100  
90% 133.33  400  90% 100 268.42  
95% 354.55    681.25  95% 233.33 525  
99% 1150 1328.57  99% 600   900    
Relative expenditure error: absolute relative differences between reported spending and actual expenditure last week or per 
week (reported in percentages); Relative refill frequency error: Absolute relative differences between reported refill frequency 
and actual refill frequency last week or per week (reported in percentages). The p-values are derived from t-tests. 
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4.2	Results	
 
4.2.1	Correlations	
 
Table 7 reports the results of an Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) of survey reported 
expenditures to actual expenditures, broken down by the the different elicitation periods, in 
order to see how satisfactorily survey responses, predict real expenditures. 
Overall, in all cases there are important individual-level deviations between the survey 
reported and the actual expenditures and refill frequencies. The ‘specific’ period predicts 
expenditures last week with a significant slope of 0.60 and an adjusted R-squared of 0.57 (this 
means that only 57% of the variation is explained by the survey responses). The results are 
better in the case of predicting refill frequency. With a significant slope of 0.69, and an adjusted 
R-squared of 0.7.    
The ‘usual’ period predicts average weekly expenditures last month with a significant 
slope of 0.51 and an adjusted R-squared of 0.67. Interestingly, although the ‘specific’ period 
fares better in terms of the size of the prediction, it seems to be capturing less of the variation 
than the ‘usual’ period. This discrepancy does not hold with predictions of refill frequency as 
both the slope (0.53) and R-squared (0.66) are lower in the ‘usual’ than in the ‘specific’ period.  
Overall, it appears that both periods predict refill frequency better than expenditure 
levels.  
 
 
 
TABLE	7	CORRELATION	OF	SURVEY	REPORTED	EXPENDITURE	AND	FREQUENCY	OF	REFILLS	WITH	ACTUAL	
EXPENDITURE	AND	FREQUENCY	OF	REFILLS	
 Expenditure  
last week 
 
Expenditure 
per week last 
month 
 
Frequency 
of refills last 
week  
Frequency of 
refills per 
week last 
month 
Constant 627.24* 
(331.76) 
236.76 
(244.36)  
0.41*** 
(0.12) 
0.39***  
(0.13) 
Survey reported weekly 
expenditure (Specific 
period) 
0.60*** 
(0.12) 
 0.69*** 
(0.07) 
 
Survey reported weekly 
expenditure (Usual 
period) 
 0.51*** 
(0.07) 
 0.53*** 
(0.06) 
Adj R-squared    0.57 0.67 0.7 0.66 
Number of observations   117 121 114 119 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. All models are ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard 
errors (coefficient and standard error reported). 
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4.2.2	Reporting	period	effects	on	total	and	relative	measurement	errors		
 
The following regressions are looking at the effect of the different recall periods, as well as of 
other determinants, on the level of error in expenditure level and refill frequency reporting. As 
mentioned previously both total and relative measurement errors have been used as measures 
of accuracy in the literature of survey methodology. Accuracy measures based on total 
differences, overemphasize deviations on higher expenditure levels, while relative measures 
overemphasize deviations on smaller expenditure levels. For that reason, average weekly 
expenditure last month and average weekly refill frequency the month prior to the survey, were 
also added as controls in the regressions. A table with an explanation of all variable names used 
in the regressions can be found in the Appendix. 
Table 8 explores the determinants of the total level of measurement error. The ‘usual’ 
week elicitation has a positive and significant effect on the level of error on both expenditure 
level and refill frequency reporting. When controlling for covariates, the effect of the ‘usual’ 
week remains strong for all extended models. This finding provides further confirmation that 
the ‘usual’ period recall gives less accurate results. 
As far as the effect of other covariates on total measurement error are concerned, the 
average weekly expenditure (or average weekly refill frequency), the irregularity of weekly 
refill frequency and level of dissatisfaction with the service, are the only measures that retain 
a strong effect in all the extended models. 
The average level of weekly expenditure (or weekly refill frequency) and irregularity 
of weekly refill frequency, as expected, have a significant and positive effect on total 
measurement error. This is in line to Menon, 1993 findings regarding the negative effect of 
irregularity of events on accuracy of frequency reporting. The level of dissatisfaction with the 
service has a positive effect on total measurement error, which indicates that over-reporting 
could be partly an outcome of protest for the service charges.  
Socio-economic variables like household size, gender of respondent, household income 
level, age of respondent and in which of the two survey waves the surveyed household 
participated are only robust in some of the models. In addition, the regression controls for other 
respondent characteristic expected to affect performance in survey responses namely the level 
of schooling of respondent, the time the meter has been used for, if respondent actively takes 
part in decision making about energy and if respondent purchases the refills in person. As none 
of these variables were significant in any of the models their coefficients are not reported.   
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These findings indicate that misreporting is largely linked to expenditure levels and 
refill frequency patterns and less due to respondent characteristics. This is not in agreement to 
other studies measuring the effect of different aspect of expenditure survey design on survey 
responses, which have found respondent specific characteristic to have an effect (Beegle et al., 
2012; Comerford et al., 2009; Winter, 2004).   
The interaction of irregularity of weekly refill frequency with the ‘usual’ period has a 
negative effect on error. In other words, as irregularity of weekly refill frequency increases the 
measurement error for the ‘specific’ period in comparison to the ‘usual’ period increases. 
However, this effect is only significant for the error in refill frequency reporting, when 
controlling for average weekly refill frequency last month, and not for the error in expenditure 
level reporting.  
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TABLE	8	DETERMINANTS	OF	TOTAL	LEVEL	OF	MEASUREMENT	ERROR	ON	EXPENDITURE	AND	REFILL	FREQUENCY	
REPORTING	
 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Irregularity *Usual period: interaction between irregularity of weekly refill 
frequency and ‘usual’ period. All models are ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors (coefficient and 
standard error reported). All regressions include additional controls regarding decision making on energy, refill habits, 
schooling levels, whether the household has the meter for at least three months and if the household belongs to the medium 
income level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
expenditure 
level error 
Total 
expenditure 
level error 
extended 
model 
Total 
expenditure 
level error 
extended 
model 
controlling 
for 
spending 
level  
Total 
refill 
frequency 
error 
 
Total 
refill 
frequency 
error 
extended 
model 
 
Total refill 
frequency 
error 
extended 
model 
controlling 
for refill 
frequency 
level  
Constant 1023.59*** 
(169.97) 
-1661.57 
(1012.47) 
-1268.7 
(961.62) 
0.56*** 
(0.09) 
-1.43*** 
(0.51) 
-1.22** 
(0.50) 
Usual period   994.81*** 
(292.42) 
1068.03*** 
(405.17) 
1131.87*** 
(383.04) 
0.61*** 
(0.17) 
0.64*** 
(0.23) 
0.77*** 
(0.21) 
Household size  38.85** 
(19.09) 
30.64 
(19.52) 
 0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
High income  1642.7*** 
(542.08) 
1238.59** 
(604.54) 
 0.61*  
(0.31) 
0.40 
(0.30) 
Female  629.81  
(437.98) 
389.30 
(424.38) 
 0.57** 
(0.23) 
 0.34 
(0.23) 
Age  -23.54* 
(13.40) 
-21.62 
(13.86) 
 -0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006)  
Irregularity   1529.68*** 
(504.30) 
1387.11*** 
(528.82) 
 0.46** 
(0.18) 
0.41** 
(0.19) 
Irregularity*Usual 
period 
 -662.18 
(794.74) 
-819.8 
(727.71) 
 -0.29  
(0.37) 
-0.57* 
(0.32) 
Average weekly 
expenditure 
  0.18** 
(0.08) 
   
Average weekly 
refill frequency 
     0.20*** 
(0.06) 
Level of 
dissatisfaction 
 468.44** 
(185.54) 
389.69** 
(184.18) 
 0.30** 
(0.12) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
Second survey 
wave 
 1531.72** 
(732.85) 
1426.51** 
(705.85) 
 0.42 
(0.27) 
0.37 
(0.28) 
Number of 
observations 
238 232 232 233 227 227 
Adj R-squared    0.04 0.18 0.21 0.05 0.13 0.18 
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Table 9 presents the determinants of relative measurement errors. There is similarity to findings 
on total measurement errors as the ‘usual’ period has a positive effect on the relative 
measurement error of expenditure level and refill frequency reporting, which remains robust 
in all extended models. As expected, the level of average weekly expenditure (or weekly refill 
frequency) in this case has a negative significant effect on level of error. Here the interaction 
of the ‘usual’ period with irregularity of weekly refill frequency is significant and negative in 
all refill frequency error models and for the extended model of expenditure level error with 
spending level controls. Dissatisfaction significantly drives the results only for refill frequency 
error, in all cases. Finally, the socio-economic variables that were significant in some of the 
models in Table 8 loose their significance here, which further indicates that the measurement 
error is not driven by socio-economic factors. 
Overall, the negative effect that irregularity of weekly refill frequency has through the 
‘specific’ period indicates a negative effect of ‘recall and count’ strategies on accuracy for refill 
frequency reporting. This in contrary to Menon, 1993 findings that ‘rate based’ estimates give 
more accurate results, but in line with Burton and Blaire, 1991 who find that ‘rate based’ 
estimates give more accurate results. The fact that this finding is robust for fewer models of 
expenditure level error in comparison to the models of refill frequency error, indicates that the 
findings regarding frequency reporting (Menon, 1993) do not fully translate to expenditure 
level reporting. However, overall results regarding the effect of the different recall periods, the 
effect of other covariates and the correlations of real and reported measures show that these 
two process are largely linked. 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
42 We also tested the effect of two additional measures of irregularity concerning the expenditure levels. One is 
the irregularity of the amount purchased to refill the prepaid meters for which we calculated the standard deviation 
of refill amounts last month. The second one is irregularity of the weekly expenditure level, for which we 
calculated the standard deviation for average weekly expenditure last month. To be able to make comparisons 
across different expenditures and refill frequency levels, the standard deviations were divided with the respective 
means of the two measures. The first measure was added as a measure of similarity and the second as an additional 
measure of irregularity for the expenditure levels. Although it was assumed that the effect of similarity is 
negligible in this case study (as the refill process is very similar each time), the irregularity of the level of refill 
amounts could be capturing a similarity effect for expenditure level reporting. These measures of irregularity were 
not found to have any significant effect in none of the models above. Their effect was tested separately to avoid 
issues of multicollinearity. These results are therefore not reported here, but are available upon request.  
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TABLE	9	DETERMINANTS	OF	RELATIVE	LEVEL	OF	MEASUREMENT	ERROR	ON	EXPENDITURE	AND	REFILL	FREQUENCY	
REPORTING	
 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. Irregularity *Usual period: interaction between irregularity of weekly refill 
frequency and ‘usual’ period. All models are ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors (coefficient and 
standard error reported). All regressions include additional controls regarding decision making on energy, refill habits, 
schooling levels, whether the household has the meter for at least three months and if household belongs to the medium income 
levels. 
 
 
 
 
 Relative 
expenditure 
level error 
Relative 
expenditure 
level error 
extended 
model 
Relative 
expenditure 
level error 
extended 
model 
controlling 
for 
spending 
level  
Relative 
refill 
frequency 
error 
 
Relative 
refill 
frequency 
error 
extended 
model 
 
Relative 
refill 
frequency 
error 
extended 
model 
controlling 
for refill 
frequency 
level  
Constant 78.94*** 
(23.97) 
29.73 
(156.88) 
-40.75 
(149.42) 
47.31*** 
(11.14) 
-82.77  
(78.72) 
-106.39 
(79.52) 
Usual period 82.22**  
(35.54) 
158.81*** 
(59.77) 
147.35** 
(57.89) 
59.42*** 
(20.80) 
133.80*** 
(37.24) 
118.69*** 
( 33.52) 
Household 
size 
 2.35 
(2.54) 
3.82  
(2.49) 
 1.82 
(1.69)    
2.63 
(1.69) 
High income  17.28 
(68.12) 
89.77 
(71.29) 
 -4.96 
(30.96) 
18.43 
(29.67) 
Female  -10.95 
(57.53) 
32.20 
(52.45) 
 41.10 
(28.21) 
66.75** 
( 30.27) 
Age   -1.86   
(2.11) 
-2.21 
( 2.09) 
 - 0.08 
( 0.70) 
-0.28 
(0.67) 
Irregularity   143.86 
( 96.65) 
169.44* 
(99.10) 
 79.92** 
(35.11) 
 85.29** 
(36.28) 
Irregularity 
*Usual period 
 -220.69* 
(122.19) 
-192.41* 
(116.28) 
 -182.27*** 
(60.55) 
-151.77*** 
(52.39) 
Average 
weekly 
expenditure 
  - 0.03*** 
 (0.008) 
   
Average 
weekly refill 
frequency 
     -22.97*** 
(6.77) 
Level of 
dissatisfaction  
 37.57 
(35.41) 
51.69 
( 35.31) 
 32.53** 
( 21.53) 
41.29* 
(22.36) 
Second 
survey wave 
 163.96 
(106.95) 
182.83* 
(106.19) 
 36.08 
(43.13) 
42.57 
(41.06) 
Number of 
observations 
238 232 232 233 227 227 
Adj R-
squared    
0.02 0.05 
 
0.12 
 
0.03 0.08 0.13 
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4.2.3	Limitations	and	the	use	of	the	effects	of	cognitive	difficulty	as	a	robustness	check	
 
The main limitation of this study is that, our conclusions regarding the accuracy of the different 
response strategies are based on certain assumptions about how irregularity, and the nature of 
recall period affect the response strategies. These assumptions are informed by findings from 
previous studies. We cannot rule out however that the effect of the interaction between 
irregularity and recall period is not driven by the different response strategies used but by some 
other dynamic that we are unaware off. In other words, irregularity could be affecting the 
accuracy of responses to the ‘specific’ period for some reason other to response strategy 
change. 
Due to time constraints associated with the fieldwork, we do not elicit a response 
strategy separately for each respondent. This is done in a number of studies by asking 
respondents to explain the way they formed their responses (Burton & Blair, 1991; Menon, 
1993; Edgar, 2009).  
In this section we use an additional confirmation of the response strategy shift we 
assumed using the cognitive effort of respondents as a proxy. A number of studies associate 
‘recall and count’ response strategies with a higher cognitive effort than ‘rate based’ response 
strategies (Menon, 1993; Tourangeau et al., 2000).  
Table 10 reports the effects of the elicitation period on the level of difficulty in reporting 
expenditure levels and refill frequency as assessed by the interviewer in a five-point scale (with 
5 signifying maximum difficulty). We find that the ‘specific’ period, which produces more 
accurate results as per discussion above, is associated with a higher level of response effort, 
i.e. a higher level of difficulty as expected.  
 
TABLE	10	THE	EFFECT	OF	RECALL	PERIOD	ON	DIFFICULTY	OF	EXPENDITURE	LEVEL	
	AND	REFILL	FREQUENCY	REPORTING	
 Specific 
period ‘Last 
Week’ 
Usual period 
‘Per Week’ 
P-value 
Difficulty of 
reporting 1 
 
2.56 2.19 0.005 
Difficulty of 
reporting 2 
2.62   2.22 0.005 
Difficulty of reporting 1: Difficulty of reporting level of expenditure in a 5-point scale (1= no difficulty). 
Difficulty of reporting 2: Difficulty of reporting refill frequency in a 5-point scale (1= no difficulty). 
The table tests that the two groups in the survey are differ in terms of the difficulty in reporting.  
The p-values are derived from t-tests.  
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The fact that response difficulty seems to be significantly higher in the ‘specific’ elicitation 
period, serves as tentative confirmation of our priors that the ‘specific’ period, evokes more 
‘recall and count’ strategies, while ‘usual’ period invoke more ‘rate based’ estimation 
strategies. Table 11 demonstrates that as irregularity of the reported task (irregularity of weekly 
refill frequency) increases, response difficulty significantly increases only for the ‘specific’ 
period. This is an indication that increased irregularity leads to switches in reporting strategy 
for the ‘specific’ period, from ‘rate based’ estimates to ‘recall and count’ strategies that are 
more time consuming, as is found in other studies (Menon, 1993). This does not happen for the 
‘usual’ period. Therefore, we can argue that this is additional evidence that the negative effect 
of irregularity on response accuracy for the ‘specific’ period found in Tables 8 and 9 is due to 
the use of ‘recall and count’ instead of ‘rate based’ strategies.    
 
 
 
																	TABLE	11	THE	EFFECT	OF	IRREGULARITY	ON	DIFFICULTY	OF	REPORTING	
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 2.20*** 
(0.21) 
2.15***   
(0.17) 
2.34*** 
(0.17) 
2.10*** 
(0.17) 
Irregularity  0.78*  
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
0.53* 
(0.3) 
0.22 
(0.36) 
Adj R-squared    0.08 -0.0003 0.03 -0.005 
Number of 
observations   
114 120 114 120 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. All models are ordinary least squares regressions with robust 
standard errors (coefficient and standard error reported). 
1.Difficulty of reporting level of expenditure in a 5-point scale (1= no difficulty) for specific period ‘Last Week.  
2.Difficulty of reporting level of expenditure in a 5-point scale (1= no difficulty) for usual period ‘Per Week’. 
3.Difficulty of reporting refill frequency in a 5-point scale (1= no difficulty) for specific period ‘Last Week’. 
4.Difficulty of reporting refill frequency in a 5-point scale (1= no difficulty) for usual period ‘Per Week’. 
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5. Conclusions	
 
This study uses data on actual energy expenditure available from a solar hybrid mini-grid in 
rural Guinea-Bissau and compares it to reported expenditure obtained via a survey to test the 
accuracy of reported energy expenditure within surveys when using differently defined recall 
periods. Through a randomized design we isolate the effects on response accuracy of asking 
respondents to state their expenditure in a ‘specific’ (‘last week’) as opposed to a ‘usual’ (‘per 
week’) period. This is the first study to compare survey data with real data on recurring 
household expenditures in a developing country in order to validate the accuracy of survey 
responses. In addition, this study focuses on energy expenditure reporting which has been 
largely overlooked in the literature despite the fact that collecting accurate information of 
energy expenditure is crucial for successful policy and project design.  
Overall, our results indicate important individual-level deviations between survey 
reported, and actual expenditures levels and frequency of refills in all cases. Regardless of the 
period used there is a general tendency to over-report energy expenditures which is more 
pronounced with the use of the ‘usual’ period. This demonstrates that survey elicited 
expenditure data should be treated with caution.  
In addition, we find that responses are more accurate and less noisy when ‘specific’ 
periods are used. The fact that ‘usual’ period recall gives less accurate results seems to be in 
line with other findings in literature (Beegle et al., 2012). However, the expectation from this 
literature is that responses to the ‘specific’ period will have an overall higher means (less 
forgetfulness) and larger dispersion measures (higher volatility) (Angrisani et al., 2015) which 
is opposite to our findings. The lower means results of the ‘specific’ period in our case, is due 
to the fact that there is an over-reporting of expenditure therefore the lower means indicate 
more accurate responses. This over-reporting can be partially driven by a tendency of certain 
respondents to overstate their responses due to dissatisfaction with the service, which is 
positively and significantly correlated with the level of measurement error in most error 
models. The fact that some of our results were found to diverge from the findings of other 
studies confirms that the results are sensitive to good-specific characteristics (Deaton & Grosh, 
2000).     
Results also indicate that misreporting is largely linked to expenditure and refill 
frequency patterns and not to socio-economic characteristics of the respondent as found in 
other studies (Beegle et al., 2012; Comerford et al., 2009; Winter, 2004). 
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More specifically, the level of average weekly expenditure (or weekly refill frequency) 
and irregularity of weekly refill frequency significantly affects both the total and relative 
measurement error.  This is close to Menon,1993 study that finds a negative effect of 
irregularity of events on accuracy of frequency reporting. Importantly, results suggest that the 
irregularity of weekly refill frequency affects negatively reporting error in the ‘specific’ period 
rather than in the ‘usual’ period. However, the effect is robust for most models of error on refill 
frequency reporting but less so for error on expenditure level reporting.   
This final finding offers some evidence regarding the effect of response strategies on 
response accuracy. The ‘usual’ period has been shown to induce respondents to follow ‘rate 
based’ estimation strategies and the ‘specific’ period to induce respondents to follow ‘recall 
and count’ strategies, specifically when irregularity of weekly refill frequency increases. 
Therefore, the negative effect that irregularity of weekly refill frequency has through the 
‘specific’ period implies that ‘recall and count’ strategies have a negative effect on accuracy, 
particularly for frequency reporting.  
Results also suggest that findings of frequency reporting (Menon, 1993) do not fully 
correspond to expenditure level reporting, but that there are many similarities.  
We were not able to collect detailed information about the respondents’ response 
strategy after the expenditure elicitation, which would confirm that the ‘specific’ period is 
indeed inducing more ‘recall and count’ strategies especially as irregularity of weekly refill 
frequency increases. Nevertheless, we use difficulty in responding (as assessed by the 
interviewer in a five-point scale) as a measure of response strategy used. ‘Recall and count’ 
response strategies are expected to be more difficult to respond to, rather than the ‘rate based’ 
estimates. We find that the ‘specific’ period is significantly more difficult overall to respond 
to, and that difficulty increases significantly in irregularity of weekly refill frequency only 
within the ‘specific’ period. This then confirms our priors. 
Our findings have implications for policy as they indicate that overall survey elicited 
energy expenditure data should be treated with caution. Issues linked to the reported activity 
(expenditure levels, irregularity of refill frequency) and attitudes of the surveyed population 
that can lead to misreporting of expenditure (e.g. dissatisfaction with the service) should be 
taken into consideration when interpreting survey elicited energy expenditure data. Finally, 
although we demonstrate that using the ‘specific’ period helps reduce measurement error to a 
certain extent, the variability of the reported measure should also be taken into consideration 
when choosing the appropriate ‘recall’ period.  
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The main limitation of this study is that we were not able to elicit response strategies 
separately, which would have provided additional evidence regarding the effect of response 
strategy on response accuracy. In addition, the limited sample size of this case study does not 
allow for a full exploration of the source of other potential biases in reporting, or to explore 
other effects of survey design. However, we are hoping to introduce a way in exploring 
expenditure reporting. Response strategy elicitation methods and (or) the use of larger sample 
sizes from clients of large utilities could be used in the future, to confirm the evidence presented 
by this study and also test other aspects of survey design and theories of response strategies 
and study their interaction. Such an exercise can also enhance our knowledge about potential 
sources of consumer misunderstanding of their energy expenditures. 
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7. Appendix	
 
7.1	Explanation	of	variable	names	used	in	regressions	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Definition 
Usual period   Dummy; 1= respondent respond to the ‘usual’ 
period 
Household size Household size 
High income Dummy; 1=household belongs to the highest 
oncome category 
Female Dummy; 1= respondent is Female 
Age Age of respondent (in years) 
Irregularity  Irregularity of weekly refill frequency 
Irregularity*Usual period Irregularity of weekly refill frequency *Usual 
period 
Average weekly expenditure Average weekly expenditure last month 
Average weekly refill frequency Average weekly refill frequency last month 
Level of dissatisfaction Level of dissatisfaction with service on a 5-point 
scale (1= very satisfied) 
Second survey wave Dummy; 1=household was interviewed in the 
second survey wave 
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7.2	Survey	draft	
 
Note to interviewer:  
Ask: “Who makes the decisions regarding the electricity in this household? Can I talk to this 
person?”. If not available ask: “When can I come back to talk to that person?”.  
If you can not talk to this person (especially if the person does not want to be interviewed) or 
if anyone else in this family prefers to answer this questionnaire, try to insist on the correct 
person answering, explaining that the participation of the correct person in this questionnaire 
is very important to us to obtain the right information.  
The last resort is to agree to talk to someone instead who is well informed of the daily activities 
of the household and who is an important part in the decision making process of the household. 
After you have established who to talk to, communicate the following information: 
 
We are conducting a survey in your community that is part of a research initiative carried out 
by a PhD student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, a university in 
London. This is in partnership with ‘TESE’ an NGO working in Guinea-Bissau on 
infrastructural projects, including energy. The purpose of the questionnaire is to study the 
energy community service of Bambadinca. 
These questions should take around 10 minutes to complete. 
 
Your answers will be strictly confidential and will not be shared with anyone else. 
Answers will only be used anonymously for research purposes. 
 
Participation is voluntary and you can refuse to participate without providing an 
explanation and without any consequences. If you agree to participate in the survey you 
have the right to stop whenever you want. 
 
Your participation is very important to us. We will use the information that you and other 
families give us to understand more fully the factors affecting the success of the community 
energy project. This is in the advancement of academic knowledge and this knowledge could 
serve future energy policies in Guinea-Bissau. 
 
Do you have any questions? May I continue interviewing you? 
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Your responses will have no influence over the way the energy service is offered to you (tariffs etc.)  
It is very important that you give honest answers and not over or understate the answers. This is because 
if the information we collect is not true, the outputs of the survey will not be beneficial to your 
community or Guinea-Bissau. 
 
 
 
Client number  
Client name  
Name of respondent  
Note to interviewer: are you speaking with the 
person who makes the financial decisions and 
decisions regarding the purchase of energy 
products in this household? 
Yes 
No 
Other. Specify____________ 
What is the gender of the respondent? Female  
Male 
What is their age? 
(Note to interviewer: If they don’t know their 
age or if they seem to be giving you the wrong 
answer take a note of the age they seem to have. 
As an indication ask them what is the age of 
their eldest son) 
 
What is your education level? No schooling 
Primary schooling  
Secondary schooling  
Superior schooling 
Other. Specify________ 
 
What is your relationship to the head of the 
household? 
 
How many people live in this household 
including yourself? By household I mean all 
individuals who normally live and eat their 
meals together in this household and share the 
expenses. 
(Note to interviewer: Here, to make sure you 
obtain the right response, make sure to have a 
short conversation about what the relationship 
of each member is to the respondent. Example: 
Begin by asking who else lives here) 
 
What is the ethnicity of the household? Fula  
Mandinga  
Balanta  
Beafada 
Papel 
Cabo-verdiana 
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Other. Specify_____________ 
 
Which family member goes to buy credit refills 
for electricity? 
 
Which family member decides the level of 
credit refills for electricity? 
 
 
 
 
Randomized elicitation period: 
 
 
1. Specific period 
How much did you spend last week for credit 
refills for your electricity meter? 
Per week 
Other_____________ 
 
How many times did you go last week to buy 
these credit refills? 
Per week 
Other_____________ 
 
 
 
2. ‘Usual’ period 
How much do you spend normally per week 
for credit refills for your electricity meter? 
Per week 
Other_____________ 
 
How many times do you normally go per week 
to buy these credit refills? 
Per week 
Other_____________ 
 
 
 
Additional Questions about the service: 
 
 
How satisfied are you with the service? Very satisfied 
Satisfied 
Not satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
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Questions for the interviewer: 
 
 
what is the income level of this household in 
your opinion? 
High income 
Medium income 
Poor  
Very poor 
Rate the interviewer’s effort to answer the 
question on expenditures in terms of time 
spent? (with 1 expressing the least possible 
effort) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Rate the interviewer’s effort to answer the 
question on the frequency of credit refills in 
terms of time spent? (with 1 expressing the 
least possible effort) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Did someone else respond for them? Yes 
No 
Other_______________ 
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Chapter	5		
The	 determinants	 of	 expenditure	 patterns	 for	 prepaid	 electricity:	
evidence	from	a	solar	hybrid	mini-grid	in	Guinea-Bissau	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract		
 
This study looks at prepayment patterns for electricity services, offered by a solar hybrid mini-
grid in rural Guinea-Bissau, and how they are affected by a number of socio-economic factors, 
the equipment in use, self-control problems, social pressures to share money and other intra-
household dynamics as well as being charged a time-varying tariff. Understanding these 
dynamics is important in order to identify the advantages and limitations of the prepayment 
method in comparison to traditional monthly billing methods. Findings indicate that 
prepayment helps address both income constraints as well as self-control problems. Overall, 
there is a preference for small and frequent repayments. The level of monthly expenditure is 
driven positively, amongst other factors, by income levels and using the service for income 
generating activities. Self-control problems affect negatively the level of refill amounts 
indicating that customers with self-control problems use smaller refill amounts as a method to 
commit to using less electricity at home. Similarly, individuals charged a higher tariff for their 
consumption between 7pm to 12am choose smaller refill amounts possibly as a method to 
control their consumption patterns. These findings are important for policy. Namely results 
advise against the use of a minimum refill amount and in favour of putting in place schemes 
that will encourage income generating activities at the household level (e.g. credit and rental 
schemes for appliances).  
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1. Introduction	
 
One of the main challenges facing electricity access policies in developing countries is ensuring 
that the new clients, who in these contexts often face severe income and liquidity constraints, 
are able to pay the bills associated with the electrification services (Jack & Smith, 2015). 
Inability to pay can lead to non-payment, which negatively impacts utility revenues and 
investments in infrastructure to expand access to electricity, but also the quality of the 
electricity provided (McRae, 2014; Szabó & Ujhelyi, 2014). Prepaid meters are seen as a 
promising technological solution to limit non-payment linked to traditional billing methods 
(Jack & Smith, 2016), and help costumers to manage their electricity consumption (Darby, 
2012). As prepaid meters offer flexibility in the payment regime and allow consumers to link 
their consumption with their expenditure they are expected to help address a number issues. 
These can be income and liquidity constraints or non-income factors like self-control problems, 
intra-household pressures and inability to understand traditional billing methods (Jack & 
Smith, 2015; Jack & Smith, 2016). However, little research has been done to see how these 
factors actually affect prepayment patterns. Such an exercise is warranted to confirm the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the prepayment method, inform the design of prepayment 
schemes and also shed light on the underlying limitations of traditional billing methods.  
Prepaid meters is a payment method for electricity that has been used in a number of 
developed (Australia, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, North America) (Boardman & Fawcett, 
2002; Brutscher, 2011, 2012b; Qiu, Xing, & Wang, 2016; Sharam & Energy Action, 2003) and 
developing countries and it is expected to expand quickly in the coming years (e.g. South Africa 
and other projects in Sub-Saharan Africa) (Jack & Smith, 2015). In this payment method 
consumers must pay for the electricity they consume in advance. Usually this electricity is 
purchased in a store and afterwards the customer must update a meter which is installed in the 
household. When the meter runs out of credit the clients need to purchase more credit. The 
consumer controls how much to purchase each time. The technology is meant to address a 
number of problems both from the consumer and the utility side.  
From the consumer’s point of view prepaid meters allow for flexibility regarding the 
size and timing of the payment. This is especially relevant for poorer households that are unable 
to meet larger monthly payments. In addition, consumption is linked with expenditure and this 
helps consumers to control better their expenditure and the electricity that they use, avoiding 
debt accumulation. Depending on the type of meter technology it can also offer feedback 
information to consumers regarding their consumption and therefore allow for better control 
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of electricity use (Anderson, White, & Finney, 2012; Brutscher, 2011; Jack & Smith, 2015; 
Qiu et al., 2016). 
Prepaid meters also offer a number of advantages to the service providers as transaction 
costs are reduced and so is non-payment as self-disconnection of non-paying customers is 
automatic (Jack & Smith, 2016). Meters allow for better peak demand management as 
information about different tariffs throughout the day becomes readily available. This is 
especially relevant for renewable energy (Darby, 2012). 
However, a number of disadvantages associated with prepaid meters have also been 
highlighted. From the side of the consumer self-disconnection and self-rationing can occur 
(Brutscher, 2012b). Self-rationing is when the consumer uses less electricity than is required 
to cover the household’s needs because of inability to pay. This could be particularly the case 
in months of lower revenues, leading to a seasonality effect in electricity consumption. Self-
disconnection occurs when the household remains without electricity for some time due to 
inability to pay to refill the meter. Self-disconnection can also occur for other reasons irrelevant 
to income constrains. For example, when an individual runs out of credit at times when it is 
not possible to purchase more credit. The problems of self-rationing and self-disconnection 
have been identified especially in studies in developed countries and they can have detrimental 
effects both for the consumers but also render the suppliers’ revenues unpredictable (Howat & 
McLaughlin, 2012).  
The study of the advantages and disadvantages of prepaid meters can draw from 
standard models of technology adoption but also from non-standard models of decision making 
including the ones looking at the role of self-control problems and the social context of decision 
making.  
The potential of self-control problems and intra-household dynamics to affect 
prepayment patterns has been suggested by a number of studies (Jack & Smith 2016; Brutscher, 
2011; 2012b), but so far no study has tested these effects in a developing country context. This 
study aims to fill this gap.  
As discussed in Chapter 1 hyperbolic discounting linked to self-control problems as 
well as intra-household pressures to share money have been linked with inability to save 
(Ashraf et al., 2006; Bauer, Chytilová, & Morduch, 2012), inability to make upfront costs to 
acquire new technologies (e.g. fertilizers, health products) in developing countries (Duflo, 
Kremer, & Robinson, 2011; Dupas & Robinson, 2013), and with a preference for small 
frequent purchases even when this leads to larger total costs (Attanasio & Frayne 2006). Access 
to different commitment devices (depending on the underlying limitation) (e.g. credit, saving 
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devices) has been shown to limit these effects (Dupas & Robinson, 2013). However, little 
research has been done to see how these findings can inform the effectiveness of billing 
methods such as prepayment and monthly billing.  
Findings from this literature could apply in the study of prepayment patterns in a 
number of ways.  
Prepaid meters are thought to increase consumers’ ability to pay since the flexibility of 
the payment regime allows individuals that face liquidity and income constraints to pay in 
smaller more frequent amounts (Jack & Smith, 2015). However, this flexibility can also help 
address self-control problems that could affect an individual’s ability to control the level of 
electricity consumed. In this case the choice of small refill amounts could serve as a 
commitment strategy to use less electricity at home (discussed in Brutscher, 2011).  
At the same time self-control problems, through their direct negative effect on saving, 
could be impacting the seasonality of electricity use (if such individuals are unable to save 
during the months of higher revenues). Self-disconnection can also be caused by self-control 
problems. This occurs when individuals with self-control problems are not able to smooth their 
income or if they are unable to purchase credit ahead of time to avoid self-disconnection during 
the night when credit is not available to purchase. Finally, not using the system properly when 
it is cheaper to consume (when a time-varying tariff scheme is in place) could also be an 
outcome of self-control problems. As such individuals might not be able to resist the temptation 
to consume when the tariff is more expensive. Intra-family dynamics can also affect these 
actions, namely family pressures to share money and different priorities regarding expenditure 
within the households, through their potentially negative impact on the individuals’ ability to 
save. Coordination issues regarding prepayment amongst family members can also increase 
the prevalence of self-disconnection.  
Brutscher, 2011; 2012b are the only two studies to my knowledge that explore some of 
the behavioural implications of the way individuals refill their meters. Brutscher, 2011 finds 
that customers in Northern Ireland refill more often with smaller amounts than expected from 
a model including the opportunity cost of time and average wages, due to the salience of cost 
of higher refill amounts. However, this conclusion is drawn through the observation of 
prepayment patterns. Brutscher, 2012b looks at the determinants of self-disconnection by using 
metering data in Great Britain and finds that financial considerations are the main drivers. The 
study also finds that this self-disconnection is very seasonal, and this seasonality is driven by 
hyperbolic discounting. However, the study does not attempt to identify the factors causing the 
seasonality of expenditure or what determines the decision to use electricity at times when it is 
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the most expensive to consume. In addition, no similar research has been done in a developing 
country setting.   
This study aims to fill these gaps by looking at how prepayment patterns for electricity, 
provided by a solar hybrid mini-grid operating in rural Guinea-Bissau, are affected by a number 
of socio-economic factors and equipment in use, but also by self-control problems, social 
pressures to share money, coordination problems and diverging priorities within the households 
as well as being charged a time-varying tariff. I use actual information on prepaid meter 
expenditures from a solar hybrid community mini-grid in rural Guinea-Bissau, and compare it 
to survey elicited information regarding discounting preferences and other relevant 
characteristics of the household. I examine both how these factors determine the level and 
frequency of monthly expenditure but also the level of refill amounts. In addition, I look at the 
drivers of self-disconnection, seasonality of expenditure and usage at times when the customers 
are charged a higher tariff (between 12 am and 9am), drawing from the same literature. The 
expenditure patterns of a small group of consumers also charged a higher tariff for their 
consumption between 7pm to 12 am are also studied. 
Findings indicate that prepayment helps address both income constraints as well as self-
control problems. Results confirm findings from other studies that overall there is a preference 
for small and frequent refills (Jack & Smith, 2015; Brutscher, 2011). The level of monthly 
expenditure is driven positively, amongst other factors, by income levels and using the service 
for income generating activities. However, lower income households do not undertake more 
frequent refills. Self-control problems have a negative significant effect on the level of refill 
amounts (the effect on average monthly expenditure and frequency of refills is also negative 
but not significant), this indicates that customers with self-control problems use smaller refill 
amounts as a method to commit to using less electricity at home. Similarly, individuals charged 
a higher tariff for their consumption between 7pm to 12am choose smaller refill amounts 
possibly as a method to control their consumption patterns. In addition, there is evidence of an 
inflexibility on the refill amount chosen, which can be driven by a general tendency of the 
population to use smaller refill amounts in order to control electricity consumption or by fear 
of losing larger amounts of credit due to technical problems. Self-disconnection due to inability 
to pay is driven by financial constraints, however the overall numbers of households reporting 
to experience self-disconnection commonly is low.  Self-control problems or intra-household 
dynamics do not seem to increase the incidence of self-disconnection or the seasonality of 
electricity use. Finally, using the meter at times when it is more expensive to consume is also 
determined by factors irrelevant to income and self-control problems.  
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These findings are important to consider when designing the specifics of the prepaid 
method. Namely results advise against the use of a minimum refill amount and in favour of 
putting in place schemes that will encourage income generating activities at the household level 
(e.g. credit and rental schemes for appliances).  
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 
discusses the case study and the data and Section 4 provides the results whilst Section 5 
concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature	review		
 
A few quantitative studies have researched into the use of prepaid meters in developed 
countries. The main areas of focus are comparisons between payment patterns of prepaid meter 
users to users that are billed on a monthly basis. Brutscher, 2011 finds that households in 
Northern Ireland that use prepaid meters consume more than households who are billed 
monthly. He attributes this effect to computational limitations and the salience of larger 
expenditures. In other words, as clients using prepaid meters refill small amounts they end up 
spending more.  Qiu et al., 2016 in a similar study in the United States find that clients consume 
less when prepaid meters are used. Both of these studies use the method of matching as in both 
cases consumers’ self-select to the payment method. Jack & Smith, 2016 is the only study to 
my knowledge that has undertaken a randomized control trial to measure these effects and the 
only such study undertaken in a developing country (South Africa). Results are similar to the 
Qiu et al., 2016 study. In other words, Jack & Smith, 2016 find that clients using prepaid meters 
consume less. They also find that the prevalence of non-payment decreases with prepaid 
meters. Both studies discuss the potential channels (e.g. information effects, price effects, 
nudging, costs of self-disconnection, self-control and intra-household control problems) of 
these effects but they do not attempt to explore them further.  
In terms of exploring the limitations that prepayment addresses, Jack & Smith, 2015 
look at expenditure information on prepaid meters from Cape Town in South Africa and 
demonstrate that prepaid meters address liquidity constraints of lower income households.  
They draw this conclusion by showing that lower income households refill their meters by the 
end of the week and the end of the month when usually salaries are paid. In addition, they show 
that poorer households purchase smaller and more frequent amounts of credit. The main 
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limitation of this study is that it does not collect detailed socio-economic and equipment use 
information of the customers and it only relies on property values as a proxy of income. In 
addition, it does not test the effect of self-control problems and intra-household dynamics.  
The present study fills this gap by testing the impact of self-control problems and intra-
household dynamics on the use of prepaid meters for electricity.  
Only two studies to my knowledge try to uncover some of these effects (Brutscher, 
2011, 2012b).  
Brutscher, 2011 explores the association of expenditure patterns with consumption of 
electricity in Northern Ireland. The study finds that customers refill more often with smaller 
amounts than expected from a model including the opportunity cost of time and average wages. 
And when tariffs increase, individuals maintain the amount they refill with and only increase 
the number of refills. The author argues that liquidity constraints cannot be the sole explanation 
behind this pattern, as the same behaviour is also observed for wealthy households. The study 
concludes that the reason is salience effects, because when customers are forced to increase 
their refill amounts they decrease their electricity use. The argument that people prefer smaller 
refill amounts because they are sophisticated about their self-control problems, and they want 
to commit to lower electricity consumption, is rejected. The author argues that if that were the 
case, when consumers were forced to increase their refill amounts, they would adjust their 
electricity use and not decrease it. The study also concludes that the salience of costs is the 
underlying reasons of why prepaid meters are associated with more consumption.  
 However, these conclusions are drawn with data observations without including any 
time preference elicitation measures. In addition, other studies have found that prepayment 
leads to less electricity use. The contribution of the present study is to include a time preference 
elicitation measure as well as measures of intra-household dynamics in order to explore 
prepayment patterns in a developing country setting. 
Brutscher, 2012b looks at the determinants of self-disconnection by using metering data 
in Great Britain and finds that self-disconnection is driven by financial considerations. The 
main alternatives tested are income effects, forgetting, coordination issues and availability of 
credit. He discovers that only income effects are significant. The study also finds that this self-
disconnection is very seasonal, and the reason behind this seasonality is hyperbolic 
discounting. However, the Brutscher, 2012b study does not test the effects of self-control 
problems on self-disconnection overall, and nor does it test the effect of self-control problems 
on seasonality of consumption.  
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My research adds to this study by looking at how self-control problems and intra-
household dynamics can affect self-disconnection and seasonality of prepayment expenditure 
in a developing country context. Finally, no study has looked at the changes of prepayment 
patterns when time-varying tariffs are charged in a developing country setting.  
 
3. Data	and	methodology	
 
3.1 Case	study	
 
This study took place in the semi-urban community of Bambadinca, situated in the Bafatá 
region in the Northeast part of Guinea-Bissau (See Chapter 1 and 3). Payment data was 
extracted from clients of a solar hybrid mini-grid operating in the community since November 
2014 (see Chapter 3 for a description).  
 
 
3.2	Prepaid	meters	and	expenditure	data	
 
The payment system for the clients of the mini-grid is based on prepaid meters that clients must 
refill every time they run out of credit. Credit is purchased in the mini-grid station. Clients have 
top-up cards which are updated according to the amount they purchase each time. These cards 
are subsequently used to update the meter at home.  
The minimum refill amount is 500 FCFA and clients are allowed to refill any multiple 
of 500. The tariff charged depends on the time of day customers use the service. The lower 
tariff is charged during the day. From 9 am until 7pm customers are charged 250 FCFA per 
kWh. This price goes up to 320 FCFA per kWh after 7pm until 12am, and to 560 FCFA per 
kWh after 12 am until 9am. This tariff scheme was devised to limit pressures on the solar 
system and reliance on the generators when there is no sunlight available. This is called the 
‘normal’ tariff scheme. A ‘social’ tariff scheme was reserved for poor households (as measured 
by equipment connected). This ‘social’ tariff scheme charges customers the lowest tariff until 
12 am. The tariff after 12am is the same for everyone. However, due to an error during client 
registration only a small number of clients were charged the ‘normal’ tariff and therefore the 
distinction between the two categories is random and not based on socio-economic criteria.    
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The meter installed inside the household provides information about the tariff that is 
being charged. A green intermittent light informs the consumers that the lowest tariff is being 
charged (250 FCFA per kWh) and a red intermittent light, that the highest tariff is being 
charged (560 FCFA per kWh) (this light turns to red when the meter is out of credit and to 
orange when the meter is almost out of credit). Finally, there is a screen displaying rotating 
information on the date and time, the total energy used so far in kWh, instant power in kW 
(power of all connected appliances), days of remaining credit with current usage patterns and 
current credit available. However, in discussions with service operators and households it was 
clear that consumers relied less on the information displayed in the screen as they found it 
confusing. The current credit available which is the most relevant information provided, is in 
a unit other than the amount paid which adds to the confusion (a picture of the meter is shown 
in the Appendix). 
The credit at least in theory is not available for purchase any time of the day. The mini-
grid station opens from 9am to 6pm daily and is closed on Sundays. But some activity is also 
observed outside operating hours and on Sundays.  
A comprehensive database regarding the time, date and size of these refills was made 
available by SCEB. This constitutes the expenditure dataset43. The expenditure information 
used in this study is until the end of October 2016.  
 
 
 
3.3 Survey and time preference elicitation 
 
A background survey was implemented in two waves as the customer base grew. The first 
wave took place between 26th of January and 29th of February 2016 and the second one between 
31st of May and 14th of June 2016. The population of interest are households who receive 
electricity from the Community Energy Service of Bambadinca. In all cases, the person who 
makes the decision regarding meter refills was interviewed.  
At the time of the second wave of surveys, SCEB had 450 clients in total: 320 were 
households, 124 businesses and 12 institutions. All household clients of the service at the time 
were contacted and overall, 312 household clients participated. 259 in the first round and 53 in 
the second round. Of these, 4 observations had to be dropped as I was not able to identify the 
                                                
43 There have been some errors in this database, due to some technical problems related to card refill and the 
updating of meters. However, the database has been monitored closely and corrected by the SCEB personnel and 
therefore it is assumed that these errors are negligible.  
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client in the SCEB client expenditure database. This was because some clients shared the same 
name and could not be distinguished from one another.  
The survey was originally written in Portuguese and the enumerator translated orally 
the questions from Portuguese to the local Portuguese Creole language. Each survey took on 
average 30 minutes to complete.  
I designed a household survey containing information on relevant socio-economic 
characteristics, household electricity use and the relevant intra-household dynamics. The full 
survey can be found in the Appendix.  
More specifically I measure household coordination issues by eliciting information on 
the number of individuals that are responsible within the household to make the payments for 
electricity. Assuming that if there is more than one person responsible coordination issues 
could arise.  
I measure family pressures to share money by directly asking individuals to state the 
degree to which they feel pressured to share money with other individuals in the household 
when they have money available. As a measure of priority disagreement within the households 
I use a similar measure to the measure Brutcher, 2012a;2012b uses to measure the degree of 
interference. I ask respondents to state the household member that gives a priority on saving 
money for electricity expenditure and the household member that makes decisions about other 
expenditure apart from electricity. I subsequently capture the level of disagreement between 
these two activities. Some disagreement means that the individual that saves money for 
electricity also makes decisions about other household expenditure, but with someone else. 
Full saving disagreement means that these two activities are undertaken by different 
individuals.   
Finally, a choice task protocol to elicit discount rates was used, to measure self-control 
problems, drawing from common practices in the literature (Frederick et al., 2002). This was 
the same used in Chapter 2 (See Chapter 2).  
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3.4 Modelling	framework	
 
To estimate the drivers of prepayment patterns, the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
models are estimated:  
 			𝑌F~KHFKHKv"rrFuJ#G = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"	 𝑌F~KHFKu#GrxKsLK#t"GJHK = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"		 𝑌F~KHFKu#GrxHKv"rrvHKwJK#Mx = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"	 
 
Where Yj represents the relevant prepayment patterns (average refill amount, average monthly 
expenditure, average monthly refill frequency).  𝛽s𝛸0 are the relevant observable factors the 
effects of which I measure (socio-economic characteristics, household electricity use, intra-
household dynamics, self-control problems, type of tariff charged), and  𝜀0 is an error term.  
 
Similarly, the following models were constructed to measure the determinants of self-
disconnection and frequency with which electricity is used when it is the most expensive to 
consume (after 12 am). Two measures of self-disconnection were included. Self-disconnection 
because the household runs out of credit at times when credit is not available to purchase (self-
disconnection 1), which is a 3-scale variable (1= never, 2=sometimes, 3=frequently) and self-
disconnection due to inability to pay (self-disconnection 2), which is also a 3-scale variable 
(1= never, 2=sometimes, 3=frequently). The frequency with which electricity is used when it 
is most expensive to consume is a 4-scale variable (1= never, 2= rarely, 3=sometimes, 
4=frequently).  
 𝑌yKrvt"yu##KMG"u#S = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"	 𝑌yKrvt"yMu##KMG"u#] = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"	 𝑌uyGKsLK#y"~K = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"	 
 
Finally, the following models measure the determinants of the seasonality of electricity use. I 
include two measures of seasonality. The first measure (seasonality 1) measures the seasonal 
variation of electricity use across equally warm months (but with different income availability), 
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specifically this is measured by the total differences between expenditure levels in March 2016 
and June 2016, the second measure (seasonality 2) measures the general variation across all 
months, specifically this is the standard deviation of monthly expenditure divided by the mean 
expenditure. 
 𝑌yKFyu#Fr"GxS = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"		 𝑌yKFyu#Fr"Gx] = 𝑎 + 𝛽s𝑋" +	𝜀"				 
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4. Results	
 
4.1	Descriptive	statistics	of	general	household	characteristics	
 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the relevant sample characteristics regarding demographics, energy 
use and inta-household dynamics44. Table 1 presents the demographics of the sample45. As far 
as household income level is concerned, due to high income variability and the absence of 
stable sources of income for the majority of households in Bambadinca, I resorted to a direct 
subjective assessment of household income. The enumerator, who had local knowledge, was 
asked to choose between four different levels of income classification for each household, 
following the conclusion of each interview: ‘high income’, ‘medium income’, ‘poor’ and ‘very 
poor’. Subsequently, roughly 17% of households were classified as ‘high income’, 47% as 
‘medium income’ and 36% as ‘poor’. Only one household was classified as ‘very poor’ 
reflecting the fact that the population of interest are those who have made electricity 
connections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 This sample is not directly comparable with the sample in Chapter 4 in terms of demographic characteristics 
and household expenditures as this chapter includes a larger client population and the prepayment patterns 
presented here refer to a larger period. 
45 The sample is not representative of the Bambadinca population, as only households using the electricity service 
(the target population) were interviewed.  But it is representative of the clients of the electricity service, since a 
large proportion of the population was interviewed. 
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				TABLE	1	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	FOR	RESPONDENT	AND	HOUSEHOLD	CHARACTERISTICS		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 reports households’ energy information. All connected households use lamps and the 
grand majority uses a TV (70%). The use of fans and fridge is also high. The use of fridge to 
generate income is also common (31%). This consists mostly to selling cold refreshments or 
other fresh products. Although households are under different contracts than businesses these 
type of income generating activities by households are allowed and they are prevalent amongst 
all income groups. Only 14% of households are currently charged under a ‘normal’ tariff 
scheme. On average households have been using the meters for 16 months. In addition, 46% 
of households were using the service previously to the meter installation and were charged a 
flat tariff46. Finally, in regards to electricity use information prior to the service 33% of 
households reported that they were connected to Badora47 and 27% that they were using a 
private generator regularly.  
 
                                                
46 The mini-grid started operating on the 15th of November 2014 with initially 120 clients, through a pilot phase 
to test the power plant and grid. In this pilot phase the grid was not yet fully operational. In that phase households 
were charged a flat rate of 3,000 FCFA, regardless of how much electricity they consumed until April 2015 when 
the meters were installed. 
47 Private electricity provider before the mini-grid started operating (see Chapter 3). 	
Number of observations 
 
308 Average age of respondent (years) 41.17 
Average household size 11.96 Respondent never had any 
schooling (%) 
20.78   
High income household (%) 16.56 Respondent received primary 
education (%) 
32.47 
Medium income household 
(%) 
47.08 Respondent received secondary 
education (%) 
37.66 
Poor household (%) 36.04 Respondent received university 
education (%) 
9.09 
Very poor household (%) 0.32 Respondent engages in 
commercial activity(%) 
56.17 
Household receives fixed 
salary (%) 
33.77 Household engages in agriculture 
(%) 
31.73 
Household has a female head 
(%) 
16.89 No hardship during rainy season 
(%) 
8.28 
Household receives 
remittances (%) 
33.77 Some hardship during rainy 
season (%) 
84.11 
Respondent is female (%) 26.30 
 
Significant hardship during rainy 
season (%) 
7.62 
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TABLE	2	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	FOR	ENERGY	INFORMATION		
Household is charged a ‘normal’ 
tariff 
13.64% Household uses lights 100% 
Household previously used  
generator regularly 
27.27% Household uses TV 69.44% 
Household previously used Badora 33.44% Household uses fan 49.34% 
Household was previously charged 
a flat tariff 
46.43% Household uses fridge 35.76% 
Household uses a fridge to generate 
income 
31.13% Household uses computers 17.55% 
High income household uses a fridge to 
generate income  
30.61% Household uses iron 8.94% 
Medium income household uses a 
fridge to generate income 
37.06% Household uses satellite 
dish 
13.58% 
Poor household uses a fridge to 
generate income 
22.12% Household uses DVD 50.33% 
Household uses lights to generate 
income 
2.98% Average wattage installed 
(W) 
665.75% 
Households uses other equipment 
to generate income 
0.33% Average months household 
is using the meter 
16.01 
 
 
  
Table 3 reports information on household decision making dynamics, pressures to share money 
and priority disagreement amongst different household members. All respondents participate 
in decision making regarding electricity use, 16% decide jointly with someone else in the 
household and 35% pay to recharge the meter with someone else in the household. As far as 
priority disagreement is concerned 40% of the surveyed households experience full priority 
disagreement and in 10% there is only some priority disagreement.  Finally, the grand majority 
reports to be at least under some pressure to share money with others within the household 
when they have money available.  
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TABLE	3	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	FOR	HOUSEHOLD	DECISION	MAKING	PATTERNS	
Respondent is a decision maker for 
electricity (%) 
100 Respondent reports no 
pressure to share money (%) 
 
1.67 
Respondent decides about electricity 
with other individuals (%) 
15.91 Respondent reports some 
pressure to share money (%) 
 
53.25 
Respondent pays for refills with 
other individuals (%) 
 
34.74 Respondent reports significant 
pressure to share money (%) 
30.13 
Full disagreement on priorities (%) 
 
10.39   
Some disagreement on priorities (%) 
 
39.61   
 
 
 
4.2	Descriptive	statistics	of	household	expenditure	patterns	
 
The following graphs show some general patterns of electricity expenditure. Figure 1 reports 
the frequency for different refill amounts. It becomes clear that there is a preference for 1000 
FCFA and in general for smaller refill amounts, which is in line with findings from other studies 
(Brutscher, 2011; Jack and Smith, 2015). Figure 2 reports the average household expenditure 
by month. There is high seasonality in expenditure. With higher levels of expenditure in June 
and the lowest ones in December (April 2015 has the lowest level but this is due to the fact that 
the meters were still being in the processes of instalment). Interestingly, although the 
seasonality effect is also present in the case of average refill amounts (Figure 3) and average 
refill frequency (Figure 4) the effect is less sharp and there is an overall declining trend for the 
level of refill amounts and an overall increasing trend for frequency of refills. Therefore, 
overall it seems that as time goes by households resort to refilling smaller amounts more often.   
As Figures 5,6 and 7 demonstrate these effects are experienced similarly across all 
income levels. Overall, the higher income groups always spend more in total and choose higher 
amounts for their refills than poorer households. However, although the refill frequency is 
higher for higher income groups in the first months after a few months this refill frequency 
converges for all income groups (Figure 7). More figures describing patterns of expenditure 
(by day of the month, time and day of the week), as well as comparison with energy expenditure 
prior to the service, that are not central to this analysis, are presented in the Appendix. 
It is not always possible to understand if this seasonality effect is the outcome of 
weather or of income effects. The months of higher income availability in the community are 
June, December and January and of lower income availability August, September and October 
(rainy season). In terms of when households experience the highest need for electricity 
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households reported to need more electricity during the warmest period of the year (due to 
more intense use of fridge and fans), which is the months of March, April, May and June. Less 
electricity is needed in the colder months starting from the end of November and extending 
throughout February. That is why it is observed that December and January experience low 
electricity expenditure levels despite high income availability. The need for electricity during 
the rainy season varies as some days are very hot and some are cooler.  
 Therefore, the best way to isolate the potential seasonality effects due to income 
constraints is to measure the difference in consumption between equally warm months where 
income availability varies (as described in the previous section).  
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FIGURE	1	TOTAL	NUMBER	OF	REFILLS	FOR	DIFFERENT	REFILL	AMOUNTS	
(FCFA)	
 
	
 
 
FIGURE	2	AVERAGE	EXPENDITURE	BY	MONTH	(FCFA)	
 
 
 
 
FIGURE	3	AVERAGE	REFILL	AMOUNT	BY	MONTH	(FCFA)	
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FIGURE	4	AVERAGE	REFILL	FREQUENCY	BY	MONTH	
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE	5	AVERAGE	MONTHLY	EXPENDITURE	BY	INCOME	LEVEL	(FCFA)	
 
 
 
 
FIGURE	6	AVERAGE	REFILL	AMOUNT	BY	INCOME	LEVEL	(FCFA)	
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FIGURE	7	AVERAGE	MONTHLY	REFILL	FREQUENCY	BY	INCOME	LEVEL		
 
 
 
 
The average refill frequency per month is reported to be 7.68 (Table 4). This is comparable to 
patterns described by Jack and Smith, 2015 in South Africa as the average refill frequency per 
month was reported to be 8.45. Brutscher, 2011 finds this number to be smaller as the average 
consumer using prepayment in Northern Ireland refills 45 times a year (3.75 a month). The 
level of expenditure and refill amounts are not comparable between studies because of 
differences in tariffs and living standards, but overall a preference for both frequent and small 
amounts has been observed across (Brutscher, 2011; Jack & Smith, 2015).  
As noted already refills only occur in one location, which is the mini-grid station. 
Overall, distance to this refill station varies as some households can be up to two kilometres 
away. However, the point of purchase is still relatively close for all households in comparison 
to other case studies where a number of purchase locations are scattered at the city level 
(Brutscher, 2011).  
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TABLE	4	DESCRIPTIVE	STATISTICS	OF	EXPENDITURE	PATTERNS	
 Average Standard deviation Minimum   Maximum 
Average monthly expenditure 
(FCFA)  
 
10146.44 9250.99 491.80      68676.92 
Average monthly refill frequency  
 
7.68  6.84 0.25          51.29 
Average refill amount (FCFA) 
 
1481.88 983.02 596.15      7877.19 
Average distance to the refill 
station in meters 
 
863.82 435.96 33.32        2020.49 
Seasonality 1  
 
6224.91 15685.95 -25500      125500 
Seasonality 2  0.41 0.24 0               1.43 
Seasonality 1= (expenditure June 2016-expenditure March 2016) Seasonality 2= standard deviation of monthly expenditure 
divided by mean expenditure. 
 
 
 
26% of respondents reported being without electricity at least once because of lack of money, 
and 68% to have been without electricity at least once because they ran out of credit after hours. 
Only 21% reported that they never consume electricity after 12am.   
 
 
 
TABLE	5	SUMMARY	STATISTICS	OF	ELECTRICITY	USING	PATTERNS		
Household never disconnects because 
of lack of money (%) 
74.35 Household never uses electricity when 
it is the most expensive to consume 
(%) 
 
21.28 
Household rarely disconnects because 
of lack of money (%) 
16.88 Household rarely uses electricity when 
it is the most expensive to consume 
(%) 
 
  
14.54   
Household often disconnects because 
of lack of money (%) 
 8.77 Household sometimes uses electricity 
when it is the most expensive to 
consume (%) 
 
5.67 
Household never runs out of credit 
because the mini-grid station is closed 
(%) 
 
31.82 Household frequently uses electricity 
when it is the most expensive to 
consume (%) 
58.51 
Household rarely runs out of credit 
because the mini-grid station is closed 
(%) 
 
45.78   
Household often runs out of credit 
because the mini-grid station is closed 
(%)  
22.40   
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4.3	Responses	to	time	preference	questions	
 
Table 6 reports the descriptive results of the discounting elicitation. 32% of respondents have 
a monthly discount rate that is lower than 25% for trade-offs now and 51% for trade-offs in a 
year from now. Mean monthly discount rates are 3.45 for trade-offs now and 2.82 for trade-
offs in a year from now. In addition, 34% of the respondents are hyperbolic discounters and 
14% are more patient in the future. 
 Overall, these discount rates are lower than the ones found in Chapter 2. One of the 
reasons behind this could be that Bambadinca is a semi-urban community and on average 
households are better off than in most of the more rural communities surveyed in Chapter 2. 
However, the time preference reversals are higher in the case of Bambadinca, which is harder 
to explain.  
These discounting rates remain higher compared to other studies in the literature both 
in developed and in developing country settings. For example, Thaler, 1981 finds yearly 
discount rates to range from 1% to 345% for hypothetical choices, Coller & Williams, 1999 
find discount rates for elicitation with real payments between 1 month to 3 months to range 
from 15% to 25%. 
  Harrison, Lau, & Williams, 2002 also using actual payments find annual discount rates 
to be 28%. Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2008 find an average annual discount rate 
of 10.1% when also controlling for risk preferences. In a developing country setting studies 
conducted also find lower discount rates. Bauer et al., 2012 find three-month discount rates in 
rural India to be 0.244 for current trade-offs, and 0.193 for future trade-offs in elicitations with 
real monetary rewards and controlling for risk preferences. Anderson, Dietz, Gordon, & 
Klawitter, 2004 find monthly discount rates to range between 0.6% to 66.9% in Vietnam and 
Pender, 1996 find discount rates to range between from 0.26 to 1.19 in India.  
The levels of absolute discount rates are not directly comparable across studies eliciting 
discount rates in the lab or the field as the time frames and the level of monetary gains or losses 
vary. For the objectives of this study what is important is to look at within sample variations 
(Bauer et al., 2012; Thaler, 1981).  
The percentages of individuals exhibiting time preference reversals that are more 
relevant for this study are comparable. My results are very close to findings from Bauer et al., 
2012 and Ashraf et al., 2006.  
Bauer et al., 2012 find the percent of individuals who exhibit hyperbolic preferences to 
be 33% and 9.6% to be patient now and impatient in the future. Ashraf et al., 2006 find 25.7% 
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to exhibit hyperbolic preferences and 14.6% to be more patient in the future. Finally, Dupas & 
Robinson, 2013 find these numbers to be 16% and 18% respectively. 
 
 
 
TABLE	6	DESCRIPTIVE	STATISTICS	OF	ANSWERS	TO	TIME	PREFERENCE	QUESTIONS	
Discount rates 
 
 
 
Average discount rate now 3.45 
 Average discount rate in a year from now 
 
2.82 
Hyperbolic preferences  
 
33.65% 
 More patient in the future  
 
13.78% 
 Discount rate 
(Now vs 1 month) 
Percent of respondents 
0.25 32.37 
0.75 17.63 
1.25 6.73 
1.75 9.29 
2.25 0.32 
2.75 2.88 
3.75 3.21 
5.5 2.24 
9 6.41 
11 18.91 
Discount rate 
(12 months vs 13 months) 
Percent of respondents 
0.25 51.28 
0.75 11.86 
1.25 4.49 
1.75 5.13 
2.25  0.32 
2.75  2.88 
3.25 0.64 
3.75 1.60 
5.5 0.96 
9 2.56 
11 18.27 
Hyperbolic preferences: higher discount rates in the present than in the future. More patient in the future: lower discount rates 
in the present than in the future. 
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4.4	Determinants	of	prepayment	patterns	
	
Table 7 reports the determinants of the relevant prepayment patterns namely the average refill 
amount, average monthly expenditure and average monthly refill frequency. A table with an 
explanation of all variable names used in the regressions can be found in the Appendix. 
 Findings show that prepayment patterns are driven by income constraints as well as 
self-control problems. 
The average refill amount is positively driven by income (being in the medium income 
group does not have a significant effect, but retains a positive sign), using a fan and using the 
service of Badora prior to the service and negatively driven by self-reported seasonality of 
income, being charged the ‘normal’ tariff and experiencing self-control problems (the effect of 
self-control problems on average monthly expenditure and frequency of refills is also negative, 
but not significant).  
The negative effect of self-control problems on the average refill amount is an 
indication that individuals with self-control problems refill lower amounts as a commitment to 
consume less electricity.  
The fact that households that are being charged a ‘normal’ tariff are also observed to 
refill with significantly lower amounts can also be interpreted as an attempt to control 
electricity consumption.  Households charged the ‘normal’ tariff need to be more careful about 
their patterns of consumption (as they are also charged a higher tariff between 7pm and 12 am). 
Importantly, although this lower refill level also translates to more frequent refills it does not 
translate to higher expenditure. This suggests that households adapt their consumption patterns 
when they are charged a time-varying tariff.  This last finding should be interpreted with 
caution however as the coefficient on the effect on monthly expenditure might be insignificant 
but it is positive and the sample of households charged a ‘normal’ tariff is small (only 42 
households).  
Average monthly expenditure is positively driven predominantly by using the fridge 
for income generating activities, which highlights the important potential of such small-scale 
income generating activities. Other factors that affect monthly expenditure positively are 
income (being in the medium income group does not have a significant effect, but retains the 
same sign), household size, using a fan, being a client of Badora prior to the service as well as 
by being a female decision maker and experiencing high pressures to share money with other 
family members. Distance to the refill station and having someone in the household employed 
in agriculture has a negative effect on monthly expenditure. These effects are the same for 
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average monthly refill frequency. The only difference is that income has no effect on average 
monthly refill frequency. This last finding confirms the patterns observed in Figure 7 showing 
refill frequency to converge across income levels. 
Lower income households are therefore not found to undertake refills more frequently 
in order to offset for lower refill amounts like in Jack & Smith, 2016. This could be due to the 
fact that distances to the repayment centre are smaller than at the city level and the range of 
income disparities captured is smaller than those at the city level.  
The positive effect of being a female decision maker and experiencing pressure to share 
money on level and frequency of expenditure could be driven by the fact that these households 
tend to belong to higher income levels. Possibly this could also be linked to less control of over 
the electricity consumption of other family members, but there is not enough information to 
confirm this. Priority disagreements and coordination issues within the household do not seem 
to affect any of the prepayment patterns.  
The regression models control for a number of other variables that were not found to 
be significant and are not presented in the table. Namely additional characteristics of the 
household and decision makers (age, schooling, commercial activity, receiving remittances 
from abroad) other equipment in use (TV, computer, iron, TV antenna), total wattage, using a 
generator frequently prior to the service, and being charged a flat tariff prior to the meter 
installation. All the included controls were checked for multicollinearity. 
Overall, all models have good predictive power however, this predictive power is 
smaller for the model looking at the determinants of refill amount (adjusted R-squared 0.14) 
compared to the models looking at the determinants of monthly expenditure and refill 
frequency (adjusted R-squared 0.41 and 0.35 respectively). This shows that there are more 
factors unaccounted for in the model looking at the determinants of refill amount. 
Overall, there is a lack of flexibility in increasing the level of refill amounts. For 
example, higher distance to the refill station seems to be affecting refill frequency negatively 
possibly due to the increased inconvenience associated with refilling. This is however not offset 
with higher refill amounts and leads to lower levels of monthly expenditure. In addition, higher 
levels of monthly expenditure due to the use of a fridge to support income generating activities 
are undertaken by increasing the amount of refill frequency and not the level of refill amount.  
Some explanations suggested by the literature that I do not account for in this model 
would be that overall smaller amounts are preferred because of the salience of higher refill 
amounts or that individuals prefer not to purchase higher amounts in fear that they would loose 
their money due to technical problems associated with the meter (discussed by Brutscher, 
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2011). Finally, it is possible that the decision maker is choosing lower refill amounts in order 
to control the electricity use of other household members. 
A general tendency of the client population to use smaller refill amounts in order to 
control electricity consumption is a possible explanation as I have already observed that this is 
undertaken by at least two types of client groups (those charged a ‘normal’ tariff and 
individuals with self-control problems).  
The second explanation, referring to lack of trust, is also plausible as some technical 
problems leading to the loss of credit for a number of clients were indeed experienced. In 
addition, this would explain the declining trends of refill amounts observed in Figures 5,6, and 
748. Despite these trends, the time using the meter has no effect on the refill level of the 
household. But it is possible that as households’ negative experience spreads throughout the 
community this could affect the refill level decisions of new costumers as well.  
The salience explanation, although it cannot be ruled out, would not explain an overall, 
declining trend on refill amounts at the community level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
48 Other factors could be driving this trend. However, a community shock like increased liquidity constraints/ or 
an overall decline in the income would affect expenditure levels as well, which is not the case.  
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TABLE	7	DETERMINANTS	OF	EXPENDITURE	PATTERNS	
 Average refill 
amount (FCFA) 
Average monthly 
expenditure (FCFA) 
Average monthly 
refill frequency  
Constant 1463.16***    
(498.79) 
11093.59**    
(5046.29) 
9.99** 
(4.32) 
Hyperbolic -184.15*    
(97.41) 
-794.93 
(910.61) 
-0.29 
(0.69) 
Rich household 803.66***   
(228.99) 
4853.90***    
(1438.72) 
1.35 
(1.18) 
Medium income 
household 
152.37    
(105.91) 
975.90    
(922.95) 
0.26    
(0.72) 
Distance to refill 
station (log) 
21.66   
(65.93) 
-1118.16*    
(584.63) 
-1.08**   
(0.52) 
Household size 8.15   
(11.48) 
229.35***    
(76.22) 
0.12**   
(0.05) 
Female decision 
maker 
1.67     
(138.03) 
2389.09*    
(1336.14) 
1.57*     
(0.92) 
Seasonality -248.23* 
(136.81) 
-592.41    
(1029.69) 
0.52 
(0.84) 
Agriculture 25.08 
(127.35) 
-1903.56*    
1135.68 
-2.18**    
(0.88) 
Family pressures to 
share money 
-30.13 
(124.05) 
1826.05*    
(1120.22) 
1.61**  
(0.81) 
Decides with other 
people 
-122.69 
(119.87) 
-607.74      
(1422.80) 
0.70 
(1.26) 
Pays for refills with 
other people 
-51.41 
(109.52) 
898.96 
(1295.23) 
0.88 
(0.87) 
Full priority 
disagreement 
27.63 
(142.50) 
-1554.19 
(1478.15) 
-0.22 
(1.22) 
Some priority 
disagreement  
-79.35 
(117.05) 
-1045.11 
(1064.29) 
-0.50  
(0.79) 
Fan 170.37* 
(99.97) 
1770.90*    
(907.44) 
1.10 
(0.73) 
Badora 222.20**    
(111.79) 
1446.06*    
(870.81) 
0.61 
(0.70) 
Fridge for income 
generation 
-35.04 
(109.92) 
9631.29***    
(1063.86) 
7.21***    
(0.85) 
Normal tariff -266.97**   
(115.48) 
1694.41   
(1286.09) 
1.94*   
(1.00) 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.41 0.35 
F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 299 299 299 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 *** p-value<0.01.   
All models are ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors (coefficient and standard error reported). 
All models control for additional characteristics of the household and decision maker (age, schooling, commercial activity, 
receiving remittances from abroad) other equipment in use (TV, computer, iron, TV antenna), total wattage, using a generator 
frequently prior to the service, and being charged a flat tariff prior to the meter installation.  
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Table 8 reports the determinants of self-disconnection. Overall, the predictive power of all 
models is low suggesting the existence of determinants that have not been accounted for. This 
is especially the case for the first model looking at the determinants of self-disconnection due 
to running out of credit when the mini-grid is closed as the adjusted R-squared is as low as 
0.02. 
Reported self-disconnection due to running out of credit when the mini-grid is closed 
is negatively determined by age of decision maker and receiving remittances from abroad and 
positively by the household size. Although the effect of the household size could be capturing 
some coordination issues, variables capturing household pressures to share money, priority 
disagreements and coordination issues have no effect.  
Reported self-disconnection due to inability to pay is negatively predicted by higher 
income levels and age of decision maker and positively predicted by distance to refill station, 
household size and when one of the principle economic activities of the household is 
agriculture. Neither self-control issues or any of the intra-household dynamics suggested like 
coordination issues, household pressures to share money, and priority disagreements within the 
household have a significant effect. This is line with findings from the Brutscher, 2012a study 
that finds that self-disconnection is driven mostly by income levels.  However, results are not 
directly comparable as Brutscher, 2012a makes no distinction between self-disconnection due 
to inability to pay and running out of credit due to unavailability of credit.   
Time-of-use is also not affected by intra-household dynamics, income or self-control 
problems. Schooling and age of decision maker have a negative effect on using the service 
after 12am, which is an indication that there could be some cognitive limitations in 
understanding the tariff system amongst less educated consumers. Using a fan and a fridge to 
generate income has a positive effect on using electricity when the higher tariff is charged. 
There is a reason to use both of these equipment after 12am. As the fridge is used to maintain 
refreshments cold during the night and the fan is commonly used overnight when temperatures 
are high.  
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TABLE	8	DETERMINANTS	OF	SELF-DISCONNECTION	AND	TIME-OF-USE	
 Self-disconnection 1 Self-disconnection 2 Time-of-use 
Constant 1.81***    
(0.58) 
0.46    
(0.43) 
4.94***    
(1.08) 
Hyperbolic -0.04 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.19    
(0.15) 
Rich household 0.21   
(0.16) 
-0.30***    
(0.11) 
0.0006    
(0.27) 
Medium income 
household 
0.03    
(0.10) 
-0.18**    
(0.08) 
-0.05  
(0.16) 
Distance to refill 
station (log) 
0.08   
(0.07) 
0.11*    
(0.06) 
-0.17    
(0.14) 
Household size 0.01*    
(0.006) 
0.01*    
(0.006) 
0.002   
(0.01) 
Age  -0.01***    
(0.004) 
-0.005*    
(0.003) 
-0.02***   
(0.007) 
Schooling -0.02 
(0.06) 
0.07    
(0.04) 
-0.19*    
(0.10) 
Remittances -0.22**    
(0.09) 
-0.05    
(0.08) 
-0.11    
(0.17) 
Agriculture -0.03    
(0.11) 
0.18*    
(0.09) 
0.19   
(0.20) 
Family pressures to 
share money  
0.07  
(0.10) 
0.008  
(0.08) 
-0.09   
(0.17) 
Decides with other 
people 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
0.003    
(0.13) 
0.28    
(0.22) 
Pays for refills with 
other people 
0.09   
(0.12) 
-0.04    
(0.09) 
-0.15   
(0.18) 
Full priority 
disagreement 
-0.20  
(0.14) 
0.17  
(0.15) 
-0.35    
(0.25) 
Some priority 
disagreement  
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.11  
(0.17) 
Fan -0.06    
(0.09) 
-0.002   
(0.08) 
0.54***    
(0.16) 
Fridge for income 
generation 
0.04   
(0.09) 
-0.04    
(0.08) 
0.28*    
(0.17) 
Normal tariff -0.15    
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
0.28   
(0.21) 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.11 0.10 
F 0.0613 0.0000 0.0000 
N 299 299 279 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 ***p-value<0.01. All models are ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors 
(coefficient and standard error reported). Self-disconnection 1: Self-disconnection because household runs out of credit: 3-
scale variable 1= never, 2=sometimes, 3=frequently.  Self-disconnection 2: Self-disconnection due to inability to pay: 3-scale 
variable 1= never, 2=sometimes, 3=frequently. Time-of-use: Frequency with which electricity is used when it is most 
expensive to consumer: 4-scale variable 1= never, 2= rarely, 3=sometimes, 4=frequently.  All models control for additional 
characteristics of decision makers (commercial activity, gender, seasonality of income), having someone in the household 
receiving a fixed salary, other equipment in use (TV, computer, iron, TV antenna), total wattage, using a generator frequently 
prior to the service, being a client of Badora prior to the service and being charged a flat tariff prior to the meter installation. 
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As far as the determinants on expenditure level variability due to seasonality of income are 
concerned overall the models ran had a very low predictive power. Showing that very few of 
the suggested determinants have an effect. The standard deviation of monthly expenditure is 
significantly reduced for the highest income households, but no other variable has an effect. 
The only variable that has a significant negative effect on expenditure level variability is 
distance to the refill station. Using a fridge for income generating activities has a significantly 
positive effect49. This suggests that overall seasonality of electricity use, for equally warm 
months, cuts across different income levels and it is not affected by any of the factors that 
negatively affect the saving ability of individuals (e.g. self-control problems, household 
pressures to share money and priority disagreements).  
 
TABLE	9	DETERMINANTS	OF	SEASONALITY	OF	INCOME	ON	EXPENDITURE		
 Seasonality 1 Seasonality 2 
 
Constant 6978.47 
(6138.96) 
0.36*** 
(0.12) 
Hyperbolic -3499.51 
(2141.13) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Rich household -684.81 
(2968.8) 
-0.08* 
(0.05) 
Medium income 
household 
-113.45 
(2199.89) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
Distance to the 
refill station 
-5.12** 
(2.15) 
0.00001 
(0.00004) 
Household size 261.08 
(185.14) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
Fridge for income 
generation 
7001.43*** 
(2504.25) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Adjusted R2 0.0681 0.0065 
F 0.0199 0.3818 
N 261 274 
*p-value<0.1 **p-value<0.05 *** p-value<0.01.  All models are ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors 
(coefficient and standard error reported).  
Seasonality1= expenditure June 2016-expenditure March 2016.   
Seasonality 2= standard deviation of monthly expenditure divided by mean expenditure. 
All models control for additional characteristics of decision makers (age, schooling, commercial activity, gender, pressure to 
share money, seasonality of income), having someone in the household receiving a fixed salary, receiving remittances from 
abroad, if the household is engaged in agriculture, deciding about electricity with other individuals, paying for refills with 
other individuals, the level of priority disagreement within the household, other equipment in use (TV, computer, iron, TV 
antenna, Fan), total wattage, being charged a ‘normal’ tariff, using a generator frequently, being a client of Badora prior to the 
service and being charged a flat tariff prior to the meter installation.  
                                                
49 A third measure of seasonality was used which measured the relative differences between expenditure levels 
in March 2016 and June 2016. Results are not reported here as this model had no significant determinants. 
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5. Conclusions	
 
This study looks at how prepayment expenditure patterns for electricity provided by a solar 
hybrid mini-grid operating in rural Guinea-Bissau are affected by a number of socio-economic 
factors, the equipment used, but also self-control problems, intra-household dynamics as well 
as being charged a time-varying tariff. These expenditure patterns include the level of monthly 
expenditure and refill frequency as well as the level of refill amounts. In addition, I look at how 
these factors affect self-disconnection, seasonality of expenditure and usage at times when the 
customers are charged the highest tariff. This is the first study to measure the effect of self-
control and intra-household dynamics on the use of prepayment in developing countries. A 
better understanding of the underlying mechanism of expenditure patterns of prepayment will 
help to both understand the relative advantages and disadvantages provided by the prepayment 
method and inform the design of such prepayment schemes. Finally, this study contributes to 
the literature of discounting anomalies as it introduces a new case study regarding the effects 
of self-control problems.  
Overall, results indicate that prepaid meters help address income limitations as well as 
self-control problems.  
Lower income households refill lower amounts and spend overall less for electricity. 
However, I do not find this to translate in higher refill frequency for lower income households 
as in other studies (Jack & Smith, 2015). In addition, there is also an indication that individuals 
experiencing self-control problems due to hyperbolic preferences are able to control their 
electricity consumption better by refilling smaller amounts, as the refill amounts for individuals 
with hyperbolic discounting are significantly lower.  
Similar patterns are observed for individuals who are charged a ‘normal’ tariff’ 
(individuals charged a higher tariff also between 7pm until 12am), which underscores that 
smaller refill levels are also chosen to control one’s consumption patterns in the presence of 
time-varying tariff schemes.  
Overall, both the effect of hyperbolic preferences and being charged the ‘normal’ tariff 
on the refill amount is much smaller than income effects. 
Using a fridge for income generating activities is the most important determinant of 
expenditure level. In order to meet the higher level of expenditure these individuals do not 
increase their refill amounts but their refill frequency. This underlines the important potential 
for small-scale income generating activities at the household level to help households finance 
their electricity consumption and also boost the utility revenues. Especially since this activity 
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is common for all income groups. Other factors that affect expenditure levels positively are the 
use of fans, being previously a client of Badora, household size, being a female decision maker 
and experiencing family pressures to share money and negatively, distance to the refill station 
and being principally employed in agriculture at the household level. All these factors also 
affect the refill frequency in similar ways.    
Lower levels of income lead to higher self-disconnection rates due to inability to pay, 
but this type of self-disconnection does not occur at all for the grand majority of the clients 
(74.35%) and only 8.77% report that it happens often. Self-control problems, family pressures 
to share money, household coordination problems and priority disagreements do not seem to 
have an effect on self-disconnection, seasonality of electricity use (between equally warm 
months) or using the service at times when it is the most expensive to consume (after 12am). 
Using the service at times when it is the most expensive to consume is largely driven by the 
use of equipment that there is a reason to operate through the night (fridge for income 
generating activities, fan).  However, lack of schooling also drives partly this trend which could 
be indicating the presence of some misunderstanding regarding the time-varying tariff scheme 
amongst less educated consumers.   
I was not able to control for other factors that have been suggested by the literature to 
affect the level of refill amounts negatively. These are namely salience effects leading 
consumers to choose a smaller refill, aversion to risk of loosing the refill amount due to 
technical issues and strategy to control the consumption of the electricity consumed by other 
members of the household.  
As far as policy recommendations are concerned prepayment does address problems 
limiting the success of traditional billing methods (e.g. income constraints, self-control 
problems). Importantly the flexibility of the prepayment method allows consumers, using 
small-scale income generating activities to finance their electricity consumption, to directly 
link their revenues with repayment for electricity. Encouraging income generating activities, is 
overall very important as it can be a way to help costumers pay for their electricity, boost their 
income and ensure the revenues of the utility. This could happen for example through credit or 
rental schemes that will help individuals purchase relevant appliances. However, policy makers 
should take into consideration the potential of these income generating activities to affect the 
time-of-use patterns, and put pressure on the plant especially if it operates on renewable energy.  
Brutscher, 2011 recommends to increase the minimum refill amount to increase 
salience of total costs and reduce expenditure levels. The finding that individuals choose 
smaller refill amounts to commit to less electricity use and control their expenditure patterns 
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in the presence of self-control problems and time-varying tariffs runs against this 
recommendation.  
The evidence that the prepayment method allows individuals to control their 
consumption patterns is an additional argument in favour of the prepayment method when 
time-varying tariffs are in place (in addition to the potential information effects Darby, 2012).  
The ability to control one’s consumption through prepayment could also be one of the 
reasons behind the reduced consumption observed in a number of studies (Jack & Smith, 2016; 
Qiu et al., 2016).  
Finally, the absence of self-control problems or family pressures effects on self-
disconnection and seasonality of electricity use shows that certain interventions like saving 
schemes, to address self-control problems or other family pressures, to smooth one’s income 
throughout the year would not help reduce seasonality of expenditure and self-disconnection.  
These findings overall could apply on other sectors that also use prepayment. For 
example, prepayment has also been expanding in the water sector (Jack & Smith. 2016). 
However, this study has also some case specific characteristics that could potentially not apply 
in a city environment which has higher distances to repayment centres and larger income gaps 
between users. 
Finally, other possible effects like information effects, price effects, nudging (discussed 
in Qiu et al., 2016) were not the focus of this study, but should be the focus of research in the 
future in order to explore more fully the effects of prepayment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 261	
6. References	
		
Andersen,	S.,	Harrison,	G.	W.,	Lau,	M.	I.,	&	Rutström,	E.	E.	(2008).	Eliciting	risk	and	time	preferences.	
Econometrica,	76(3),	583-618.		
Anderson,	C.	L.,	Dietz,	M.,	Gordon,	A.,	&	Klawitter,	M.	(2004).	Discount	rates	in	Vietnam.	Economic	
Development	and	Cultural	Change,	52(4),	873-887.		
Anderson,	W.,	White,	V.,	&	Finney,	A.	(2012).	Coping	with	low	incomes	and	cold	homes.	Energy	
Policy,	49,	40-52.		
Ashraf,	N.,	Karlan,	D.,	&	Yin,	W.	(2006).	Tying	Odysseus	to	the	mast:	Evidence	from	a	commitment	
savings	product	in	the	Philippines.	The	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics,	635-672.		
Attanasio,	O.,	&	Frayne,	C.	(2006).	Do	the	poor	pay	more?	Paper	presented	at	the	Eighth	BREAD	
Conference,	Cornell	University.	
Bauer,	M.,	Chytilová,	J.,	&	Morduch,	J.	(2012).	Behavioral	foundations	of	microcredit:	Experimental	
and	survey	evidence	from	rural	India.	The	American	Economic	Review,	102(2),	1118-1139.		
Boardman,	B.,	&	Fawcett,	T.	(2002).	Competition	for	the	poor.	Liberalisation	of	electricity	supply	and	
fuel	poverty:	lessons	from	Great	Britain	for	Northern	Ireland.	Lower	Carbon	Futures,	
Environmental	Change	Institute.	University	of	Oxford,	United	Kingdom.		
Brutscher,	P.-B.	(2011).	Payment	Matters?	-An	Exploratory	Study	into	the	Pre-Payment	Electricity	
Metering.		
Brutscher,	P.-B.	(2012a).	Making	Sense	of	Oil	Stamp	Saving	Schemes.		
Brutscher,	P.-B.	(2012b).	Self-Disconnection	Among	Pre-Payment	Customers-A	Behavioural	Analysis.		
Coller,	M.,	&	Williams,	M.	B.	(1999).	Eliciting	individual	discount	rates.	Experimental	Economics,	2(2),	
107-127.		
Darby,	S.	J.	(2012).	Metering:	EU	policy	and	implications	for	fuel	poor	households.	Energy	Policy,	49,	
98-106.		
Duflo,	E.,	Kremer,	M.,	&	Robinson,	J.	(2011).	Nudging	farmers	to	use	fertilizer:	Theory	and	
experimental	evidence	from	Kenya.	The	American	Economic	Review,	101(6),	2350-2390.		
Dupas,	P.,	&	Robinson,	J.	(2013).	Why	don't	the	poor	save	more?	Evidence	from	health	savings	
experiments.	The	American	Economic	Review,	103(4),	1138-1171.		
Frederick,	S.,	Loewenstein,	G.,	&	O'donoghue,	T.	(2002).	Time	discounting	and	time	preference:	A	
critical	review.	Journal	of	economic	literature,	40(2),	351-401.		
Harrison,	G.	W.,	Lau,	M.	I.,	&	Williams,	M.	B.	(2002).	Estimating	individual	discount	rates	in	Denmark:	
A	field	experiment.	The	American	Economic	Review,	92(5),	1606-1617.		
Howat,	J.,	&	McLaughlin,	J.	(2012).	Rethinking	prepaid	utility	service:	customers	at	risk.	Boston,	MA,	
National	Consumer	Law	Centre.		
Jack,	B.	K.,	&	Smith,	G.	(2015).	Pay	as	You	Go:	Prepaid	Metering	and	Electricity	Expenditures	in	South	
Africa.	The	American	Economic	Review,	105(5),	237-241.		
Jack,	B.	K.,	&	Smith,	G.	(2016).	Charging	Ahead:	Prepaid	Electricity	Metering	in	South	Africa:	National	
Bureau	of	Economic	Research.	
McRae,	S.	(2014).	Infrastructure	Quality	and	the	Subsidy	Trap.	The	American	Economic	Review,	
105(1),	35-66.		
Pender,	J.	L.	(1996).	Discount	rates	and	credit	markets:	Theory	and	evidence	from	rural	India.	Journal	
of	development	Economics,	50(2),	257-296.		
	
Qiu,	Y.,	Xing,	B.,	&	Wang,	Y.	D.	(2016).	Prepaid	electricity	plan	and	electricity	consumption	behavior.	
Contemporary	Economic	Policy.		
Sharam,	A.,	&	Energy	Action,	G.	(2003).	Second	class	customers:	pre-payment	meters,	the	fuel	poor	
and	discrimination:	Energy	Action	Group.	
Szabó,	A.,	&	Ujhelyi,	G.	(2014).	Can	Information	Reduce	Nonpayment	for	Public	Utilities?	
Experimental	Evidence	from	South	Africa.	
	
	 262	
Thaler,	R.	(1981).	Some	empirical	evidence	on	dynamic	inconsistency.	Economics	letters,	8(3),	201-
207	
	
	
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 263	
7. Appendix	
 
7.1	Explanation	of	variable	names	used	in	regressions	
 
 Definition 
Hyperbolic Dummy; 1 = higher discount rates in the present than in the future 
 
Rich household Dummy; 1=household belongs to the highest income category 
Medium income 
household 
Dummy; 1=household belongs to the medium  income category 
Distance to refill station 
(log) 
The natural logarithm of distance to refill station in meters 
 
Household size Household size 
Female decision maker Dummy; 1= decision maker for electricity is female 
Seasonality 
 
Self-reported hardship during rainy season (3 scales 1=do not 
experience hardship at all) 
Agriculture Dummy; 1= household engaged in agriculture 
 
Remittances Dummy; 1= household receives remittances from abroad 
 
Age Age of decision maker for electricity in household (in years) 
Schooling Schooling of decision maker for electricity  
Family pressures to 
share money 
Dummy; 1=a lot of pressure to share money with other household 
members (self-reported) 
Decides with other 
people 
Dummy; 1= respondent decides about electricity with other 
individuals 
Pays for refills with 
other people 
Dummy; 1= respondent pays for refills with other individuals 
Full priority 
disagreement 
Dummy; 1= the individual that saves money for electricity is not 
the one that makes decisions about other household expenditure 
 
Some priority 
disagreement  
Dummy; 1= the individual that saves money for electricity also 
makes decisions about other household expenditure, but with 
someone else 
 
Fan 
 
Dummy; 1=household uses a fan 
 
Badora Dummy; 1= household was using the Badora service prior to 
connecting to the mini-grid 
 
Fridge for income 
generation 
Dummy; 1= household uses a fridge for income generation 
activities 
Normal tariff Dummy; 1= household is charged a ‘normal’ tariff  
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7.2 Meter	images50	
 
 
 
FIGURE	1	ELECTRICITY	METER:	1:	ROTATING	SCREEN,	2:	LED	LIGHT,	3:	CARD	READER	
 
 
 
 
1) Rotating screen: informs the consumer about the date and time, total energy used so far in 
kWh, instant power in kW (power of all connected appliances), days of remaining credit 
with current usage patterns and current credit available.  
2) Led light: three colours warning the consumer about tariff schedule and availability of 
credit (see Table 1) 
 
 
                                                
50 Images from the utilization manual of Trama TecnoAmbietal tta 
	
1 
2 
3 
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TABLE	1	THE	MEANING	OF	THE	DIFFERENT	LIGHTS	OF	THE	METER	
Colour  Meaning 
No colour 
 
Normal tariff (320 FCFA per kWh) 
Red 
 
Out of credit 
Orange 
 
Almost out of credit 
Intermittent green  
 
Low price (250 FCFA per kWh) 
Intermittent red  
 
High price  (560 FCFA per kWh) 
 
 
 
 
3) Card reader (See image below) 
 
 
FIGURE	2	METER	ACTIVATION.	THE	PREPAID	CARD		
IS	USED	TO	TOP-UP	THE	METER	EACH	TIME	THE		
HOUSEHOLD	RUNS	OUT	OF	CREDIT	
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7.3 Other	expenditure	patterns	
 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show expenditure patterns per day of the month, day of the week and time 
of the day. Expenditures drop by the end of the month. In addition, as the mini-grid officially 
does not sell credit on Sundays, expenditures are higher on the day before and after. However, 
there as still substantial expenditures occurring on Sunday. As far as time of the day is concern 
the bulk of expenditures occur in the evening right before closing hours. This is probably due 
to the fact that at this time demand for electricity increases. Also by the end of the day the is 
more money available.   
 
	
FIGURE	3	TOTAL	AMOUNT	SPENT	PER	DAY	OF	MONTH	(FCFA)	
 
 
 
FIGURE	4	TOTAL	AMOUNT	SPENT	PER	DAY	(FCFA)	
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FIGURE	5	TOTAL	AMOUNT	SPENT	PER	TIME	OF	DAY	(FCFA)	
 
 
Table 2 presents the average expenditure in Bambadinca for electricity and electricity 
substitutes prior to the commencement of the mini-grid service (elicited in the survey presented 
in Chapter 3). Current average monthly electricity expenditure (10,146 FCFA) is lower than 
the previous average monthly expenditure of households for electricity substitutes and 
electricity combined (11,295 FCFA) and much lower than it used to be for electricity (Badora, 
frequent use of generators) (29,563 FCFA). 
However, the average expenditure of household previously using only electricity 
substitutes (e.g. battery powered lamps, candles etc.), which is the grand majority of 
Bambadinca, was lower (7,591 FCFA).  
This indicates that overall the mini-grid service has not drastically increased the 
previous expenditure patterns for energy for the population of Bambadinca. However, the idea 
that access to electrification can lead to a reduction in expenditure compared to previous 
spending patterns is not confirmed for the case of cheap electricity substitutes.  
 
	
TABLE	2	AVERAGE	MONTHLY	EXPENDITURE	IN	BAMBADINCA	FOR	ELECTRICITY	AND	SUBSITUTES	PRIOR	TO	THE	
SERVICE	
 General population Clients 
Households connected to Badora 
or using generators frequently 
(FCFA) 
29,563 29,067 
Household only using electricity 
substitutes (FCFA) 
7,591 8,581 
All households (FCFA) 11,295  
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7.4 Survey	draft	
 
Note to interviewer: Ask: “Who makes the financial decisions and decisions regarding the 
electricity in this household? Can I talk to this person?”. If not available ask: “When can I come 
back to talk to that person?”.  
If you can not talk to this person, especially if that person does not want to be interviewed, or 
if anyone else in this family prefers to answer this questionnaire, try to insist that the 
participation of this person in this questionnaire is very important to us. 
 
After that communicate the following information: 
 
We are conducting a survey in your community that is part of a research initiative carried out 
by a PhD student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, a university in 
London, in partnership with ‘TESE’ an NGO working in Guinea-Bissau on infrastructural 
projects, including energy. The purpose of the questionnaire is to study the community energy 
service of Bambadinca. 
These questions should take around 30 minutes to complete. 
 
Your answers will be strictly confidential and will not be shared with anyone else. Answers will only be 
used anonymously for research purposes.  
 
Participation is voluntary you can refuse to participate without providing any explanation and without any 
consequences. If you agree to participate in the survey you have the right to stop whenever you want.  
 
Your participation is very important to us. We will use the information that you and other families give us to better 
understand the factors affecting the success of the community energy project, for the advancement of academic 
knowledge. This knowledge could serve future energy policies in Guinea-Bissau.  
 
Do you have any questions? May I continue interviewing you?  
 
Your response will have no influence over the way the energy service is being offered to you 
(tariffs etc.)  
It is very important that you give honest answers, not over or under state the answers, as if the 
information we collect is not true, the outputs of the survey will not be beneficial to your community 
or Guinea-Bissau. 
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Which family member decides about the service 
repayments 
 
Which family member pays for the service 
repayments 
 
Client number  
Client name  
Name of respondent  
What is the gender of the respondent? Female  
Male 
What is your principal economic activity? 
(Note to interviewer: you can note more than 
one) 
Public servants. Specify ______________ 
Private employees. Specify ___________ 
Services/ Commerce. Specify _________ 
Agriculture. Specify_________________    
Fishing. Specify ____________________  
Animals. Specify ___________________ 
Other. Specify ______________________  
 
How many people live in this household 
including you? By household I mean all 
individuals who normally live and eat their 
meals together in this household and share their 
expenses. 
(Note to interviewer: Here in order to make sure 
we get the right response make sure to make a 
short conversation about what the relationship 
of each member is to the respondent. Example: 
Begin by asking who else lives here) 
 
What is the ethnicity of the household? Fula  
Mandinga  
Balanta  
Beafada 
Papel 
Cabo-verdiana 
Other. Specify_____________ 
 
What is your age? 
(Note to interviewer: If they don’t know their 
age or if they seem to be giving you the wrong 
answer take a note of the age they seem to have. 
As a clue, ask them what is the age of their eldest 
son) 
 
What is your education level? No schooling 
Primary schooling  
Secondary schooling  
Superior schooling 
Other. Specify________ 
	 270	
 
Did your household use the Badora service 
before connecting to the service of ‘Bambadinca 
Sta Claro’?  
 
Did your household use a generator regularly 
before connecting to the service of ‘Bambadinca 
Sta Claro’?  
 
When you have money available are you 
pressured to share it with people inside your 
household?  
Not at all 
A little bit 
A lot 
Which family member saves to meet 
repayments for the services? 
 
Which family member decides about other 
family expenditures apart from electricity? 
 
 
 
 
Time	preference	questions	
 
Note to interviewer: Introduce by saying: “I will ask you to answer some hypothetical questions 
regarding your preferences for receiving money in different times”:  
Current	trade-offs	
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 1,500 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 2,000 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 2,500 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
Today 
In a month 
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If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 3,000 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer?  
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 3,500 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer?  
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 4,000 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 4,500 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 5,000 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 8,000 FCFA guaranteed in 
1 month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘Today’ otherwise stop and 
move to the following page) 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed today, or 12,000 FCFA guaranteed 
in 1 month, what would you prefer? 
Today 
In a month 
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Future	trade-offs	
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 1,500 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 2,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 2,500 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 3,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 3,500 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 4,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 4,500 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
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(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 5,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 8,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
(Note to interviewer: Continue asking only if 
answer above is ‘12 months’ otherwise stop and 
conclude the interview) 
 
If someone offered you to receive 1,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 12 months, or 12,000 FCFA 
guaranteed in 13 months what would you prefer? 
12 months 
13 months 
 
 
	
 
What is the gender of the household head? Male 
Female 
How many household members are between 
0-16 years old? 
 
Do you have children that are currently 
attending school? 
Yes 
No 
What is the principal economic activity of 
your household? 
(Note to interviewer: you can note more than 
one) 
Public servants. Specify ______________ 
Private employees. Specify ___________ 
Services/ Commerce. Specify _________ 
Agriculture. Specify_________________    
Fishing. Specify ____________________  
Animals. Specify ___________________ 
Other. Specify ______________________  
 
Does any member of the family receive a 
fixed salary? 
Yes 
No 
Is your household negatively affected during 
the months when there is less income 
availability in the community? (August, 
September, October) 
Not at all 
A little bit 
A lot 
 
Does your household receive money from 
abroad? 
Yes 
No 
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Energy	use	questions	
 
Do you use lamps in your household?  (Note 
to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many lamps do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
lamps?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer 
to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use televisions in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
How many televisions do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
televisions?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use fans in your household?  (Note to 
interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many fans do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
fans?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer to 
report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use fridges in your household?  (Note 
to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
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How many fridges do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
fridges?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer 
to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use computers in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
How many computers do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
computers?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use electric irons in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
How many electric irons do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
electric irons?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use satellite dishes in your household?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
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How many satellite dishes do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
satellite dishes?     (Note to interviewer:  if 
they prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use DVDs in your household?  (Note 
to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many DVDs do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
DVDs?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer 
to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use Mobile chargers in your 
household?  (Note to interviewer: If 
‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
How many Mobile chargers do you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
mobile chargers?     (Note to interviewer:  if 
they prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
Do you use radios powered by electricity in 
your household?  (Note to interviewer: If 
‘No’ move to the next page) 
Yes 
No 
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How many radios powered by electricity do 
you use? 
 
 
How many hours per day do you use these 
radios?     (Note to interviewer:  if they prefer 
to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
 
Does your household use other equipment?  
(Note to interviewer: If ‘No’ move to the next 
page) 
Yes 
No 
Specify 
 
 
Quantity  
How many hours per day do you use these 
equipment?     (Note to interviewer:  if they 
prefer to report per week take a note) 
Per Day  ____________________ 
Per Week  ____________________ 
Other  ____________________ 
Don’t use  
Can’t tell  
 
 
 
 
 
To you use the service for income generating 
activities? 
Yes 
No 
If ‘Yes’ what type of activities? Light 
Fridge 
Other 
With what frequency do you undertake these 
activities? 
Per day 
Per week 
Other 
Are there months that you need more electricity?  
If ‘Yes’ what are these months?  
Are there months that you need less electricity?  
If ‘Yes’ what are these months?  
How often are you left without credit in you 
meter because you are unable to pay? 
Never 
Rarely 
Often 
How often are you left without credit in you 
meter because the mini-grid station is closed? 
Never 
Rarely 
Often 
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How often do you use the service between 12am 
and 9am?  
Never 
Rarely 
Sometimes 
Always 
 
 
 
Questions	for	the	interviewer	
 
In your opinion what is the income level of this 
household? 
High income 
Medium income 
Poor  
Very poor 
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Chapter	6		
Conclusions		
 
This thesis demonstrates that even in the context of rural Guinea-Bissau with a population 
facing severe income constraints there is high demand for electrification. This demand can be 
untapped with the right delivery models and payment methods particularly as lump sum costs, 
seem to constitute one of the biggest barriers to adoption and proper repayment.  
Chapter 2 shows how credit and rental schemes can significantly increase adoption of 
solar home systems, Chapter 3 shows that proximity to the grid which significantly reduces the 
variable costs of connection leads to increased connections. Chapter 3 also indicates that 
despite the high demand there was almost no connections (in the first year of operation) 
amongst the poorest income group and Chapter 5 demonstrates that prepayment for electricity 
allows individuals to address income constraints and to finance their electricity consumption 
through small-scale income generating activities. This last finding points to the 
recommendation that rental and credit schemes for relevant appliances should be considered in 
these contexts to encourage income generating activities.  
One of the motivations of this thesis is to test if certain findings from behavioural 
economics and the social capital literature, namely regarding the role of discounting anomalies 
on technology adoption and the role of trust for technology adoption, can apply in the case of 
electrification access in developing countries. This is in order to enrich our understanding of 
the barriers and drivers of electrification access in developing countries.  
Income constraints seem to pose the main and most common barrier on adoption and 
to define energy using patterns. However, some of the findings suggest that electrification 
access can be informed by non-standard models of behaviour.  
Chapter 2 provides some evidence that individuals exhibiting hyperbolic preferences 
have a preference for credit schemes. One explanation behind this is that credit is preferred by 
individuals with hyperbolic preferences as they see it as a form of commitment.  In addition, 
lack of trust for actors within the community leads to a lower preference for delivery models 
that entail monthly repayments (credit and rental). This is possibly due to the lack of a social 
structure to rely upon in case one is unable to meet the monthly repayments.   
Chapter 3 demonstrates that social capital as expressed in trust for ones’ neighbours, 
has a positive effect on connections through the informal expansion of the grid, whereby 
households use their neighbour’s infrastructure to connect to the service and reduce their 
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upfront costs of connection. Trust for one’s neighbours is understood to play a positive role in 
the informal expansion of the grid as neighbours need to come to an agreement to share the 
associated costs or to allow each other to use their infrastructure.  
Chapter 5 demonstrates that prepayment for electricity can help individuals with self-
control problems manage their electricity consumption by choosing smaller refill amounts. A 
similar pattern is observed for individuals facing an additional time-varying tariff (a higher 
tariff between 7pm and 12 am).  
Another objective of this thesis is to demonstrate if and how electrification access case 
studies can help to strengthen empirical findings from other contexts. 
Chapter 2 confirms a number of findings from the discounting literature that observes 
the actual choices of consumers between different energy consuming products in order to infer 
implicit discount rates (e.g. Revelt & Train, 1998; Hauseman, 1979; Allcott & Wozny 2014). 
By observing consumer trade-offs between different intertemporal payments this study shows 
the validity of these methods and the replicability of the findings (high discount rates and the 
systematic variation of discount rates between different time intervals and between different 
individuals) in the context of demand for different delivery models of SHS.  
Chapter 4 also confirms certain findings from other contexts regarding the accuracy of 
expenditure reporting in surveys (higher accuracy with the use of the ‘specific’ period), but 
also finds some differences (general over-reporting instead of under-reporting of expenditure 
found in other studies) (Beegle et al., 2012; Angrisani et al., 2015). In addition, this chapter 
proposes the use of energy expenditures as a general case study to test the effect of different 
aspects of survey design on expenditure elicitation by using real expenditure information as a 
comparison. This is because in contrast to other recurring household expenditure, information 
on real energy expenditure is becoming increasingly available to researchers, both in developed 
and developing countries (e.g. Brutscher, 2011; Qiu et al., 2016; Jack & Smith, 2016).  
This thesis is hoping to motivate interest for future research. The use of larger sample 
sizes and opportunities for field experiments in future studies can help confirm and explore 
further some of the findings of this research, but also to look at other issues pertinent to 
electrification access.  
For example, test other aspects of survey design and theories of response strategies. 
Explore more fully the effects of prepayment for electricity by testing the role of information, 
price effects and nudging. As well as explore in more detail the effects of time-varying tariffs 
(e.g. randomize across a bigger range of time-varying tariffs). Explore the effects on demand 
of other characteristics of delivery models for electricity (e.g. weekly repayments, flexible 
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repayments) and how they interact with individual characteristics and to study the effect of 
these on actual repayment patterns. And finally, isolate the different potential channels through 
which peer effects can impact electrification. 
New opportunities will arise in the future as detailed information on electricity use 
patterns will become increasingly available with the increased take-up of smart technologies.  
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Images	from	the	field	
	
	
	
FIGURE	1	THE	BAFATÁ	CITY	POWER	PLANT	THAT	USED	TO	ELECTRIFY	THE	WHOLE	REGION	NOW	OPERATES	WITHIN	
THE	LIMITS	OF	BAFATÁ	CITY	
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FIGURE	2	NIGHT	IMAGE	OF	THE	CITY	OF	BAFATÁ	WHEN	THE	POWER	PLANT	IS	NOT	OPERATING	
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FIGURE	3	A	SOLAR	HOME	SYSTEM	INSTALLED	ON	THE	ROOF	OF	A	HOUSEHOLD	(LOCATED	IN	A	VILLAGE	IN	THE	
REGION	OF	BAFATÁ)	
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FIGURE	4	A	HOUSEHOLD	USING	A	SOLAR	HOME	SYSTEM	IN	A	VILLAGE	IN	THE	BAFATÁ	REGION	
	OFFERS	MOBILE	CHARGING	SERVICES	TO	NEIGHBOURS	
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FIGURE	5	DIFFERENT	TYPES	OF	DWELLINGS	IN	BAMBADINCA:	ZINC	ROOFS	INDICATE	A	HIGHER	INCOME	LEVEL	
THAN	ROOFS	MADE	OF	STRAW	
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FIGURE	6	ABANDONED	INFRASTRUCTURE	IN	BAMBADINCA	THAT	WAS	LATTER	INCORPORATED	TO	THE	MAIN	GRID	
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FIGURE	7	INSTALLATION	OF	THE	SOLAR	PANELS	IN	THE	MINI-GRID	STATION	IN	BAMBADINCA	
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FIGURE	8	CONSTRUCTION	OF	THE	MAIN	GRID	IN	BAMBADINCA	
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FIGURE	9	IMAGE	OF	A	NEIGHBOURHOOD	OF	BAMBADINCA	WITH	THE	MAIN	GRID	IN	PLACE	
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 291	
FIGURE	10	THE	MINI-GRID	STATION	IN	BAMBADINCA	
 
 
 
FIGURE	11	ENTRANCE	OF	THE	MINI-GRID	STATION	IN	BAMBADINCA	
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FIGURE	12	METER	INSTALLED	WITHIN	THE	HOUSEHOLD	OF	A	CLIENT	OF	THE	SERVICE	IN	BAMBADINCA.	THE	
GREEN	LIGHT	INDICATES	THAT	THE	CHEAPEST	TARIFF	IS	BEING	CHARGED	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
